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ABSTRACT
Strategic Pricing in Service Industries
by
Yao Cui
Co-Chairs: Izak Duenyas, Ozge Sahin
This dissertation studies several strategic-level pricing decisions of firms that are
motivated by recent changes of pricing policies in several service industries. It consists
of three essays, each analyzing a different problem of selecting the optimal pricing
policy for firms in a certain service industry. All three essays contribute to the
arising areas of strategic-level revenue management and consumer-driven operations
management.
The first essay studies whether preventing resale of tickets benefits the ticket
providers for sporting and entertainment events. Different from what common wis-
dom may suggest, I find that this event organizers can benefit from reductions in
consumers’ (and speculators’) transaction costs of resale in many cases. Further, I
propose ticket options (where consumers would initially purchase an option to buy a
ticket and then exercise at a later date) as a novel ticket pricing policy, and show that
ticket options naturally reduce ticket resale and increase event organizers’ revenues.
The second essay studies a conditional upgrade strategy that has recently become
common in the travel industry. A consumer can accept a conditional upgrade offer
after making a reservation and pay the fee to upgrade at check-in if the higher-quality
xii
product type is still available. I identify multiple benefits of conditional upgrades
including demand expansion, price correction, and risk management. Moreover, I
find that using conditional upgrades can generate higher revenues than having the
ability to optimize product prices and use dynamic pricing.
The third essay studies the firm’s strategic decision of whether to bundle the an-
cillary service (e.g., baggage delivery) into the main service (e.g., air travel) or to
unbundle and charge separate prices. I find that a firm that can price-discriminate
when selling the main service should unbundle the ancillary service because con-
sumers’ likelihoods of purchasing the ancillary service are low, or a large proportion
of consumers are myopic instead of forward-looking, or the firm is dependent on inter-
mediaries to make sales. I also find that the firm’s ability to price-discriminate when
selling the main service reverses some classic bundling results for a uniform-pricing
firm.
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CHAPTER I
Introduction
Traditionally, research in the area of revenue management has focused on using
models with exogenous demand to optimize firms’ pricing decisions on the tactical
level. The key question to answer has been what price to charge. This dissertation
applies the idea of revenue management to firms’ strategic-level pricing decisions. The
key question to answer is what pricing policy to use. In the three essays included in
this dissertation, I study three of firm’s optimal pricing policy selection problems in
the contexts of different service industries. The research questions are motivated by
recent changes of pricing policies in these industries, and the goal of this dissertation
is to provide firms with insights about innovating their pricing policies in the right
directions. When choosing the right pricing policy, it is important for firms to take the
consumer response into consideration. I use economic models and consumer-driven
operations management models to capture the strategic interactions between firms
and consumers.
In the first essay, I am interested in whether preventing resale of tickets bene-
fits the capacity providers for sporting and entertainment events. Common wisdom
suggests that ticket resale is harmful to event organizers’ revenues and event orga-
nizers have tried to prevent resale of tickets. For instance, Ticketmaster has recently
proposed paperless (non-transferrable) ticketing which would severely limit the op-
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portunity to resell tickets. I consider a model that allows resale from both consumers
and speculators with different transaction costs for each party. Surprisingly, I find
that this wisdom is incorrect when event organizers use fixed pricing policies, in fact
event organizers benefit from reductions in consumers’ (and speculators’) transaction
costs of resale. Even when multiperiod pricing policies are used, I find that an event
organizer may still benefit from ticket resale if his capacity is small. While paperless
ticketing is suggested as a way to reduce ticket resale and prevent speculators from
buying tickets, my results suggest that it may reduce the capacity providers’ revenues
in many situations. Instead, I propose ticket options as a novel ticket pricing mech-
anism. I show that ticket options (where consumers would initially buy an option to
buy a ticket and then exercise at a later date) naturally reduce ticket resale signifi-
cantly and result in significant increases in event organizers’ revenues. Furthermore,
since a consumer only risks the option price (and not the whole ticket price) if she
cannot attend the event, options may face less consumer resistance than paperless
tickets.
In the second essay, I study a conditional upgrade strategy that has recently
become very common in the travel industry. After a consumer makes a reservation
for a product (e.g., a hotel room), she is asked whether she would like to upgrade
her product to a more expensive one at a discounted price. The upgrade, however, is
not fulfilled immediately. The firm fulfills upgrades at check-in if there are still more
expensive products available, and the upgrade fee is only charged to the consumer if
she gets upgraded. Consumers decide which product type to book and whether to
accept an upgrade offer or not based on the anticipated upgrade probability. I model
the consumers’ decisions using a Poisson-arrival game framework with incomplete
information and prove the existence of Bayesian Nash equilibrium. To further study
the firm’s optimal upgrade pricing strategy and develop managerial insights, I also
analyze a fluid model which is the asymptotic version of the stochastic model. My
2
numerical studies validate that my theoretical results derived from the fluid model
carry through to the stochastic model.
My analysis identifies multiple benefits of conditional upgrades. First, the firm
is able to capture more demand by offering conditional upgrades, i.e., the consumers
who value original product types lower than the original prices but value higher-
quality products higher than the discounted price with upgrades. Second, conditional
upgrades enable the firm to improve its market segmentation by inducing more con-
sumers to purchase higher-quality products. Third, conditional upgrades give the
firm more flexibility in better matching fixed capacities to stochastic demands. For
a firm that is a price taker in the market, offering conditional upgrades is effective
in compensating for the firm’s lack of ability in setting its prices optimally, and can
sometimes generate even higher revenues than being able to optimize product prices.
For a firm that has the ability to optimize product prices, conditional upgrades can
generate higher revenues than dynamic pricing.
In the third essay, I consider a setting where the firm sells a main service (e.g.,
air travel) as well as an ancillary service (e.g., baggage delivery) to two types of
consumers with different valuations (e.g., business travelers and leisure travelers). I
study the firm’s strategic decision of whether to bundle the ancillary service into the
main service and charge a single price, or to unbundle and charge separate prices. I
consider both a firm that price-discriminates when selling the main service and a firm
that charges a uniform main service price. For a price-discriminating firm, I find that
it may be more profitable to unbundle the ancillary service for the following three
cases: 1) consumers’ likelihoods of purchasing the ancillary service are low, 2) a large
proportion of consumers are myopic (i.e., they do not consider future purchase of the
ancillary service when purchasing the main service in advance) instead of forward-
looking (i.e., considering future utilities), 3) the firm is dependent on intermediaries
to make sales.
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Moreover, I study how the firm’s ability to price-discriminate when selling the
main service affects the optimal strategy for the ancillary service. For a uniform-
pricing firm, it is optimal to unbundle the ancillary service if the consumers that
value the main service higher have a high enough likelihood of purchasing the ancil-
lary service. However, for a price-discriminating firm, it is optimal to unbundle the
ancillary service if the consumers that value the main service higher have a low enough
likelihood of purchasing the ancillary service. The ability to price-discriminate when
selling the main service makes bundling (unbundling) more likely to be the optimal
ancillary service strategy when consumers’ valuations for the main service and the an-
cillary service are positively (negatively) correlated. Finally, I characterize how firms’
use of main service price discrimination and consumers’ valuation structure (i.e., the
correlation between consumers’ valuations for the main service and the ancillary ser-
vice) jointly determine the ancillary service pricing strategies in an industry.
4
CHAPTER II
Should Event Organizers Prevent Resale of
Tickets?
2.1 Introduction
Consumer resale behavior plays an important role in ticket sales of concerts and
sporting events. For live music and sporting events, ticket sales in the primary markets
generate $20 billion per year in the US. On the other hand, resale markets generate
$3 billion each year in the US, and this number is expected to grow over the next
several years (Mulpuru et al., 2008). For popular concerts, the resale market revenue
can be as much as 37% of the primary market revenue, and 46% of the resale activity
is generated by consumers (Leslie and Sorensen, 2011). Consumer resale is prevalent
in event ticket sales for the following reasons. First, event capacity providers make
tickets available early in advance to satisfy the needs of those highly dedicated fans
who want to secure the rights to attend the events they are interested in (Courty ,
2003a and Moe et al., 2011). Second, event tickets are usually transferrable. Third,
most tickets are non-refundable and consumers purchasing event tickets usually have
high valuation uncertainties. A sports fan may not know whether her favorite team
will get into the final game or not when she buys the ticket for it. A consumer may
also find the event conflicting with some other appointment of higher priority after
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she buys the ticket. In addition to consumer resale, there may be speculators who
purchase tickets solely for the purpose of reselling later hopefully at a higher price.1
A consumer who cannot attend the event can resell the ticket directly to another
consumer or through a broker, among which StubHub, eBay, RazorGator are major
players. Brokers obtain profits by charging transaction fees that can be as high as
25% of the ticket resale value to the seller and the buyer. The development of on-
line transactions on the Internet has provided more opportunities for such brokers to
thrive. No matter how consumers resell their tickets, traditionally the perception is
that resale (secondary) markets are bad for the event organizers and ticket distribu-
tors and need to be prevented. As the largest ticket sales and distribution company in
the US, Ticketmaster attempted to prevent resale of tickets by influencing ticketing
legislation. The battle between firsthand ticket sellers and brokers has produced two
nonprofit groups (Sisario, 2011). The Fans First Coalition, financed by Live Nation
Entertainment which is the parent company of Ticketmaster, supports paperless tick-
eting. On the other hand, The Fan Freedom Project, financed by StubHub, supports
the use of paper tickets. Paperless ticketing works like an airline e-ticket, with no
traditional ticket printed when a customer places an order. Instead, a fan shows his
credit card at the box office to enter the event, guaranteeing that the person who orig-
inally placed the order is the same one attending the event. Paperless ticketing is an
instrument to make the tickets non-transferrable while paper tickets are transferrable.
However, in 2010, Ticketmaster failed to prevent a change to New York’s scalping law
which required that consumers have the option for transferrable tickets. So far, there
is no federal regulation regarding event ticket resale in the US. Some states restrict
resale, but anti-scalping laws are rarely enforced. In 2010, non-transferrable tickets
made up only 0.01 percent of all the tickets Ticketmaster processed (Rovell , 2011).
Moreover, it is not clear when and under what conditions resale markets are harmful
1Speculators can be thought as consumers with zero valuations for attending the event.
6
to event capacity providers, as many college athletics departments have recently part-
nered with brokers to create fan-to-fan ticket exchange marketplaces and encouraged
their fans to use these platforms to resell their tickets.
There are two major goals of event capacity providers in order to maximize revenue
in this challenging environment: first, tie prices to demand; second, capture the
revenues from the resale markets. Indeed, Nathan Hubbard, the CEO of Ticketmaster,
said that 2010 taught them they have real challenges as an industry and one of them
is pricing (Smith, 2011). While the level of analytics and technology in event revenue
management is far behind travel and retail revenue management, in recent years, event
capacity providers started to use multiperiod pricing (i.e., changing the ticket price
over time) which has been used by airlines for 30 years. For example, Ticketmaster
has partnered with MarketShare to bring multiperiod pricing to events.2 The event
capacity providers are hoping that rather than fixed pricing (i.e., keeping the same
ticket price over time) which was used as the major pricing strategy, a more flexible
pricing strategy can help them capture more of the revenue potential, especially the
revenue generated by the resale markets. Recent dynamics of the event ticketing
industry and the resale markets motivate my research questions: (i) How does ticket
resale affect the event capacity providers’ prices and revenues (i.e., is resale harmful
to event capacity providers?), and ii) Which pricing strategy is more effective in
capturing the resale market revenues?
Period 1: tickets Period 1: ticket options
Price fixed over time Fixed pricing (Section 2.4) N/A
Price changes over time Multiperiod pricing (Section 2.5) Ticket options (Section 2.6)
Table 2.1: Pricing strategies studied in this essay
To answer these questions, I study whether an event capacity provider is indeed
harmed by or in fact can benefit from resale of tickets from consumers as well as
2According to LiveAnalytics (March 3, 2012 MIT Sports Analytics Conference Presentation),
57% of NBA, 50% of MLB, 37% of NHL teams use multiperiod pricing.
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speculators under different pricing strategies. As described by Table 2.1, I consider
whether the capacity provider keeps the price fixed over the selling period (fixed pric-
ing) or can change the price (multiperiod pricing) and whether the capacity provider
actually sells tickets or ticket options in period 1 (clearly, if the capacity provider
sells ticket options initially but tickets later, the prices over time cannot be fixed).
Fixed pricing is the pricing mechanism used by most college athletics departments
and concert organizers, and multiperiod pricing has started to be used by professional
sports teams. I find that the capacity provider’s optimal revenue from fixed pricing
increases when ticket resale is easier for either consumers or speculators, and paperless
(non-transferrable) ticketing actually hurts the capacity provider’s revenue. Under
multiperiod pricing, when the provider’s capacity is small, similar to fixed pricing,
he benefits from consumer resale. On the other hand, if an event capacity provider
uses multiperiod pricing and his capacity is large, then he indeed may benefit from
making tickets non-transferrable. Finally, motivated by recent industry practice, I
study ticket options that are offered by OptionIt. When an event capacity provider
sells options, the consumer pays a fee to get an option to buy a ticket later, and
she pays an execution fee when she finally buys the ticket. An advantage to the
consumer is that if the consumer cannot attend the event, she only loses the option
fee instead of the whole ticket price. I show that options generate higher revenues
for event capacity providers by significantly reducing ticket resale and capturing the
resale market revenues. However, the capacity provider improves revenues further
if tickets are non-transferrable under option pricing. My numerical results indicate
that while switching to selling options from multiperiod pricing results in a large
revenue increase, making tickets non-transferrable in addition does not result in a
revenue increase that is as significant. Therefore, the revenue gains from switching to
selling options can be very significant for event capacity providers. Thus, this essay
offers a different route to increasing revenues and shrinking the resale market (than
8
non-transferrable tickets) that is likely to generate less adverse consumer reaction.
2.2 Literature Review
This essay is related to the general revenue management literature (see Talluri and
van Ryzin, 2005 for a review). In particular, the advance pricing literature, Gale and
Holmes (1993), DeGraba (1995), Dana (1998), Shugan and Xie (2000), is relevant
to event ticket sales. However, these papers assume tickets are non-transferrable and
there is no secondary market. There is not much literature in operations management
that deals with issues regarding event ticket pricing in particular. To my knowledge,
this essay is one of the very few works that study event ticket pricing (Su, 2010,
Balseiro et al., 2011, Tereyagoglu et al., 2012) and the first one that studies the
consumer resale behavior in the context of event ticket pricing (perishable product
pricing).
Streams of economics and marketing literature investigate several aspects of the
ticket industry. Table 2.2 summarizes the papers, including this essay, that study
ticket resale and are closely related to event revenue management. Courty (2003b)
studies monopolistic ticket selling to consumers who learn new information about their
demands over time. He assumes no capacity constraint and shows that rationing and
inter-temporal sales are never optimal. He also shows that the monopolist cannot
do strictly better by allowing resale. I assume the provider has limited capacity and
the resellers incur resale transaction costs, and study how the capacity level and the
resale transaction cost influence the provider’s optimal pricing decisions. Moreover,
I study a general ticket options model and show that options help event capacity
providers capture more resale market revenues. Leslie and Sorensen (2011) study a
similar problem empirically and find that while consumer resale improves allocative
efficiency, some of the welfare gain from reallocation is offset by increases in efforts
and transaction costs in the resale market. Moller and Watanabe (2010) briefly study
9
consumer resale with price commitment and with period 1 arrivals only. They show
that the relative profitability of clearance sales with respect to advance purchase
discounts increases with resale.
Geng et al. (2007) study a two-period model where the capacity provider changes
the price in period 2 (multiperiod pricing) and assume consumers are only allowed
to resell before the capacity provider’s price change (they call this pricing scheme
“partial resale”). In contrast, in this essay, I assume that initially tickets can only
be sold by the capacity provider, but after a later date, tickets are also available
from the secondary market till the event takes place (currently it is possible to buy
a ticket from StubHub only a few hours before the start of an event). Furthermore,
Geng et al. (2007) assume no resale transaction cost. In contrast, I am interested in
whether increases in the resale transaction cost benefit or hurt the capacity provider.
These differences in modeling lead to different conclusions. For example, Geng et al.
(2007) predict that resale before the price change is beneficial to the capacity provider
only if he sells advance tickets at a premium. If advance tickets are discounted, they
find that resale should not be allowed. I find that premium advance selling is not
an equilibrium if resale occurs till event takes place, and the only equilibrium is
discounted advance selling. Finally, I also study ticket resale in the context of fixed
pricing and option pricing, in addition to multiperiod pricing. Therefore, the focus
and the insights of this essay are different.
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There is also a stream of literature on ticket scalping and speculative behavior.
Different from consumer resale, speculators purchase tickets solely for the purpose
of reselling later hopefully at a higher price. Courty (2003a) provides a survey of
this literature. Karp and Perloff (2005) assume scalpers are able to perfectly price
discriminate and extract maximal consumer surplus. Therefore, they find that specu-
lators do not reduce and may increase monopoly profits when their transaction costs
are low under multiperiod pricing. I find that if the speculators cannot perfectly price
discriminate and consumer resale is possible, speculator resale is never beneficial to
the capacity provider under multiperiod pricing. Different from Karp and Perloff
(2005), Su (2010) captures the possibility that scalpers may incur a loss (e.g., if de-
mand turns out to be weak). He finds that the presence of speculators increases the
firm’s expected profits from fixed pricing but does not change the profits if dynamic
pricing is used. This essay is complementary to Su (2010), as I study resale from
both consumers and speculators. I show that while his finding regarding speculator
resale remains true for consumer resale as well if fixed pricing is used, consumer re-
sale can sometimes be a benefit to the capacity provider when multiperiod pricing
is used. Under multiperiod pricing, consumer resale can create competition in the
secondary market and drive down the capacity provider’s price, but it also increases
consumers’ willingness to pay in the advance selling period. Thus, consumer resale
can sometimes be beneficial to the capacity provider. On the other hand, speculator
resale is never beneficial and may even decrease the revenues of the provider under
multiperiod pricing. Therefore, interestingly, I find that effects of consumer resale and
speculator resale on provider revenues are not identical. Moreover, unlike previous
papers, I allow consumers to have inter-temporal valuation uncertainties, and allow
both consumers and speculators to incur transaction costs for ticket resale. Finally,
for the first time in the literature, I show that ticket options result in higher revenues
for event capacity providers than fixed and multiperiod pricing due to significant
12
reduction of the resale markets.
Finally, there are a few papers that study options for services. Xie and Gerst-
ner (2007) show that a capacity-constrained service provider can profit from offering
partial refunds for service cancellations. Selling ticket options is similar to allowing
service cancellations, with the advance price equal to the sum of the option price and
the execution fee, and the refund equal to the execution fee. However, in Xie and
Gerstner (2007), the refund is set upon receiving a cancellation notification. With
ticket options, the service provider commits to the refund upfront as he pre-announces
both the option price and the execution fee. It is easy to show that commitment re-
sults in higher profits. More importantly, my focus is the benefit of tickets options in
capturing the resale market revenues. Xie and Shugan (2001) show that with infinite
capacity, advance selling with refund is more profitable than both advance selling
without refund and spot selling. Gallego and Sahin (2010) study real options with
limited capacity. They show that the capacity provider earns significantly higher
revenues by selling real options on capacity than low-to-high pricing. Similarly, Bal-
seiro et al. (2011) show that offering team-based options for sporting events benefits
the provider and the consumers. Sainam et al. (2010) find that consumer options
can protect consumers from the downside risk related to uncertain outcomes and
enhance seller profits by enabling superior market segmentation and increasing con-
sumer willingness to pay. They empirically demonstrate that consumer willingness to
pay increases and profits from option pricing can exceed those from advance selling
and spot selling. However, none of these papers considers consumer or speculator
resale in secondary markets. My main focus is how resale markets and transaction
costs affect the capacity providers’ revenues and optimal pricing strategies. I am
interested in whether the capacity provider has an incentive to prevent ticket resale
under different pricing strategies where pricing with ticket options is one of these
strategies. I show that the capacity provider can significantly reduce resale hence
13
capture more resale market revenues with options, while under fixed and multiperiod
pricing, he has only limited control over resale markets.
2.3 Model
Consider an event capacity provider that sells his capacity C over two periods.
As in Courty (2003a), I “assume that the audience is composed only of two types of
consumers: ‘diehard fans,’ who plan their social calendars well in advance, and ‘busy
professionals,’ who make decisions at the last minute. This consumer characterization
does not suggest that busy professionals enjoy the event less than diehard fans, only
that these two market segments plan their social calendars differently. Indeed, a
consumer could qualify as a diehard fan for one event and as a busy professional for
another.” λ1 consumers arrive in period 1 to purchase advance tickets. λ2 consumers
arrive in period 2, who make their purchasing decisions at the last minute because
they may want to wait until some uncertainties in their schedules or regarding the
event are settled (e.g., a diehard soccer fan can buy a ticket for the World Cup final
without knowing who will be in the final; others will only buy if their country is
in the final). λ1 + λ2 measures the magnitude of the consumer base for the event.
In my analysis, I focus on the case of C < λ1 + λ2 which is the more realistic and
interesting scenario. When C ≥ λ1 + λ2, the prices decrease to the lowest possible
level vmin (i.e., consumer valuation lower bound) no matter which strategy is used
because the market is over-supplied. In that case, every pricing strategy results in
the same outcome.
Consumers have an ex ante i.i.d. valuation V which has a continuous support and
is bounded below by vmin > 0. Let F (·) and f(·) denote the cumulative distribution
function and probability density function of V , respectively. Without loss of gener-
ality, I assume that consumers arriving in different periods have the same valuation
distribution, my analysis can be easily generalized to the case where period 2 con-
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sumers’ valuations follow a different distribution.3 Consumers learn their valuations
at the beginning of period 2. If a period 1 consumer purchases an advance ticket, she
can either use the ticket to attend the event or resell it in period 2, depending on her
realized valuation. A period 1 consumer may also decide to postpone her purchasing
decision to period 2 when she gains more information about her valuation. In this
case, she can buy from either the capacity provider or the resale market. I assume
efficient rationing, i.e., given the same price, consumers who value the ticket the most
are served first and resellers who value the ticket the least make sales first. This
assumption is common in economics literature and is also made in papers studying
event ticketing such as Su (2010).
Consumers incur a transaction cost when they resell tickets. This transaction
cost can represent the commission paid to the broker and can also represent the
search or inconvenience cost when looking for the buyer. In reality, brokers charge
commissions which are typically percentages of the ticket resale prices. For example,
StubHub charges a 15% commission to the seller and a 10% commission to the buyer.
To make sales, the resellers have to reduce the resale price so that buyers find the
price competitive to the capacity provider’s price after paying the buyers’ commission.
Without loss of generality, I use a single transaction cost τ > 0 which is a percentage
of the resale price and define the resale price as the one in the case where only the
resellers pay the commission.4
Besides regular consumers who have a genuine interest in potentially attending
the event, I also allow an infinite pool of speculators who do not value attending
3All my results in Sections 2.4 - 2.6 hold and all my managerial insights remain valid if the
valuations of the two classes of consumers are different but both follow uniform or shifted exponential
distributions.
4To see the equivalence of using a single transaction cost and using separate transaction costs,
let r denote the resale price, and let τs and τb denote the transaction costs (as percentages) that the
broker charges to the seller and the buyer, respectively. With separate transaction costs, the actual
price resellers can charge is r/(1+τb), hence the net gain from resale is r(1−τs)/(1+τb). Thus, using
separate transaction costs is equivalent to using a single transaction cost of τ = 1− (1− τs)/(1+ τb).
For StubHub, this single transaction cost is equal to τ = 1− (1− 15%)/(1 + 10%) = 22.73%.
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the event but may purchase tickets in period 1 and resell tickets in period 2. Since
speculators only enter the market if the net payoff from resale is greater than the
capacity provider’s period 1 price, the number of speculators entering the market in
equilibrium is endogenously determined.5 I use τ ′ to denote the speculators’ resale
transaction cost and assume τ ′ ≤ τ to capture the fact that speculators usually
have less costly channels to resell tickets (e.g., speculators may not have to sell their
tickets through well-established brokers such as StubHub but create their own cheaper
channels to sell tickets directly to consumers).
The capacity provider’s goal is to maximize his revenue from selling his capacity
over two periods.6 To reflect the event ticketing industry practice, I assume that
the capacity provider makes tickets available in advance to satisfy the needs of those
highly dedicated fans who want to secure the rights to attend events they are in-
terested in (Courty , 2003a, Moe et al., 2011). (Under fixed pricing, in my model,
the capacity provider may increase his revenues even further by not allowing advance
sales, whereas under multiperiod or option pricing, advance sales can be endogenously
optimal. Note that it may not be realistic to sell event tickets only on the spot before
the event. For example, many college football fans travel from out of state to see their
team play. Last minute airfares and hotel prices are a lot more expensive typically.
Thus, if the capacity provider does not make tickets available in advance, these fans
may not attend the event.) I also assume the provider does not strategically hold
back capacity in either period. This is consistent with the practice of most college
sports teams, professional sports teams and artists as they intentionally offer all seats
available to maximize the entertainment value of the event which is highly correlated
with the size of the audience: the bigger the audience, the more enjoyable the expe-
5Without loss of generality, in the model I do not include arbitrageurs who buy tickets in period
2 and resell tickets immediately. Similarly, I do not allow period 2 consumers to buy and resell
tickets in period 2. It is easy to show that such behavior cannot occur in equilibrium.
6I ignore the variable cost because from a production standpoint, events have high fixed costs
and low variable costs (Connolly and Krueger , 2006).
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rience (Becker , 1991). In section 2.7.1, I study the case where the provider may hold
back part of his capacity in period 1 to sell in period 2 as a model extension.
I first study the pricing strategies that have been commonly used in practice by
event organizers. In Section 2.4, I study fixed pricing where the capacity provider
sells tickets at price pf throughout two periods. In Section 2.5, I study multiperiod
pricing where the capacity provider sells tickets at price p1 in period 1 and at price
p2 in period 2. The sequence of events is as follows. First, at the beginning of period
1, the capacity provider announces his advance ticket price. After that, period 1
consumers decide whether to purchase tickets immediately or wait, and speculators
decide whether to enter the market or not. Then, in period 2, after consumers realize
their valuations, the period 1 consumers who have purchased tickets decide whether
to resell or use them, and those choosing to resell the tickets as well as speculators
determine the resale price. If the capacity provider uses multiperiod pricing, he
determines his period 2 price at the same time. Figure 2.1 describes the period 1
consumers’ inter-temporal decision process and the payoff from each decision under
fixed and multiperiod pricing. A speculator’s decision process is a special case of
Figure 2.1 where V = 0 with probability one and the resale transaction cost is τ ′
instead of τ . Throughout this chapter, I add subscripts to the notations to specify
which pricing strategy I am considering: “f” for fixed pricing, “m” for multiperiod
pricing, “o” for ticket options.
As described above, my main interest is in the effect of ticket resale on the capacity
provider’s revenues where the capacity provider’s goal is to extract as much revenue
as possible while selling out the tickets to maximize the entertainment value of the
event. On the one hand, allowing resale (or a decrease in resale transaction costs) can
increase the value of tickets for consumers since consumers know that they have an
option to resell tickets if for some reason they cannot attend the event. On the other
hand, resale markets (as well as speculators buying tickets when resale is allowed)
17
Figure 2.1: Consumer choice model under fixed and multiperiod pricing
may increase competition with the capacity provider and may result in a decrease of
ticket revenues. This is the fundamental high-level tradeoff that I am interested in
and that I am going to analyze under fixed, multiperiod and option pricing in the
following sections.
2.4 Fixed Pricing
In this section, I study the fixed pricing strategy that has been commonly used
by event capacity providers such as college sports teams and concert organizers in
practice. My result here is that event capacity providers are always hurt by an increase
in the transaction costs that either consumers or speculators incur in reselling the
tickets, that is, an event capacity provider using fixed pricing prefers consumers and
speculators to be able to use resale markets with no transaction cost at all. To analyze
this case, I use backward induction to find the subgame perfect equilibrium of the
game between the capacity provider, consumers and speculators. More specifically,
I first characterize the equilibrium resale price in period 2, then characterize the
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purchasing decisions of consumers and speculators in period 1, and finally determine
the capacity provider’s optimal fixed price.
Theorem II.1. (i) The equilibrium resale price r∗f is given by [(λ1−C)++λ2)]F¯ (r∗f ) =
(C − λ1)+ + min(λ1, C)F ((1− τ)r∗f ).
(ii) Define ps as the solution to (λ1+λ2)F¯ (ps) = C and define p
n
f as the solution to
pnf +
∫∞
ps
(v− pnf ) dF (v) = E[max(V, (1− τ)r∗f )]. The capacity provider’s optimal fixed
price is p∗f = p
n
f if p
n
f ≥ (1− τ ′)ps and p∗f = min
(
E[max(V, (1− τ)r∗f )]−E(V − ps)+,
(1− τ ′)ps
)
otherwise. Moreover, p∗f < r
∗
f .
(iii) For a given τ , speculators enter the market in equilibrium if and only if
τ ′ < τ¯ ′f (τ) = 1− pnf/r∗f .
Theorem II.1 characterizes the equilibrium outcome under fixed pricing. Given
that a period 1 consumer obtains a ticket from the capacity provider, in period 2,
if her valuation is smaller than the net payoff from resale, (1 − τ)r∗f , she resells
the ticket; otherwise, she uses the ticket herself. Note that the equilibrium resale
price is higher than the capacity provider’s optimal fixed price. This price inflation
in resale markets close to event dates is often observed in reality,7 and is one of
the reasons event capacity providers are sometimes interested in eliminating resale
markets. However, as I will show in Theorem II.2 below, this would actually hurt
event capacity providers.
Theorem II.1(iii) states that speculators enter the market in equilibrium if their
resale transaction cost is small enough. In this case, speculators keep entering the
market in period 1 until the provider’s capacity is depleted, and they resell the tickets
in period 2 instead of the capacity provider at the resale price which is higher than
the capacity provider’s fixed price. This result provides one explanation for why we
see speculators in reality – their transaction cost to resell tickets is smaller than the
7In 2012, the average ticket resale price is $139.71 for the Southeastern Conference and $132.65
for the Big Ten Conference (Rovell , 2012) which is almost double the original ticket price.
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transaction cost incurred by regular consumers. A reduced transaction cost to resell
tickets gives speculators an advantage and makes speculators more likely to enter the
market.
On the other hand, if speculators’ resale transaction cost is large enough so that
their willingness to pay for advance tickets is lower than regular consumers, by charg-
ing a price higher than speculators’ willingness to pay, the capacity provider may shut
speculators out of the market. Of course, in many events where the capacity provider
uses fixed pricing, we see speculators and they are not shut out of the market. A sec-
ond reason for speculators’ existence may be underpricing by event capacity providers.
Note that in my model, if τ ′ ≥ τ¯ ′f (τ), the capacity provider can shut speculators out
of the market if he uses “optimal” pricing. However, it is not clear that event capac-
ity providers always set prices optimally in reality. For example, in the 2012 college
football season, the Ohio State University charged $75 or $85 per seat for every game
($85 was charged for better seats) even though some games are known to be much
more popular than others, such as the game against the University of Michigan. Even
though the Michigan – Ohio State game is one of the most popular games in college
football, Ohio State did not charge more for this game. Consequently, ticket prices on
the resale markets were at a minimum double the original ticket price, which would
offer a great opportunity for speculators to make profits. Thus, underpricing may be
another reason for speculators’ existence in the market. There is some evidence in the
literature that until recently, teams were afraid of offending loyal fans by changing
prices according to demand. For example, as Courty (2003a) pointed out, “a constant
price (same price for all events in a season) may be necessary to attract loyal team
fans”. Similarly, Krueger (2001) cited the NFL vice president for public relations
who stated that the league tries to set “a fair, reasonable price” because it wants
to maintain an “ongoing relationship with fans and business associates”. The NFL
vice president for public relations stated that although the NFL could increase its
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“present-day profit” by raising ticket prices, it prefers to take “a long-term strategic
view”.8 The underpricing potentially motivated by these considerations, however,
can lead to speculators buying tickets under fixed pricing as I showed above. Inter-
estingly, under fixed pricing at least, speculator and consumer resale do not hurt the
capacity provider’s optimal revenues, as I show below.
Theorem II.2. Under fixed pricing, the capacity provider’s optimal price and optimal
revenue are decreasing in τ and τ ′. Thus, the capacity provider achieves the highest
revenue when τ = τ ′ = 0, and selling non-transferrable tickets harms the capacity
provider.
My primary interest is in whether the capacity provider benefits from a larger or
smaller resale transaction cost and whether the capacity provider should prevent resale
of tickets. I answer this question by analyzing the most favorable resale transaction
costs incurred by consumers and speculators from the capacity provider’s point of
view. Theorem II.2 states that the capacity provider’s optimal fixed price and optimal
revenue from fixed pricing are decreasing9 in both τ and τ ′. The decreasing result
regarding τ holds for any τ ′ and is independent of the existence of speculators in the
market, and vice versa. Thus, the existence of speculators never hurts the capacity
provider under fixed pricing. If τ ′ is small enough (i.e., τ ′ < 1− pnf/ps), the capacity
provider’s optimal fixed price and revenue are higher with the existence of speculators.
This is because when speculators’ transaction cost is small enough, they will enter
the market even when period 1 consumers do not buy tickets immediately. In this
case, if period 1 consumers wait, then in period 2, they will have to buy tickets from
speculators at a higher price than the capacity provider. Seeing this threat, period 1
consumers will accept a higher price for advance tickets from the capacity provider,
hence the capacity provider can earn more revenue.
8Modeling how long-term demand may change because loyal fans may be offended by more
demand-driven pricing is beyond the scope of this essay. It is an interesting future research direction.
9In this chapter, I use increasing/decreasing in the weak sense.
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Moreover, Theorem II.2 implies that the capacity provider actually loses money
when it is more costly for consumers to resell tickets. This is exactly the opposite
of the belief of many event capacity providers in practice. As τ becomes larger,
period 1 consumers value advance tickets less because their payoff in period 2 if
purchasing advance tickets, E[max(V, (1−τ)r∗f )], decreases. On the other hand, their
payoff from waiting and purchasing in period 2 may increase. To induce them to
buy tickets, the capacity provider has to decrease his price.10 The capacity provider
can charge a higher price and earn more revenue when resale is less costly.11 When
τ = τ ′ = 1, the net payoff from resale is zero for both consumers and speculators, so
this corresponds to the case of selling non-transferrable tickets.12 I have clearly shown
that an event capacity provider using fixed pricing would be hurt by non-transferrable
tickets and always benefits from ticket resale, even if some of the tickets will be bought
by speculators. Thus, the increase in how much consumers value tickets (and thus
the capacity provider being able to charge consumers more because of this increased
valuation) dominates the effect of increased competition with the capacity provider
from the resale market. I now analyze how these results are affected if the capacity
provider charges different prices over time.
10Note that the amount that the capacity provider decreases his price is not always equal to the
amount that period 1 consumers’ payoff from buying tickets decreases. Period 1 consumers’ payoff
from waiting is
∫∞
ps
(v − pnf ) dF (v) if pnf ≥ (1 − τ ′)ps and E(V − ps)+ otherwise. E(V − ps)+ is
independent of τ while
∫∞
ps
(v−pnf ) dF (v) is increasing in τ , hence as the capacity provider decreases
his price, period 1 consumers’ payoff from waiting may increase. Thus, as τ becomes larger, if period
1 consumers’ payoff from waiting increases, the capacity provider may have to decrease his price
more than the amount that period 1 consumers’ payoff from buying tickets decreases.
11The University of Michigan signed an agreement with StubHub in July 2011 that makes the
company the official fan-to-fan ticket exchange marketplace for Wolverine Athletics. In the following
season, Michigan raised ticket prices for the first time in seven seasons (Shea, 2012). In fact, StubHub
is now the secondary ticketing partner of 20 colleges. In addition to Michigan, StubHub has partnered
with the Big Ten Conference, North Carolina, Florida State and Virginia Tech.
12Strictly speaking, for every C, selling non-transferrable tickets is equivalent to τ ≥ τˆ(C) =
inf{0 ≤ τ ≤ 1 : [(λ1 − C)+ + λ2]F¯ (vmin/(1− τ)) ≤ (C − λ1)+} and τ ′ ≥ 1− pnf /r∗f . For the sake of
readability, I refer to τ = τ ′ = 1 as selling non-transferrable tickets in the main text.
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2.5 Multiperiod Pricing
In this section, I study the multiperiod pricing strategies where capacity providers
change their ticket prices over time. Multiperiod pricing has started to become the
dominant strategy used by capacity providers such as professional sports teams. To
study the effects of price changes and demonstrate whether the capacity provider
should try to prevent resale or not, I analyze a two-period model. I assume the
capacity provider announces his advance ticket price p1 at the beginning of period 1
and can adjust his price to p2 in period 2, after consumers learn their valuations, to
sell the remaining capacity. In this section, I assume the capacity provider cannot
commit to the period 2 price upfront. (I have also analyzed the case where the capacity
provider can commit to the period 2 price, and omit this case for space considerations.
The insights regarding whether the capacity provider should prevent resale or not do
not change if he can commit to the period 2 price under the multiperiod pricing
setting.) Clearly, being able to charge different prices over time gives the capacity
provider more flexibility, so the fact that multiperiod pricing results in higher revenues
than fixed pricing is not too surprising. However, I am more interested in whether
the capacity provider benefits from a larger or smaller resale transaction cost for
consumers and speculators under multiperiod pricing. Recall that under fixed pricing,
I showed that the capacity provider always benefits from a smaller transaction cost.
As I will show in this section, this is no longer true under multiperiod pricing.
Theorem II.3. (i) The capacity provider’s optimal period 2 price p∗2 and the equilib-
rium resale price r∗m are p
∗
2 = r
∗
m = r
∗
f .
(ii) The capacity provider’s optimal period 1 price is p∗1 = E[max(V, (1− τ)p∗2)]−
E(V − ps)+. Moreover, p∗1 < p∗2.
(iii) For a given τ , speculators enter the market in equilibrium if and only if
τ ′ < τ¯ ′m(τ) = 1− p∗1/p∗2.
23
Similar to fixed pricing, I use backward induction to find the subgame perfect
equilibrium of the game between the capacity provider, consumers and speculators.
The difference is that in period 2, to determine p∗2, the capacity provider plays a
simultaneous game with the consumers and speculators who have purchased tickets
in period 1. Theorem II.3 characterizes the equilibrium outcome under multiperiod
pricing. In period 2, the capacity provider’s price is equal to the resale price, so the
equilibrium outcome in period 2 is equivalent to the situation where the capacity
provider participates in the resale market and determines its market clearing price
together with the resellers. This is because the capacity provider and the resale market
are competitors in period 2. When their prices are different, the party with the lower
price will raise the price to gain more margin, and if the party with the higher price
is not making sales, it will decrease the price to gain market share. As p∗1 < p
∗
2,
the capacity provider implements a “low-to-high” pricing. He offers a discount for
advance tickets but captures a higher margin close to the event date.
Note that Theorem II.3(iii) characterizes the condition on τ ′ for a given τ such that
speculators enter the market in equilibrium. For a given τ ′, I can also characterize the
condition on τ such that speculators enter the market in equilibrium. Define τ¯m(τ
′) as
the τ solving τ ′ = τ¯ ′m(τ), i.e., τ¯m(τ
′) is the inverse function of τ¯ ′m(τ). Speculators enter
the market in equilibrium if τ > τ¯m(τ
′) and do not enter the market in equilibrium
if τ ≤ τ¯m(τ ′). This is because when consumers’ transaction cost becomes larger,
fewer consumers would like to resell tickets, hence speculators have less competition
in the resale market and can make more profits. Recall that under fixed pricing,
I showed that the existence of speculators does not hurt the capacity provider and
may in fact benefit the capacity provider. Under multiperiod pricing, the result is
exactly the opposite – the capacity provider’s revenue decreases when speculators
enter the market in equilibrium. Speculators hurt the capacity provider’s revenue
under multiperiod pricing because they force the capacity provider to sell more tickets
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in period 1 at a lower price than period 2. Without speculators, if the provider has
sufficient capacity to satisfy the period 1 consumers and has leftovers, he will then sell
the remaining tickets in period 2 at a higher price and earn more revenue. Under fixed
pricing, however, the capacity provider does not have the flexibility to change the price
and capture a higher margin close to the event date in the first place. Therefore, with
the additional price flexibility under multiperiod pricing, an event capacity provider
no longer needs speculators as an instrument to boost revenue, he is better off in the
absence of speculators. Given these interesting dynamics under multiperiod pricing,
the result on whether the capacity provider would like consumer resale to be less or
more costly is more complex than under fixed pricing and I characterize it below.
Theorem II.4. (i) Under multiperiod pricing, the capacity provider’s optimal period
1 price is decreasing in τ , while the optimal period 2 price is increasing in τ .
(ii) For τ > τ¯m(τ
′), the optimal revenue from multiperiod pricing is decreasing in
τ .
(iii) Assume f(·) is decreasing. For τ ≤ τ¯m(τ ′), there exists a threshold C¯ > λ1
such that if C ≤ λ1, the optimal revenue from multiperiod pricing is decreasing in
τ ; if C ≥ C¯, it is increasing in τ ; otherwise, it may be decreasing or first decreasing
then increasing in τ . The capacity provider achieves the highest revenue either when
τ = τ ′ = 0 or τ = τ ′ = 1. If C ≤ λ1, τ = τ ′ = 0 results in the highest revenue; if
C ≥ C¯, τ = τ ′ = 1 results in the highest revenue (i.e., the capacity provider benefits
from selling non-transferrable tickets).
I have shown that under multiperiod pricing, the capacity provider prefers spec-
ulators’ resale transaction cost to be large enough to prevent them from entering the
market. Now I analyze what resale transaction cost incurred by consumers is most
favorable to the capacity provider. For a given τ ′, Parts (ii) and (iii) of Theorem II.4
characterize how the capacity provider’s optimal revenue from multiperiod pricing
changes with respect to τ when speculators exist and do not exist in equilibrium,
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respectively. When speculators exist in equilibrium (i.e., τ > τ¯m(τ
′)), decreases in
the consumer resale transaction cost increase the capacity provider’s revenue. This is
because in this case, the provider will sell out his capacity in period 1 (with specula-
tors’ help) and he can increase his period 1 price and earn more revenue if consumers
incur a smaller resale transaction cost. On the other hand, when speculators do not
enter the market in equilibrium (i.e., τ ≤ τ¯m(τ ′)), how the capacity provider’s optimal
revenue from multiperiod pricing changes with respect to τ depends on the capacity
C. If the provider’s capacity is small, he sells out his capacity early and most sales
occur in period 1. Since a smaller τ results in a higher period 1 price, the capacity
provider achieves a higher revenue when the consumers’ resale transaction cost is
smaller. Thus, if an event capacity provider has a small capacity or the event is pop-
ular (a sufficient condition is C ≤ λ1), I have the same result from fixed pricing that
the capacity provider will be better off when consumer resale is less costly. On the
contrary, if the provider’s capacity is large enough so that the majority of his revenue
comes from ticket sales in period 2 (a sufficient condition is when C ≥ C¯), the effect
of a larger τ on the period 2 price will dominate. As I show in Part (i) of Theorem
II.4, a larger τ results in a higher period 2 price. Thus, the capacity provider prefers
larger resale transaction costs in this case, as he has sufficient remaining tickets to
sell in period 2 at a higher margin and the competition from consumers that resell
tickets can harm his revenue. This is different from what I found under fixed pricing.
To summarize, my result indicates that the capacity provider may sometimes
benefit from non-transferrable tickets when using multiperiod pricing, unlike the fixed
pricing case when he will always be hurt by non-transferrable tickets. Whether the
capacity provider benefits or not depends on the actual values of demand and capacity.
For example, if demand significantly exceeds capacity, then non-transferrable tickets
are again a bad idea for capacity providers. However, the problem is that most
capacity providers have more than one event in the same venue during a season with
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each event having a different demand level. For example, an NBA team (where
multiperiod pricing is commonly used) typically plays 82 games in a regular season.
The Detroit Pistons (who have been performing pretty badly in the last few years), for
example, cannot sell out capacity for most games except the games where they play
against very popular teams such as Miami Heat. It would be very difficult for a team
like Pistons to allow ticket resale for the Miami Heat game but sell non-transferrable
tickets for another game.
Interestingly, the primary reason that a team would want to make resale more
difficult (or sell non-transferrable tickets) is to increase revenues. In fact, in the
next section, I show that for that purpose, there is a much better pricing mechanism
than multiperiod pricing. I will show that ticket options always dominate multiperiod
pricing in revenue generation for event capacity providers. Furthermore, ticket options
naturally reduce ticket resale. Thus, there is in fact a way for capacity providers
to reduce the resale market and capture its revenue without resorting to paperless
ticketing.
2.6 Ticket Options
So far, I have analyzed fixed and multiperiod pricing which are the pricing strate-
gies that have been commonly used by event capacity providers in practice. I have
found that consumer resale is actually beneficial to an event capacity provider in most
cases unless he has a large capacity to sell and is using multiperiod pricing. Specu-
lators may benefit the capacity provider under fixed pricing, but they may hurt the
capacity provider under multiperiod pricing. Thus, under multiperiod pricing, if the
provider has a large capacity (or the event is not popular), he achieves the highest
revenue without any ticket resale, where paperless ticketing proposed by Ticketmas-
ter is one way to make tickets non-transferrable and eliminate the resale markets.
However, to achieve this benefit in practice, an event capacity provider would have
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to enforce paperless ticketing for only unpopular events and allow ticket resale for
other events in the same season. In this section, I study a novel pricing strategy
with ticket options that has emerged recently in practice (e.g., OptionIt sells online
ticket options for events). As I will show, this novel pricing strategy is generally more
profitable than the current strategies used in practice. It also has the benefit of giving
consumers more flexibility, that is, consumers initially only buy an option to attend
the event at a much lower price than the regular ticket price and can exercise the
option when they know their valuations for the event.
Consumers expose themselves to low valuation risks by purchasing advance tickets
as the event may conflict with their schedules that are not known in advance. Also,
many sports employ elimination type tournaments, and an advance ticket may become
worthless to a consumer if the athlete/team she supports does not qualify for the event
(e.g., US Open men’s final). On the other hand, if consumers do not purchase tickets
in advance, they risk paying high prices in the resale markets or seats being sold
out. Options can be very attractive to consumers because options can help them
hedge against the valuation uncertainties. For example, a search for tickets for the
ice hockey game of Florida Panthers vs. Montreal Canadiens on March 10, 2013
resulted in tickets at $76.75− $87 on Ticketmaster for seats on the lower level of the
stadium. On the other hand, OptionIt allows consumers to buy an option (i.e., to
reserve a seat) for the seats in the same region for $8 and pay an additional $100
if later deciding to actually buy the ticket. By purchasing an option, if a consumer
later finds herself unable to attend the event, she loses at most $8 (she may even be
able to resell the ticket and incur a smaller loss if the resale price is high enough),
while she may lose up to $87 if purchasing a regular ticket. With options, consumers
can purchase the right but not the obligation to buy tickets closer to the event date.
A consumer can pay a relatively small amount (option price) to secure the right of
purchase and make her final purchasing decision after the uncertainties are resolved.
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She needs to pay an additional amount (strike price) if she exercises the option to
obtain a real ticket later. A consumer may exercise the option because her valuation
is high enough (e.g., her favorite tennis player qualifies for the final) so she will use
the ticket to attend the event, or the resale price is high enough so she will resell
the ticket. Otherwise, the consumer will find an event ticket unattractive and let the
option expire.
I study a pricing scheme where the capacity provider sells (x, p) options in period
1 and regular tickets at price po in period 2. x is the option price. i.e., the price to
purchase a ticket option; p is the strike price, i.e., the extra amount to pay if one
decides to exercise the option to obtain a real ticket. Both x and p are announced at
the beginning of period 1. To reflect the fact that consumers would want to decide
whether to exercise the options or not as their uncertainties are resolved, I assume
options can be exercised in period 2 after consumers learn their valuations. The
capacity provider can sell the expired options again as tickets in period 2. I assume
the capacity provider announces his period 2 ticket price po after consumers learn
their valuations, that is, my ticket options model also has the multiperiod pricing
feature. At the same time, the consumers and speculators who choose to resell tickets
after exercising the options determine the resale price ro. The capacity provider’s goal
is to optimally set the option price, the strike price (both are announced in period
1) and the period 2 price (announced in period 2) so that his revenue is maximized.
I do not allow the capacity provider to sell more options than his capacity although
one might increase revenues by doing so in the short term. The reason is that there
have been consumer backlashes to firms (e.g., Yoonew and FirstDibz) that have sold
more options than their available capacities and had to deny consumers’ requests to
exercise the options. Compared to airline tickets where overselling is standard, event
tickets are much less substitutable because an event usually occurs only once.
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2.6.1 Consumer Choice Model
Consumers make their purchasing decisions in period 1 based on their expectations
on the realizations of valuations and the prices in period 2. Period 1 consumers’ inter-
temporal decision process and the corresponding payoffs are illustrated in Figure
2.2. A speculator’s decision process is a special case of Figure 2.2 where V = 0
with probability one and the resale transaction cost is τ ′ instead of τ . In period 2,
the option price x becomes sunk cost; the period 1 consumers who have purchased
options decide whether to exercise the options or not and whether to resell or use
the tickets. A consumer exercises the option if her valuation is greater than the
strike price or the payoff from reselling the ticket is greater than the strike price, i.e.,
max(V, (1 − τ)ro) > p; she lets the option expire otherwise. On the other hand, as
speculators never use the tickets to attend the event, they exercise the options and
resell the tickets if (1− τ ′)ro > p and let the options expire otherwise.
Figure 2.2: Consumer choice model under option pricing
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2.6.2 Optimal Option Pricing
I again use backward induction to solve the game between the capacity provider,
consumers and speculators. In this section, I assume F (·) has an increasing failure
rate. I will show that selling ticket options in period 1 instead of regular tickets can
indeed improve the capacity provider’s revenue in the multiperiod pricing framework,
and I discuss where the benefit of ticket options comes from. Theorem II.5 character-
izes the optimal pricing strategy with options as well as how the capacity provider’s
optimal prices and revenue change as consumers’ and speculators’ transaction costs
are changed. Similar to multiperiod pricing, the capacity provider’s period 2 price
is equal to the resale price in equilibrium due to competition. Speculators enter the
market in equilibrium if their resale transaction cost is small enough. If speculators
buy options in period 1, then in period 2, they exercise the options and resell the
tickets because they would not enter the market in the first place if they later let
the option expire and incur a net loss. In Section 2.5, I showed that with the flex-
ibility to change the price in period 2, the capacity provider prefers the absence of
speculators. This is still true if the capacity provider sells ticket options, as without
speculators, the capacity provider can sell more tickets in period 2 at a higher margin
(i.e., x∗ + p∗ < p∗o) and increase the revenue.
Theorem II.5. (i) The capacity provider’s optimal strike price p∗ is decreasing in
τ .13 The optimal options price is x∗ = E(V − p∗)+ −E(V − ps)+ which is increasing
in τ . In equilibrium, period 1 consumers do not choose to resell tickets in period 2.
(ii) The capacity provider’s optimal period 2 price p∗o and the equilibrium re-
sale price r∗o are p
∗
o = r
∗
o = inf{r ≥ vmin : [(λ1 − C)+ + λ2]F¯ (r) ≤ (C − λ1)+ +
min(λ1, C)F (p
∗)}. p∗o is increasing in τ . Moreover, x∗ + p∗ < p∗o.
(iii) For a given τ , there exists a threshold τ¯ ′o(τ) such that speculators enter the
13The characterization of p∗ is complicated, therefore I omit it in the theorem statement. It can
be found in the proof of Theorem II.5 in Appendix A.
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market in equilibrium if and only if τ ′ < τ¯ ′o(τ).
(iv) The capacity provider’s optimal revenue from option pricing is increasing in
τ . The capacity provider achieves the highest revenue when τ = τ ′ = 1 (i.e., the
capacity provider benefits from selling non-transferrable tickets).
Different from speculators that exercise the options in equilibrium, the equilibrium
number of period 1 consumers that choose to exercise the options after learning their
valuations is influenced by the strike price p. If p < (1 − τ)ro, since the payoff from
reselling a ticket exceeds the strike price, all consumers exercise the options. In this
case, the capacity provider’s optimal period 2 price is equal to the optimal period 2
price under multiperiod pricing and selling (x, p) options is equivalent to multiperiod
pricing with the period 1 price equal to x + p. Thus, the pricing strategy with
options I am analyzing cannot result in a lower optimal revenue than multiperiod
pricing. On the other hand, if p ≥ (1 − τ)ro, since the payoff from reselling a ticket
does not exceed the strike price, a consumer will exercise an option only because her
valuation is higher than the strike price so that she will use the ticket herself. In this
case, consumer resale is eliminated. I find that it is indeed optimal for the capacity
provider to set the strike price high enough to eliminate consumer resale (i.e., the
optimal strike satisfies p∗ ≥ (1 − τ)r∗o), as he can achieve a higher revenue without
the resale competition from consumers. Moreover, the capacity provider should set
the optimal option price x∗ at the minimum possible level that induces period 1
consumers to purchase options. Therefore, by appropriately choosing the prices, the
capacity provider can prevent resale from consumers with the use of ticket options.
Given the fact that the capacity provider’s optimal strike price is high enough
to dominate the payoff from resale so that consumers are prevented from reselling
tickets in equilibrium, I can explain why the optimal prices and revenue change with
respect to the consumers’ resale transaction cost τ in the way stated in Theorem II.5.
Observing the high strike price, when a period 1 consumer purchases the option, she
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knows that her chance of reselling the ticket after exercising the option in period 2 is
very low. Thus, her payoff in period 2 is merely her realized valuation. As τ becomes
larger, the payoff from ticket resale becomes lower, so the capacity provider is able to
prevent consumer resale with a lower strike price (i.e., p∗ is decreasing in τ). Having a
lower strike price to pay later, a period 1 consumer is willing to pay more to purchase
an option. Thus, when τ is larger, the capacity provider can charge a higher option
price (i.e., x∗ is increasing in τ). Since consumers do not resell tickets in equilibrium,
a period 1 consumer exercises the option in period 2 if her realized valuation is greater
than the strike price. When τ is larger, the capacity provider’s optimal strike price
is lower, hence more consumers will exercise the options and fewer consumers will
let the options expire. As the capacity provider can sell the expired options again as
regular tickets in period 2, when τ is larger, he has fewer tickets left to sell and the
total supply in period 2 becomes smaller. As a result, the equilibrium resale price as
well as the capacity provider’s period 2 price is driven up (i.e., p∗o is increasing in τ).
Finally, Theorem II.5(iv) states that unlike fixed or multiperiod pricing, the ca-
pacity provider always benefits when consumers have larger resale transaction costs
if he sells ticket options. Recall that under multiperiod pricing, if the provider’s
capacity is small enough, his revenue increases when consumer resale becomes less
costly because he can charge a higher period 1 price. This is not true with ticket
options because for all levels of capacity, while the provider’s optimal strike price is
high enough to eliminate consumer resale, it also guarantees that there are enough
consumers letting the options expire in period 2 so that the capacity provider can
sell a significant amount of tickets in period 2 at a higher price. Thus, the effect that
the optimal period 2 price is increasing in τ dominates and the optimal revenue from
option pricing is increasing in τ . Therefore, I have shown that with ticket options,
the capacity provider loses revenue when resale is less costly for either consumers or
speculators. The capacity provider achieves the highest revenue when τ = τ ′ = 1
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in which case ticket resale from both speculators and consumers are precluded, that
is, if an event capacity provider sells ticket options, he always benefits from making
tickets non-transferrable.
Theorem II.6. τ¯ ′o(τ) ≤ τ¯ ′m(τ) < τ¯ ′f (τ).
Theorem II.6 points out another interesting feature of option pricing. I have stated
before that whereas speculators can benefit the capacity provider under fixed pricing,
they can hurt the capacity provider’s revenues under multiperiod pricing and option
pricing. For speculators to profitably buy and resell tickets, their transaction cost has
to be lower than a certain threshold τ¯ ′i(τ), i = f,m, o. Theorem II.6 shows that this
threshold is lowest under option pricing. Thus, an event capacity provider is most
likely to be able to shut speculators out of the market under option pricing.
Finally, I discuss why option pricing is beneficial to event capacity providers.
First, option pricing is more effective in reducing resale of tickets, hence the capacity
provider can capture more revenue from the resale markets. I have shown that with
ticket options, the capacity provider can eliminate consumer resale regardless of the
consumers’ resale transaction cost. Moreover, Theorem II.6 indicates that specula-
tors are less likely to exist under option pricing, as speculators enter the market in
equilibrium for a smaller range of τ ′ compared to other pricing strategies. Second,
as the capacity provider can sell the expired options as tickets in period 2 and can
use the strike price to control the number of expired options, this additional price
decision gives the capacity provider more flexibility that he can “virtually” allocate
capacity to the two periods and earn more revenue from selling more tickets in period
2 at a higher price.
Note that my comparison between multiperiod pricing and option pricing has
been for the same τ and τ ′, that is, if an event capacity provider is currently using
multiperiod pricing, he can increase revenues by switching to selling ticket options
while consumers and speculators incur the same resale transaction costs. Theorem
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II.5(iv) indicates that the capacity provider could increase his revenues even more
by switching to ticket options and making tickets non-transferrable. Note that under
fixed and multiperiod pricing, consumers lose a lot if they buy non-transferrable
tickets and then cannot attend the event, as they lose the whole value of the ticket in
this case. Thus, generally, even discussions to initiate non-transferrable tickets have
led to significant consumer backlashes (e.g., in a June 18, 2012 op-ed, the Consumer
League of New Jersey President Bob Russo stated that “Ticketmaster paperless tickets
are anti-consumer and is new ploy by company to take more of fans’ hard-earned
money”). Negative consumer reaction usually focuses on the fact that consumers
would lose the whole value of the ticket if they could not attend the event for some
reason. However, with ticket options, a consumer will only lose the option price (which
is much less than the regular ticket price) if she buys an option and then decides
she does not want the ticket. Even more interestingly, by only switching to ticket
options from multiperiod pricing while still allowing resale of tickets, the capacity
provider may capture most of the total benefit that he could obtain from option
pricing with non-transferrable tickets. For example, if λ1 = 150, λ2 = 100, C = 120,
V ∼ U [10, 100], τ = 0.25, τ ′ = 0.1, by switching from multiperiod pricing to option
pricing, the capacity provider improves his revenue from 6339 to 7166 (increased by
13%); by further making tickets non-transferrable, the capacity provider’s revenue is
increased to 7253 (increased by only 1.2% additionally). Thus, compared to making
tickets non-transferrable which may result in significant consumer backlashes, the
novel pricing strategy of option pricing may be a good choice for event capacity
providers to consider.
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2.7 Extensions
2.7.1 Strategic Capacity Rationing
In this section, I consider the case where the capacity provider can strategically
hold back some of his capacity in period 1 to sell later in period 2. This, however,
isn’t common for events in practice. As I have stated before, consumers can get very
upset if the capacity provider sells tickets later when he claimed tickets were sold
out earlier. Although Ticketmaster explicitly claims on its website that it does not
divert inventory designated by clients for primary sales into the resale market, the
possibility that Ticketmaster does this still has worried consumers and there have
been consumer complaints.14 Nevertheless, it is of interest to understand if any of my
main findings regarding whether the capacity provider should prevent resale or not
in the previous sections would change in this case.
I define the decision variable 0 < b ≤ C as the provider’s designated capacity
to be sold in period 1. For any b, the previous equilibrium analysis for each pricing
strategy still holds. Thus, to analyze the optimal pricing problem with strategic
capacity rationing, I can write all optimal prices as functions of b and optimize on
the b-dimension. For fixed pricing, I can easily show that the optimal revenue is
increasing in b. As Theorem II.1 indicates, the equilibrium resale price r∗f (b) is given
by [(λ1 − b)+ + λ2)]F¯ (r∗f ) = C − min(λ1, b) + min(λ1, b)F ((1 − τ)r∗f ). Since r∗f (b) is
increasing in b, p∗f is also increasing in b. Thus, under fixed pricing, even if the capacity
provider can hold back some capacity, it is optimal to sell as many tickets in period 1
as possible (i.e., not to ration any capacity). Thus, strategic capacity rationing does
not improve the capacity provider’s revenue and I have the same results in Section
2.4. The capacity provider still benefits when resale of tickets are easier for consumers
as well as speculators, and selling non-transferrable tickets hurts his revenue.
14See http://www.consumeraffairs.com/entertainment/ticketmaster.htm.
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Theorem II.7. If the consumer valuations are uniformly distributed over [vmin, vmax],
the optimal revenue from multiperiod pricing with strategic capacity rationing is in-
creasing in τ .
In Section 2.5, I showed that under multiperiod pricing, the capacity provider may
still prefer consumers to have a zero resale transaction cost if his capacity is small.
Interestingly, Theorem II.7 states that this is no longer true when the provider can
strategically ration capacity in period 1. With the additional flexibility from capacity
rationing, I find that the optimal revenue from multiperiod pricing is always increasing
in τ . Therefore, if an event capacity provider can ration capacity in period 1, he will
never benefit from a resale market in period 2. In this case, the capacity provider
achieves a higher revenue if the resale market is precluded (e.g., by the enforcement
of non-transferrable tickets).
Finally, if the capacity provider sells ticket options, all my numerical results indi-
cate that the optimal revenue is still increasing in τ with strategic capacity rationing.
So the capacity provider still benefits when consumers have larger resale transaction
costs, and he achieves the highest revenue by making tickets non-transferrable. More-
over, for any b, option pricing reduces to multiperiod pricing if the strike price is low
enough (i.e., p < (1− τ)ro(b)), and the capacity provider can improve his revenue by
choosing a high enough strike price that dominates the payoff from ticket resale so
that consumer resale is prevented. Therefore, my previous insight that ticket options
can help event capacity providers prevent consumers resale of tickets and increase rev-
enues carries through to a capacity rationing provider. As I noted at the beginning,
holding back capacity to sell later may cause significant consumer dissatisfaction and
may be very hard to implement in practice. Thus, it is interesting to compare its
benefit to other strategies (such as ticket options) that I have discussed. Consider the
example given at the end of Section 2.6 (λ1 = 150, λ2 = 100, C = 120, V ∼ U [10, 100],
τ = 0.25, τ ′ = 0.1). By strategically rationing capacity, the provider can improve his
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multiperiod pricing revenue from 6339 to 6762, whereas his revenue is increased to
7166 by switching to option pricing. Moreover, after switching to ticket options, the
capacity provider does not further increase the revenue by rationing capacity, because
it is indeed optimal for the capacity provider to sell as many options as possible in pe-
riod 1 in this example. Therefore, compared to increasing revenues through rationing
capacity, switching to option pricing may be a better way to increase revenues and
avoid risking upsetting the fan base.
2.7.2 Heterogeneous Consumers
Similar to other papers in the literature (e.g., Geng et al., 2007, Courty , 2003b),
my model considered a situation where all period 1 customers have ex ante symmetric
valuations. In this section, I consider the case of two types of consumers in period 1
to explore whether the insights from my model are affected. In this case, I assume
that among the λ1 consumers who arrive in period 1, λ1H consumers (the super fans)
have higher ex ante valuations (VH) than the rest λ1L consumers (VL), where VH is
stochastically larger than VL. The λ2 consumers who arrive in period 2 have ex ante
valuations VL. For each consumer type, all the equilibrium analysis in my model
still holds. However, characterizing the optimal pricing policy becomes much more
complicated, because in period 1 the capacity provider may want only one type or
both types of consumers to buy tickets, resulting in a much more complex revenue
function. Nevertheless, my numerical results indicate that the main insights regarding
when resale markets are beneficial or harmful to the capacity provider do not seem
to be affected. For example, suppose the capacity provider is using multiperiod
pricing and the problem parameters are as follows: λ1H = 90, λ1L = 60, λ2 = 100,
VH ∼ U [50, 100], VL ∼ U [10, 80]. If C ≤ 104, the capacity provider achieves the
highest revenue when τ = τ ′ = 0, that is, if the capacity is small enough, the capacity
provider’s most favorable scenario is when tickets can be resold with zero transaction
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cost. On the other hand, if C > 104, the capacity provider achieves the highest
revenue when τ = τ ′ = 1, that is, if the capacity is large enough, the capacity provider
benefits from making tickets non-transferrable. These observations are consistent with
my results given by Theorem II.4. Moreover, intuitively, the capacity provider would
like to induce more consumer types to purchase tickets in period 1 when he has a
larger capacity. In the above example, when τ = τ ′ = 1 which is the best scenario for
the capacity provider for C > 104, the optimal multiperiod pricing policy induces only
the high-valuation consumers to purchase tickets in period 1 if C ≤ 193; if C > 193,
the optimal multiperiod pricing policy induces both types of consumers to purchase
tickets in period 1. Thus, as the numerical results clearly indicate, my main insights
with respect to whether event capacity providers should prevent resale of tickets or
not do not change significantly with more complex assumptions about the number of
period 1 consumer types.
2.8 Conclusion
In this essay, I study three pricing strategies, fixed pricing, multiperiod pricing,
and option pricing, for an event capacity provider that faces resale of tickets. One
major contribution of this essay is that I find how the behavior of optimal prices
and revenues depend on the resale transaction costs incurred by the consumers and
speculators, which indicates whether the capacity provider should prevent resale of
tickets or not. I have found that contrary to what common wisdom suggests, event
capacity providers do not always benefit from restricting resale.
By appropriately choosing the prices associated with ticket options (i.e., option
price and strike price), an event capacity provider can eliminate consumer resale of
tickets and significantly reduce the magnitude of the resale market. I conjecture that
compared to enforcing paperless ticketing under multiperiod pricing, event capacity
providers would have a much easier time convincing consumers to switch to buying
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options. Ticket options also benefit consumers, because if a consumer buys an option
and cannot attend the event, she is risking only the option price instead of the whole
ticket price. Furthermore, under multiperiod pricing, whether paperless ticketing is
beneficial or not depends on the event’s demand, which would imply that to obtain
the highest benefit, the capacity provider would have to make some events’ tickets
paperless and allow ticket resale for other events. This is clearly impractical. While
going to paperless ticketing with options would increase the capacity provider’s rev-
enues even more, my numerical results indicate that this additional revenue gain is
small compared to switching to option pricing from multiperiod or fixed pricing.
Thus, this essay suggests that efforts to move to paperless ticketing are likely to
hurt not only consumers but also event capacity providers in many cases. A reason
given by Ticketmaster to introduce paperless ticketing is to prevent speculators from
entering the market. However, this essay argues that speculators may actually be
beneficial to event providers when they use fixed pricing. While speculators are in-
deed never beneficial to capacity providers under multiperiod pricing, the capacity
provider may still lose revenues overall by introducing paperless ticketing. Moreover,
I provide the insight that option pricing not only results in the highest revenues for
event capacity providers but also has the highest likelihood of shutting down specula-
tors, while giving consumers much greater choice than paperless ticketing. Thus, my
research indicates that event organizers should not support paperless ticketing but
instead consider novel pricing strategies such as ticket options.
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CHAPTER III
Pricing of Conditional Upgrades in the Presence of
Strategic Consumers
3.1 Introduction
Like many other industries, a big challenge faced by the travel industry is the
mismatch between demand and supply across different types of products. In the
travel industry (e.g., hotels, airlines, car rental companies, cruise lines), consumers
usually make reservations in advance and the products are perishable in the sense
that they do not generate value for the firm after the end of the booking period. The
capacity for each type of product is fixed, but due to the stochastic demand across
different product types over time, firms frequently find capacity of some product
types under-utilized while capacity of other product types in shortage at the end of
the booking period. Ideally, firms should be able to eliminate the demand-supply
mismatch by having enough flexibility in pricing their products. However, in reality,
different industries face different constraints on setting prices.
In the hotel industry, a lot of firms lack the ability to adjust prices dynamically.
Due to consumer resistance, dynamic pricing (i.e., adjusting prices for the same prod-
uct over time) is not as common as in the airline industry. Some hotels do not use
dynamic pricing at all but only use variable pricing (i.e., setting different nightly
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rates for the same room based on expected demand) as their primary pricing strat-
egy. Others use dynamic pricing for their “best available rates” but have had a
hard time convincing corporate travel buyers. For example, hotel chains would like
to change prices dynamically and give large travel accounts a negotiated discount
off the dynamic best available price. However, according to the survey by Business
Travel News conducted on 221 travel buyers, more than two-thirds said that they did
not use dynamic pricing in their hotel program(Baker , 2010). Instead, most travel
buyers negotiate a fixed corporate rate which does not change dynamically. 16% of
travel buyers used dynamic pricing only with select hotel chains, 9% used dynamic
pricing only in low-volume markets, and only 6% reported that their use of dynamic
pricing is standard.
Even with variable pricing, hotels still face constraints on setting room rates. In
competitive industries such as travel, firms usually have several direct competitors,
hence have less flexibility to adjust product prices as they like. Since consumers can
compare prices for similar products very easily on the Internet where online travel
agencies such as Orbitz and Expedia have provided such services, most firms providing
similar products set similar prices for at least some of their products. For example,
the following three hotels all reside in Ann Arbor, Michigan: Hilton Garden Inn,
Residence Inn by Marriott, Sheraton. These are all upscale mid-priced hotels, and
are located within 1 mile from each other. Thus, they are direct competitors in the
local market. As a result, all three hotels use exactly the same (variable rather than
dynamic) pricing strategy for standard rooms (with either one king-size bed or two
queen-size beds). For example, the price in September and October 2013 is $169 for
weekdays and $139 for Friday/Saturday nights.
While hotels have struggled with widespread acceptance of dynamic pricing, es-
pecially with corporate clients, and some are price takers in the market, many hotels
have recently adopted a new type of conditional upgrade policy. This new strategy
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works in the following way. After a consumer makes a reservation, she is offered an
upgrade option which she decides whether to accept or not. If she accepts the upgrade
offer, then she will be notified whether she gets upgraded or not during check-in. By
accepting the upgrade offer, the consumer agrees that she will pay the associated
upgrade fee if her upgrade is fulfilled by the hotel later. The hotel fulfills upgrades if
there are high-quality products still available by the check-in date. Many of the hotels
use Nor1, a leading technological company, to offer the upgrades and decide the price
of the upgrades.1 These new upgrades are different from the upgrades historically
offered by hotels where elite travelers may be upgraded for free at check-in as part
of their consumer loyalty program benefits. First, these are paid upgrades instead of
free upgrades. Second, they are conditional upgrades because a consumer does not
know whether she will be upgraded and pay the upgrade fee when she accepts an up-
grade offer; the upgrades are fulfilled conditional on the availability of higher-quality
products by the check-in date. Third, they are offered to not only elite members but
also regular consumers. Fourth, instead of being offered at check-in, the upgrades we
consider are offered in advance, usually right after the original booking.
However, offering conditional upgrades may result in some consumers, who would
purchase high-quality products when the firm does not offer conditional upgrades,
to deliberately book less expensive products as they hope to get upgraded and pay
less than the original price of high-quality products they actually prefer. Thus, con-
ditional upgrades have the potential to cannibalize the high-quality product sales.
When using the conditional upgrade strategy, it is important for the firm to carefully
account for such consumer behaviors in setting upgrade prices optimally. In this es-
say, we study how firms can properly manage the trade-off between the conditional
upgrade strategy’s potential benefits and potential threats such as cannibalization.
More specifically, the research questions we investigate are: 1) what is the optimal
1Besides hotels, Nor1 is also expanding its business to airlines, cruise lines, car rentals.
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conditional upgrade pricing strategy for the firm when consumers may deliberately
choose lower-quality products with upgrades? 2) When are conditional upgrades
profitable/non-profitable for the firm? 3) How profitable is the conditional upgrade
strategy compared to being able to set product prices optimally, in particular, can it
replace product price optimization and dynamic pricing?
To answer these questions, we study a model where consumers select which prod-
uct type to book and whether or not to accept an upgrade offer based on the an-
ticipation of future upgrade probability. Our model analyzes the upgrade policy as
currently implemented by Nor1 and hotels, where upgrade prices are static over time.
Our analysis indicates that conditional upgrades significantly improve revenues of
the firm by “demand expansion”, “price correction”, and “risk management”. The
conditional upgrades are “real options” that consumers purchase from the firm to be
exercised with an upgrade fee if the high-quality products are still available by the
end of the booking period. We find that this option expands the firm’s demand by
capturing the consumers who are not willing to pay the full price of higher-quality
products but still value higher-quality products significantly more than regular prod-
ucts. If the firm does not have pricing flexibility due to competition or other industry
constraints, conditional upgrades can be an instrument to correct the firm’s original
price for higher-quality products and reoptimize the firm’s demand segmentation to
improve demand-supply matching. Our numerical studies show that by properly us-
ing conditional upgrades, the firm can capture at least the revenue potential from
being able to optimize the higher-quality product price. Interestingly, we also iden-
tify situations where conditional upgrades can generate even higher revenues than the
case where the firm can set both product prices optimally but do not offer upgrades.
This implies that conditional upgrades can compensate for the firm’s lack of ability
in setting the optimal product prices by managing prices and capacities in a more
flexible way. Moreover, offering conditional upgrades generate higher revenues than
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offering last-minute upgrades in most cases. Thus, we believe that the novel form
of “conditional” upgrades is a worthy initiative for travel industries. Finally, if the
firm does have the ability to set product prices optimally, then our numerical re-
sults indicate that the revenue improvements with conditional upgrades are generally
larger than the revenue improvements with dynamic pricing. By offering conditional
upgrades, the firm allocates the consumers who accept the upgrade offers to different
types of products at the end of the booking period. One of our interesting findings is
that this ex-post allocation flexibility that the firm gains with conditional upgrades
is generally more valuable than the pricing flexibility one has in dynamic pricing.
Interestingly, these observations hold true even for the case where the firm sets only a
static upgrade price, indicating that the potential of conditional upgrades to “correct”
for mispricing of product prices may be even higher when dynamic upgrade prices
can be used.
3.2 Literature Review
Although upgrades are widely used in service industries such as travel, there is
limited academic literature that focuses on upgrades in service industries. Most of
the literature studies upgrades in the context of airlines where upgrades are offered
to preferred travelers as a perk or if the flight’s economy cabin is overbooked (see
for example Karaesmen and Van Ryzin, 2004). Gallego and Stefanescu (2009) is
one of a handful of papers that study upgrades in detail. They first study free up-
grades by generalizing the traditional network revenue management model (where
product prices are fixed and demands for different product types are independent)
to explicitly account for upgrades. They also study paid upgrades, and find that if
a primary capacity provider has complete freedom to select prices, upgrades cannot
improve profits. The result found by Gallego and Stefanescu (2009) is based on a
fluid model. By considering demand randomness, we find that the firm can strictly
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improve revenues with conditional upgrades compared to having complete freedom
to select product prices. Biyalogorsky et al. (2005) study conditional upgrades where
the upgrade fee is charged at the time of upgrade request (i.e., a consumer pays the
upgrade fee even if she does not get upgraded at the end) and find that upgrades
increase the provider’s profits when the probability of selling higher-quality units at
full price is sufficiently high. The upgrade strategy studied in Biyalogorsky et al.
(2005) is similar to an industry practice where only passengers who hold more expen-
sive “upgradable class” tickets can be upgraded if there is available capacity at the
fulfillment time. In this essay, we analyze a more recent upgrade strategy pioneered
by Nor1 for the travel industry (i.e., selling conditional upgrades where the fee is
paid if the upgrade is honored). Furthermore, unlike Gallego and Stefanescu (2009)
and Biyalogorsky et al. (2005), we model the strategic consumer behavior and ana-
lyze conditional upgrades with a Bayesian game. The strategic consumer behavior
significantly changes the insights.
There is also a stream of literature studying multi-product inventory manage-
ment with provider-driven demand substitution. Hsu and Bassok (1999), Bassok
et al. (1999) study full downward substitution where a consumer can be served by
another product with superior quality. Netessine et al. (2002), Shumsky and Zhang
(2009) study single-level upgrades where consumers may be upgraded by at most one
product level. Although primarily focusing on inventory management or capacity
management, these papers also consider upgrades. The main difference from this es-
say is that in these papers, the upgrade decision is entirely made by the provider and
no additional fee is charged to the consumer, while in this essay, consumers get to
decide whether they would like to be upgraded to a better product if it is still avail-
able by the end of the booking period. Moreover, in the above papers, consumers are
not strategic when making their product purchasing decisions and do not take the
future upgrade possibility into consideration, while we model this strategic behavior
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of consumers.
A growing literature in operations management studies the interaction between
consumers’ strategic behavior and firm’s decisions (see Netessine and Tang , 2009 for
a detailed review). For example, a problem that has been extensively studied is
the consumers’ deliberate waiting to purchase later in anticipation of a price decrease
when the firm can change prices over time (Su, 2007, Elmaghraby et al., 2008, Gallego
et al., 2008, Yin et al., 2009, Levin et al., 2010, Mersereau and Zhang , 2012). Aviv
and Pazgal (2008), Osadchiy and Vulcano (2010), Correa et al. (2013) model the
strategic consumers’ purchasing decisions as a game with incomplete information and
assume Poisson arrival of consumers to capture the randomness in the number of
players in the game. We adopt the same assumption to model the random arrival of
consumers over time to book different types of products. While the papers mentioned
above consider a single product type and focus on the consumers’ decision of “buy-
now-or-wait”, we model a firm selling multiple substitutable product types and study
the consumers’ decisions on which type of product to book and whether to accept an
upgrade offer or not.
Jerath et al. (2010) study the effect of strategic consumer behavior if compet-
ing firms offer last-minute sales through opaque channels versus through their direct
channels. Fay and Xie (2008) study probabilistic selling where the firm creates a prob-
abilistic product by creating uncertainty about the type of product that a consumer
will eventually receive. In opaque and probabilistic selling, the different product
types are horizontally differentiated (i.e., differentiated based on a single characteris-
tic other than quality), while with conditional upgrades, the different product types
are vertically differentiated (i.e., they can be ordered according to quality). With the
conditional upgrade strategy, the provider sells an option to the consumer so that
the consumer can obtain a higher-quality product if the capacity is available at the
fulfillment time. Due to the quality difference between the product types, consumers
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pay an exercise fee when the upgrade option is fulfilled, which is different from opaque
and probabilistic selling. This essay is also methodologically different than the above
papers in that we model the consumers’ booking decisions as a Bayesian game with
Poisson arrivals. In this essay, a consumer forms an expectation about the upgrade
probability based on the arrival time and the product availability information, and
decides which product type to book and whether or not to accept an upgrade offer.
We prove the existence of equilibrium and provide a condition for equilibrium unique-
ness. We study both the fully stochastic problem and its asymptotic approximation
to propose a heuristic.
3.3 Model
We consider a firm that sells two types of perishable products, regular and high-
quality (e.g., standard rooms and suites in a hotel). The firm has KH high-quality
products and KR regular products. The products are consumed at time T but con-
sumers can book the products any time before T . We refer to [0, T ] as the booking
period. The products are perishable in the sense that they have no value to the
firm after time T . The high-quality products are sold at price pH and the regular
products are sold at price pR (pH > pR). After a consumer books a regular product,
the firm may offer an upgrade opportunity so that the consumer can pay an addi-
tional fee p to upgrade the product to a high-quality one if there are leftovers by the
end of the booking period. Although the firm does not guarantee the fulfillment of
such an upgrade, a consumer only needs to pay the upgrade fee when she actually
obtains an upgrade, and she is obliged to pay in this case. The firm offers upgrades
to γ proportion of consumers.2 Another interpretation is that (1 − γ) proportion
2In reality, travel firms sell through multiple channels and may offer conditional upgrades in
selected channels only. For example, Hilton offers conditional upgrades to consumers who book
their rooms in hilton.com while it does not offer conditional upgrades if consumers book through
online travel agencies. Consumer can infer whether they will be offered upgrades or not from the
channels they book through.
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of consumers are inattentive (do not consider the upgrade offer) when making their
purchasing decisions even if the firm offers them conditional upgrades.3 We assume,
consistent with industry practice, that if the firm does not have enough remaining
high-quality products to satisfy all consumers that have accepted the upgrade offers,
these consumers are rationed randomly, that is, the probability that a consumer gets
upgraded does not depend on her booking time. The firm’s goal is to optimally choose
the upgrade price given product prices so that its revenue from selling two types of
products as well as collecting upgrade fees is maximized. As stated before, settings
where firms are price takers on product prices but can set upgrade price are common
in practice. In Section 3.7 where we evaluate the revenue performance of conditional
upgrades, we will also consider a firm that is not a price taker at all and demonstrate
that conditional upgrades have great value for such a firm.
Consumers arrive to the market following a Poisson process with rate λ. Each
consumer is characterized by a pair of valuations (vR, vH), where vR denotes her
valuation for regular products and vH denotes her valuation for high-quality products.
A consumer privately observes her own valuations before arriving to the market. The
valuations of consumers are jointly distributed in the two-dimensional support Ω
which is a finite subset of R2+. The joint probability density function is denoted by
f(vR, vH).
4 By allowing a joint distribution of consumers’ valuations for different
product types, we are able to capture not only the consumers’ heterogeneity in the
willingness to pay but also their heterogeneity in the valuation differential between
different product types which is important in making decisions regarding upgrades.
3As studied in the recent economics literature, consumers may pay attention to part of the price,
menu of products or offerings. When a firm offers a multi-dimensional product, consumers may take
only a subset of these dimensions into consideration. This is exemplified by Spiegler (2006), where a
consumer samples one price dimension from each firm selling a product with a complicated pricing
scheme (e.g., health insurance plans); Gabaix and Laibson (2006), where some consumers do not
observe the price of an add-on before choosing a firm; Armstrong and Chen (2009), who extend the
notion of “captive” consumers to those who always consider one dimension of a product but not
another (e.g., price but not quality).
4Our equilibrium analysis for the stochastic model can be generalized to time-dependent arrival
rates and time-dependent consumer valuation distributions.
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Thus, the way we model consumer valuations is more general than the traditional
approach used by the market segmentation literature (e.g., Mussa and Rosen, 1978,
Moorthy and Png , 1992) where consumers’ valuations for different product types are
proportional. The Poisson arrival rate, product capacities, valuation distribution,
percentage of consumers that are offered upgrades are common information for the
firm and the consumers.
Figure 3.1: Consumer decision process
Consumers are strategic in the sense that a consumer trying to book a product
at time t and seeing products are still available can anticipate the probability q(t) of
actually obtaining an upgrade if she accepts the upgrade offer. Consumers’ rational
expectations on the upgrade probability q(t) depend on the arrival time because we
allow consumers to infer the upgrade probability from the fact that products have not
been fully booked by time t. Figure 3.1 depicts the consumer decision process and
the payoffs from each possible decision. We use “H” to denote booking a high-quality
product, use “U” to denote booking a regular product and accepting an upgrade offer,
use “R” to denote booking a regular product without upgrade, and use “N” to denote
not booking any product. The consumers that are not offered upgrades choose from
“H”, “R”, and “N”. Note that if p ≥ pH − pR, nobody accepts the upgrade offer
because the total price to pay in order to get a high-quality product through upgrade
is at least as large as the original price for high-quality products. This is equivalent
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to the case without upgrades. Thus, we refer to p ≥ pH − pR as the case where the
firm does not offer upgrades.
The firm needs to decide when to stop selling each product type, taking into ac-
count the instant booking levels for each product type including upgrades defined as
a unique type. Define NH(t), NU(t), NR(t) as the demand stream booking each prod-
uct type, respectively. Note that NU(t) is the arrival process of consumers booking
a regular product and accepting the upgrade offer, and NR(t) is the arrival pro-
cess of consumers booking a regular product and not accepting the upgrade offer,
hence NU(t) and NR(t) are mutually exclusive. Due to the decomposition property
of Poisson processes, NH(t), NU(t), and NR(t) are independent Poisson processes.
We assume the firm cannot “bump” consumers upon check-in (i.e., the firm has to
accommodate check-in requests of all reservation holders). The firm stops selling high-
quality products when NH(t) ≥ KH and regular products when NR(t) ≥ KR, that is,
the firm tries to sell as many products as possible. Moreover, the firm stops selling
both product types at the same time when NH(t) +NU(t) +NR(t) ≥ KH +KR. Note
that this stopping rule allows the firm to accept more bookings for regular products
during the booking period than the capacity (because some of the consumers booking
regular products with upgrades may later get upgraded and free up some capacity for
regular products) while ensuring no bumping of consumers.
A consumer does not observe the firm’s instant capacities (also, how many con-
sumers have arrived and the booking decisions they have made) when she makes
her booking decision. However, consumers can observe whether a product type is
fully booked or still available when making booking decisions. As the firm stops
selling some product type, consumers are restricted to fewer choices. When the high-
quality products are unavailable, consumers can only book regular products without
upgrades. When the regular products are unavailable, consumers can only book high-
quality products. When both types of products are unavailable, consumers cannot
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book any product. We can see that when at least one product type is unavailable, the
consumer decision becomes a simple take-it-or-leave-it decision, so consumers do not
anticipate the upgrade probability anymore. Let τ denote the first time when some
product type is unavailable (τ = T if the firm never stops selling any type of product
during the booking period), then τ is the (random) stopping time of the consumer
booking game that strategic consumers play regarding upgrades.
3.4 Consumer Booking Equilibrium
Before deriving the firm’s optimal conditional upgrade policy, we first need to
analyze how strategic consumers make their booking decisions. In this section, we
derive and characterize the symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium of the consumer
booking game for a given upgrade price p. Upon arrival, a consumer observes her
valuations for two product types (vR, vH) and arrival time t as well as the availability
of product types, and books the product type that maximizes her expected utility.
For a consumer that is offered an upgrade, the key to her booking decision is the
expected upgrade probability q(·) she anticipates which is a function of her booking
time t. Let at(vR, vH |q(t)) denote the consumer’s utility-maximizing decision if she
arrives at time t, has valuations (vR, vH), and anticipates the upgrade probability to
be q(t).5 Similarly, let a′t(vR, vH) denote the utility-maximizing decision of a consumer
that is not offered an upgrade.
Now we derive at(vR, vH |q(t)) and a′t(vR, vH). Figure 3.1 shows the consumers’
utilities from booking different product types. The consumer’s utility from booking a
high-quality product is vH − pH , the utility from booking a regular product without
upgrade is vR−pR, the expected utility from booking a regular product with upgrade
is q(t)(vH − pR − p) + [1 − q(t)](vR − pR), the utility from not booking any product
is zero. Thus, the consumer chooses to book a high-quality product if vH − pH ≥
5We use q(·) to denote the whole function, and q(t) to denote its value at t.
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max{q(t)(vH − pR − p) + [1 − q(t)](vR − pR), vR − pR, 0}; she chooses to book a
regular product with upgrade if q(t)(vH − pR − p) + [1− q(t)](vR − pR) ≥ max{vH −
pH , vR − pR, 0}; she chooses to book a regular product without upgrade if vR − pR ≥
max{vH−pH , q(t)(vH−pR−p) + [1− q(t)](vR−pR), 0}; otherwise, she does not book
any product. We can simplify the above decision rule to the following:
• If p ≥ pH − pR,
at(vR, vH |q(t)) =

H if vH − vR ≥ pH − pR and vH ≥ pH ,
R if vH − vR < pH − pR and vR ≥ pR,
N otherwise.
• If 0 ≤ p < pH − pR,
at(vR, vH |q(t)) =

H if vH − vR ≥ pH−pR−q(t)p1−q(t) and vH ≥ pH ,
U if p ≤ vH − vR < pH−pR−q(t)p1−q(t) and
q(t)vH + [1− q(t)]vR ≥ pR + q(t)p,
R if vH − vR < p and vR ≥ pR,
N otherwise.
The utility-maximizing decision of consumers that are not offered upgrades, a′t(vR, vH),
is same as at(vR, vH |q(t)) with p ≥ pH − pR. It is easy to see that a′t(vR, vH) is also
the equilibrium strategy for consumers that are not offered upgrades. We next focus
on consumers that are offered upgrades and find their equilibrium strategy.
It is easy to see that if 0 ≤ p < pH − pR, at(vR, vH |q(t)) divides Ω into four
subsets. Given q(·), at(vR, vH |q(t)) is uniquely determined for each (vR, vH) and each
t, and at(vR, vH |q(t)) can be easily computed by plugging q(t) into the equation of
at(vR, vH |q(t)). Thus, we use q(·) to define the consumer’s strategy in the booking
game. The reason for using q(·) as the strategy instead of at(vR, vH |q(·)) is that the
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corresponding strategy space has fewer dimensions and the computational burden of
equilibrium is smaller. The strategy space is then defined asQ = {q(·) : [0, T ]→ [0, 1],
such that q(·) is differentiable}. Q contains all differentiable functions of t ∈ [0, T ]
taking values between 0 and 1.
To find the symmetric equilibrium q∗(·), we first fix one consumer (we call this
consumer the acting consumer) and calculate the expected upgrade probability for
the acting consumer if she books a regular product and accepts an upgrade offer
when all other consumers are making their decisions based on q(·). Denote this
resulting upgrade probability for the acting consumer as b(q(·)), b(q(·)) is also a
function of t. Then, q∗(·) is the solution to b(q∗(·)) = q∗(·). We can write b(q(·)) as
b(q(·)) = g(q(·))/h(q(·)), where g(q(·)) is the unconditional expected probability that
a consumer arriving at time t accepts an upgrade offer and gets upgraded at the end
of the booking period, and h(q(·)) is the probability that both product types are still
available by time t. So, b(q(·)) is the expected upgrade probability conditioning on
the fact that products are still available at time t.
Now we derive g(q(·)) and h(q(·)). With a slight abuse of notation, we use
NH(t|q(·)), NU(t|q(·)), NR(t|q(·)) to denote the arrival processes of other consumers
(as seen by the acting consumer) booking each product type given that the strategy
they are using is q(·). Let τ(q(·)) denote the stopping time of the consumer booking
game (i.e., the time when the firm stops selling at least one product type) if the acting
consumer chooses to book a regular product and accept an upgrade offer and all other
consumers use q(·). Then, we have
g(q(·)) = E
NH(t|q(·)),NU (t|q(·)),NR(t|q(·))
{
min
{
[KH −NH(τ(q(·))|q(·))]+
NU(τ(q(·))|q(·)) + 1 , 1
}
· 1 {t ≤ τ(q(·))}
}
where the “+1” term represents the acting consumer, and
h(q(·)) = P(NH(t|q(·)) < KH , NR(t|q(·)) < KR, NH(t|q(·))+NU(t|q(·))+NR(t|q(·)) < KH+KR).
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Note that g(q(·)) and h(q(·)) both depend on t. To completely characterize g(q(·))
and h(q(·)), it remains to characterize NH(t|q(·)), NU(t|q(·)), NR(t|q(·)) as well as
τ(q(·)).
Lemma III.1. (Myerson 1998: Environmental equivalence property of games with
Poisson arrivals6) From the perspective of any one player, the arrival process of other
players is also a Poisson process with the same rate as the total arrival rate.
Lemma III.1 implies that NH(t|q(·)), NU(t|q(·)), NR(t|q(·)) are indeed Poisson
processes. Moreover, they have the same distributions as the overall arrival processes.
Given q(·), the probabilities of any other consumer that is offered an upgrade booking
each type of product are as follows:
ξγH(t|q(·)) =
∫∫
Ω
1{at(vR, vH |q(·)) = H}f(vR, vH) dvR dvH ,
ξγU(t|q(·)) =
∫∫
Ω
1{at(vR, vH |q(·)) = U}f(vR, vH) dvR dvH ,
ξγR(t|q(·)) =
∫∫
Ω
1{at(vR, vH |q(·)) = R}f(vR, vH) dvR dvH .
The probabilities of any other consumer that is not offered an upgrade booking each
type of product are as follows:
ξ′H(t) =
∫∫
Ω
1{a′t(vR, vH) = H}f(vR, vH) dvR dvH ,
ξ′R(t) =
∫∫
Ω
1{a′t(vR, vH) = R}f(vR, vH) dvR dvH .
Thus, the arrival rates ofNH(t|q(·)), NU(t|q(·)), NR(t|q(·)) are λH(t|q(·)) = λγξγH(t|q(·))+
6Myerson (1998) first proved the environmental equivalence property of games with Poisson
arrivals. Myerson (1998) provides a proof for the case of discrete player type set, but it is easily
generalized to the case of continuous player type set (in our problem, the player type set is continuous
because we assume a continuous valuation support). We refer the readers interested in Poisson games
to Myerson (1998), Myerson (2000) and Milchtaich (2004).
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λ(1 − γ)ξ′H(t), λU(t|q(·)) = λγξγU(t|q(·)), λR(t|q(·)) = λγξγR(t|q(·)) + λ(1 − γ)ξ′R(t),
respectively.
Next, we derive the stopping time τ(q(·)). Define the following auxiliary stopping
times:
• τH(q(·)) = inf{t ≥ 0 : NH(t|q(·)) ≥ KH}.
• τR(q(·)) = inf{t ≥ 0 : NR(t|q(·)) ≥ KR}.
• τT (q(·)) = inf{t ≥ 0 : NH(t|q(·)) +NU(t|q(·)) + 1 +NR(t|q(·)) ≥ KH +KR}.
τH(q(·)) is the time when high-quality products are fully booked, τR(q(·)) is the
time when regular products are fully booked, τT (q(·)) is the time when the total
demand reaches the firm’s total capacity so both product types are fully booked
simultaneously. Then, the stopping time of the consumer booking game is τ(q(·)) =
min{τˆ(q(·)), T}, where
τˆ(q(·)) = min {τH(q(·)), τR(q(·)), τT (q(·))}
=

τH(q(·)) if τH(q(·)) ≤ τT (q(·)),
τR(q(·)) if τR(q(·)) ≤ τT (q(·)),
τT (q(·)) if τH(q(·)) > τT (q(·)) and τR(q(·)) > τT (q(·)).
τˆ(·) can be interpreted as the stopping time when T → ∞. Note that the second
equality in the above equation follows from the fact that τH(q(·)) ≤ τT (q(·)) implies
τH(q(·)) < τR(q(·)) and that τR(q(·)) ≤ τT (q(·)) implies τR(q(·)) < τH(q(·)).
Theorem III.2. There exists a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium q∗(·) of the con-
sumer booking game. q∗(·) is increasing in the arrival time of the consumer. More-
over, with Q equipped with the uniform norm ‖q(·)‖∞ = sup0≤t≤T |q(t)|, there exists
a constant α¯ such that for any q1(·), q2(·) ∈ Q, we have ‖b(q1(·)) − b(q2(·))‖∞ ≤
α¯‖q1(·) − q2(·)‖∞. Thus, if α¯ < 1, b(q(·)) is a contraction mapping and the equilib-
rium is unique.
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Theorem III.2 states that the consumer booking game indeed has a symmetric
pure-strategy equilibrium q∗(·) which is the solution to b(q∗(·)) = q∗(·). q∗(·) is
an increasing function because a consumer that arrives later and still finds both
product types are available will have better knowledge that demand has realized to
be weak, and hence form a higher probability of getting upgraded. Theorem III.2 also
gives a sufficient condition for q∗(·) to be unique.7 However, due to the complicated
structure of our Poisson game, it is not possible to derive the closed-form equilibrium
or further analyze the firm’s optimal upgrade pricing policy analytically (the firm’s
revenue function is given in Section 3.9). To study conditional upgrades in greater
depth and develop more managerial and policy insights, we are going to analyze a
fluid model which is the asymptotic version of our stochastic model (i.e., scale up
the capacities and demand rates by n and let n → ∞). One may consider our fluid
model as a deterministic approximation of the stochastic model where the consumer
booking game is essentially one with perfect information. However, as verified by
our numerical examples in Sections 3.5.3 and 3.6, our fluid model is very accurate
in approximating the stochastic model and the results and insights derived from the
fluid model also hold in the stochastic model. In Section 3.7, we study the stochastic
model numerically and derive additional insights from the stochastic model.
3.5 Fluid Model
In this section, we derive and analyze the fluid model. In Section 3.5.1, we derive
the asymptotic consumer booking equilibrium by scaling up the problem size by n
and letting n → ∞. In the problem instance scaled by n, the consumer arrival rate
7The formula of α¯ is complicated and is given in the proof of Theorem III.2 in Appendix B. Our
numerical studies indicate that α¯ < 1 is satisfied when the product prices are far apart enough from
each other and the capacity-demand ratio is moderately large. Note that α¯ < 1 is a sufficient but
not necessary condition for the equilibrium to be unique. In our extensive numerical studies with
joint-uniform valuation distributions, we do not observe multiple equilibria to arise. In fact, as the
capacities and demand rates increase proportionally to infinity, the equilibrium is provably unique
(Theorem III.4).
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is nλ(t) and the firm’s capacities are nKH and nKR. For other variables, we add a
subscript of n to specify the problem size. Based on the model in Section 3.5.1, in
Section 3.5.2, we study the firm’s optimal upgrade pricing strategy. In Section 3.5.3,
we evaluate the performance of the fluid model.
3.5.1 Consumer Booking Equilibrium
The following theorem characterizes the equilibrium upgrade probability in the
asymptotic scenario of the consumer booking game. As n→∞, q∗(·) converges to a
constant qf , where the subscript of f denotes the fluid model (we also use s to denote
the stochastic model).
Theorem III.3. (i) As n → ∞, for any q(·) ∈ Q, the auxiliary stopping times
converge to
τ∞H (q(·)) = inf
t ≥ 0 :
t∫
0
λH(s|q(·)) ds ≥ KH
 ,
τ∞R (q(·)) = inf
t ≥ 0 :
t∫
0
λR(s|q(·)) ds ≥ KR
 ,
τ∞T (q(·)) = inf
t ≥ 0 :
t∫
0
[λH(s|q(·)) + λU(s|q(·)) + λR(s|q(·))] ds ≥ KR +KH
 ,
a.s., respectively. The stopping time of the consumer booking game converges to
τ∞(q(·)) = min{τˆ∞(q(·)), T} a.s., where
τˆ∞(q(·)) =

τ∞H (q(·)) if τ∞H (q(·)) ≤ τ∞T (q(·)),
τ∞R (q(·)) if τ∞R (q(·)) ≤ τ∞T (q(·)),
τ∞T (q(·)) if τ∞H (q(·)) > τ∞T (q(·)) and τ∞R (q(·)) > τ∞T (q(·)).
(ii) As n → ∞, the equilibrium upgrade probability qn∗(·) converges pointwise to
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qf which is the (time-independent) solution of the following equation:
qf = min

[
KH −
∫ τ∞(qf )
0
λH(t|qf ) dt
]+
∫ τ∞(qf )
0
λU(t|qf ) dt
, 1
 . (3.1)
Our primary goal with the fluid model is to derive closed-form solutions which
will provide us sharp insights about how consumers make upgrading decisions and
how the firm’s optimal upgrade price depends on problem parameters. To be able to
obtain closed-form solutions, we will assume that the consumers’ valuations for two
types of products are jointly uniformly distributed in the two-dimensional support
Ω = {(vR, vH) : 0 ≤ vR ≤ vH ≤ u}, that is, for consumers that value high-quality
products at vH , their valuations for regular products are uniformly distributed over
[0, vH ]. u > pH is the upper bound of consumer valuations. Thus, the valuation
support Ω is now an upper triangular subset of R2+, and the joint probability density
is f(vR, vH) = 2/u
2. Our analysis can be easily generalized if we move Ω within
R2+ to allow for different upper and lower bounds of consumer valuations. Moreover,
we have numerically tested our results when consumers’ valuations follow a bivariate
normal distribution, and we find that all results in the paper carry through to the
case with bivariate normal distribution.
Now we calculate qf by solving (3.1). We first need to derive the demand seg-
mentation in the fluid model for a given q (i.e., λH(q), λU(q), λR(q)). Figure 3.2
plots all five possible demand segmentations of consumers that are offered upgrades.
Throughout this chapter, we use the superscript “a” through “e” consistent with
Figure 3.2 to specify which case we are referring to. Case a also gives the demand
segmentation of consumers that are not offered upgrades. In each ease, the propor-
tions of consumers booking each product type, ξH(q), ξU(q), ξR(q), can be calculated
as the ratio between the area of each region where the consumer decision is to book
the corresponding product type and the area of the entire valuation support Ω. The
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Figure 3.2: Demand segmentation given the upgrade price p and the upgrade prob-
ability q: (a) no upgrades offered, or p ≥ pH − pR; (b) p < pH − pR and
q = 1; (c) p < pH − pR and q < 1 and (pH − pR − qp)/(1 − q) ≥ u;
(d) p < pH − pR and q < 1 and pH ≤ (pH − pR − qp)/(1 − q) < u; (e)
p < pH − pR and q < 1 and (pH − pR − qp)/(1− q) < pH .
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results are shown below. The overall demand rates are λH(q) = λγξ
i
H(q)+λ(1−γ)ξaH ,
λU(q) = λγξ
i
U(q), λR(q) = λγξ
i
R(q) + λ(1− γ)ξaR in Case i.
Case a If p ≥ pH −pR (i.e., the firm does not offer upgrades), the consumer segmen-
tation (of consumers that are offered upgrades) is
ξaH =
1
u2
(u−pH+2pR)(u−pH), ξaU = 0, ξaR =
1
u2
(pH−pR)(2u−pH−pR).
Case b If p < pH − pR (i.e., the firm offers upgrades) and q = 1, because upgrades
are guaranteed to be fulfilled, nobody books a high-quality product directly.
The consumer segmentation in this case is
ξbH = 0, ξ
b
U =
1
u2
(pR +u− p)(u− pR− p), ξbR =
1
u2
[−p2 + 2(u− pR)p] .
Case c If p < pH − pR and q < 1 and (pH − pR − qp)/(1 − q) ≥ u, since q < 1, by
booking a regular product and accepting an upgrade offer instead of booking a
high-quality product directly, a consumer risks not being upgraded and ending
up consuming a regular product. Recall that a consumer books a high-quality
product directly if vH − vR ≥ (pH − pR − qp)/(1 − q) and vH ≥ pH , where
(pH − pR− qp)/(1− q) is the minimum valuation differential required to induce
one to book a high-quality product directly. If (pH − pR − qp)/(1− q) ≥ u, all
consumers that are interested in high-quality products will choose to get them
through upgrades. The consumer segmentation in this case is
ξcH = 0, ξ
c
U(q) =
1
u2
[
−p
2
R
q
+ (u− p)2
]
, ξcR =
1
u2
[−p2 + 2(u− pR)p] .
Case d If p < pH − pR and q < 1 and pH ≤ (pH − pR − qp)/(1− q) < u, since (pH −
pR−qp)/(1−q) < u, the consumers with high enough valuations for high-quality
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products combined with low enough valuations for regular products will book
high-quality products directly. Thus, in this case, high-quality products are
sold in both channels (i.e., directly and through upgrades). Further, depending
on whether (pH − pR − qp)/(1− q) ≥ pH or not, ξH(q) and ξU(q) take different
functional forms. If (pH − pR− qp)/(1− q) ≥ pH , the consumer segmentation is
ξdH(q) =
1
u2
(
u− pH − pR − qp
1− q
)2
,
ξdU(q) =
1
u2
[
−
(
pH − pR − qp
1− q
)2
+ 2u
(
pH − pR − qp
1− q
)
− p
2
R
q
+ p2 − 2up
]
,
ξdR =
1
u2
[−p2 + 2(u− pR)p] .
Otherwise we are in Case e.
Case e If p < pH − pR and q < 1 and (pH − pR − qp)/(1 − q) < pH , the consumer
segmentation is
ξeH(q) =
1
u2
[
u+ pH − 2(pH − pR − qp)
1− q
]
(u− pH),
ξeU(q) =
1
u2
· pH − pR − p
1− q · (2u− pH − pR − p),
ξeR =
1
u2
[−p2 + 2(u− pR)p] .
We assume KH ≥ λaHT and KR ≥ λaRT , that is, the firm’s expected demand when
upgrades are not offered does not exceed its capacity for either product type at the
prices pH and pR. This assumption is reasonable since the utilization rates in travel
industries are generally not high (according to Statista8, the average occupancy rate
of the U.S. hotel lodging industry from 2000 to 2013 is only 60%). We would like to
note that when the firm offers upgrades, it is still possible under this assumption that
8http://www.statista.com/statistics/200161/us-annual-accomodation-and-lodging-occupancy-
rate.
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the firm’s total capacity is fully booked before the end of the booking period, because
offering upgrades can generate more demand than the case without upgrades. Thus,
our analysis allows for any utilization level with upgrades. Moreover, our numerical
analysis indicates that all findings in this essay continue to hold even if the above
assumption is not satisfied.
Theorem III.4. Define
p¯ = u−
√
1
γ
[
KH
λT
u2 − (u− pH + 2pR)(u− pH)
]
+ (u− pH + pR)2,
p = pH − pR −
KH
λT
u2 − (u− pH + 2pR)(u− pH)
γ(u− pH + pR) ,
p′ = − 1
pR
[
KH
λT
u2 − u2 + 2(pH − pR)u− p2H + pHpR + p2R
]
+
1
γpR
√
γ
[
KH
λT
u2 − (u− pH + 2pR)(u− pH)
]
·
√[
1− γ − (1− γ)KH +KR
λT
]
u2 + 2γ(pH − pR)u− γp2H − 2(1− γ)pHpR + γp2R.
(i) If KH ≥ (λT/u2)[(u− pH + 2pR)(u− pH) + γ(pH − pR)(2u− pH + pR)], qf = 1
for all 0 ≤ p < pH − pR.
(ii) If KH < (λT/u
2)[(u − pH + 2pR)(u − pH) + γ(pH − pR)(2u − pH + pR)], the
equilibrium upgrade probability is uniquely given by the following:
• If p+ ≥ p′+ (where x+ = max{x, 0}),
qf =

1 for p¯ ≤ p < pH − pR,
KH
λT
u2−(u−pH+2pR)(u−pH)+γ(u−pH+pR)2
γ(u−p)2 for p
+ ≤ p < p¯,
KH
λT
u2−(u−pH+2pR)(u−pH)
γ(pH−pR−p)2+KHλT u2−(u−pH+2pR)(u−pH)
for 0 ≤ p < p+;
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• If p+ < p′+,
qf =

1 for p¯ ≤ p < pH − pR,
KH
λT
u2−(u−pH+2pR)(u−pH)+γ(u−pH+pR)2
γ(u−p)2 for p
′+ ≤ p < p¯,
2γ
KH
KH+KR
p2R
−β−
√
β2−4γ2 KH
KH+KR
p2R(u−p)2
for 0 ≤ p < p′+,
where β = (u − pH + 2pR)(u − pH) − γ(u − pH + pR)2 + KHKH+KR [2γpRp − u2 +
(1− γ)(2pHpR − p2R)].
(iii) qf is increasing in p.
Theorem III.4 gives the equilibrium upgrade probability qf for any upgrade price
p set by the firm. If the firm’s capacity for high-quality products is very large (i.e.,
KH ≥ (λT/u2)[(u − pH + 2pR)(u − pH) + γ(pH − pR)(2u − pH + pR)]), consumers
accepting upgrade offers are guaranteed to get upgraded. In equilibrium, being aware
of the very high chance to get upgraded, all consumers who are interested in high-
quality products and offered upgrades choose to book regular products and accept
upgrade offers. If the firm’s capacity for high-quality products is not very large (i.e.,
KH < (λT/u
2)[(u− pH + 2pR)(u− pH) + γ(pH − pR)(2u− pH + pR)]), the equilibrium
upgrade probability qf increases with the upgrade price p. This is because fewer
consumers accept upgrade offers when the upgrade price is higher. As the upgrade
price p decreases from pH−pR to 0, as shown by the proof of Theorem III.4, the market
segmentation takes the form in Cases b, c, d, e in sequence.9 Case d or e occurs only
if the upgrade price is low (i.e., 0 ≤ p < p+), meaning the equilibrium upgrade
probability is small enough. Thus, the consumers with high enough valuations for
high-quality products and low enough valuations for low-quality products will book
9p¯ is the threshold between Case b and Case c, p is the threshold between Case c and Case d
when τ∞(qf ) ≥ T , p′ is the threshold between Case c and Case d when τ∞(qf ) < T . If p+ ≥ p′+,
when Case c switches to Case d, we have τ∞(qf ) ≥ T ; and vice versa. qf takes the same form in
Cases d and e.
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high-quality products directly even if they are offered upgrades. In Case b or c, the
upgrade probability is large enough so that consumers would like to obtain high-
quality products through upgrades if they are given the offers.
3.5.2 Optimal Upgrade Pricing
In this section, based on the equilibrium consumer booking decision characterized
in Section 3.5.1, we study the firm’s optimal conditional upgrade pricing strategy. The
firm’s goal is to maximize its revenue from selling both types of products and charging
upgrade fees. Recall that p ≥ pH − pR corresponds to the case without upgrades. In
this case, the firm’s revenue is ΠN,f = pRλ
a
R min{KR/λaR, T}+pHλaH min{KH/λaH , T},
where the subscript of N denotes no upgrades. If the firm offers upgrades with
p < pH − pR, its revenue is
Πf (p) = pR[λU(qf ) + λR]τ
∞(qf ) + pλU(qf )τ∞(qf )qf + pHλH(qf )τ∞(qf )
+1{τ∞(qf ) = τ∞R (qf )}pH min {λaH [T − τ∞(qf )], KH − [λH(qf ) + λU(qf )]τ∞(qf )}
+1{τ∞(qf ) = τ∞H (qf )}pR min {λaR[T − τ∞(qf )], KR − [λU(qf ) + λR]τ∞(qf )} .
The first line of Πf (p) is the revenue collected before the consumer booking game
stops. The first term is the revenue from selling regular products (including the
revenue from consumers accepting upgrade offers), the second term is the revenue
from collecting upgrade fees, the third term is the revenue from selling high-quality
products. The second line of Πf (p) is the revenue from selling high-quality products
after regular products are fully booked, where λaH [T − τ∞(qf )] is the demand and
KH − [λH(qf ) + λU(qf )]τ∞(qf ) is the remaining capacity for high-quality products.
The third line of Πf (p) is the revenue from selling regular products after high-quality
products are fully booked . Since Πf (p) = ΠN,f at p = pH − pR, we limit ourselves
to 0 ≤ p ≤ pH − pR in studying Πf (p) in the remainder of this chapter. When the
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optimal upgrade price is achieved at p∗f = pH − pR, we know that it is optimal for the
firm not to offer upgrades.
Theorem III.5. The optimal upgrade price is p∗f = min
{
max
{
(pbfoc)
+, p¯
}
, pH − pR
}
,
where
pbfoc =
2u−√u2 + 9p2R
3
.
Moreover, the optimal pricing induces qf = 1.
Theorem III.5 characterizes the optimal upgrade price. The optimal upgrade price
results in an equilibrium consumer segmentation in Case b (pbfoc is the optimal price
in Case b, Case b occurs for p¯ ≤ p ≤ pH − pR) where the upgrade probability is equal
to one. Recall that Theorem III.4 states qf is increasing in p (or always equal to one if
the high-quality product capacity is very large). Thus, Theorem III.5 states that the
firm should choose an upgrade price that is high enough. If an upgrade price results
in some consumers being rationed for upgrades, that means too many consumers are
willing to pay for the upgrades and the current upgrade price is too low. The firm
should increase the upgrade price to extract more surplus from consumers while still
being able to sell out high-quality products after fulfilling upgrades. Thus, under
the optimal upgrade pricing policy, strategic consumers who are offered upgrades
purchase high-quality products through upgrades instead of booking directly. Note
that because of the deterministic feature, our fluid model captures an ideal situation
where the firm and consumers have perfect knowledge about the total demand for
each product type. In the stochastic model, because of the demand randomness, the
equilibrium upgrade probability may not be exactly equal to one under the optimal
upgrade price, so consumers with very high valuations for high-quality products and
very low valuations for regular products may choose to book high-quality products
directly even if upgrades are offered at the optimal price. However, consistent with
the insight we developed from the fluid model, in the stochastic model, the firm
66
should generally charge a high enough upgrade price that results in a high upgrade
probability for consumers (Tables 3.1 and 3.2 in the next subsection provide a set of
examples).
3.5.3 Performance Evaluation of Fluid Model
We now evaluate how well the fluid model approximates the stochastic model for
relatively small values of n (we know that as n → ∞, the fluid model converges
to the stochastic model). In Figure 3.3, we provide an illustrative example for the
comparison between the consumer purchasing equilibria in the stochastic model for
different values of n and the consumer booking equilibrium in the fluid model. For
example, in Figure 3.3, we see that the upgrade probability in the fluid model is 1. We
also see that when n = 5, in the stochastic model, the upgrade probability is 0.9927.
We note that in this example, n = 5 corresponds to a relatively small hotel with 60
rooms (n(KH + KR) = 60). Furthermore, in the example in Figure 3.3, we see that
when n = 5, the percentage of consumers that would make a different decision in the
stochastic model (with respect to which type of product to book) than in the fluid
model is only 0.73%. In Tables 3.1 and 3.2, we examine the gap between the consumer
booking equilibria in the stochastic model and in the fluid model with more exam-
ples. Table 3.1 provides examples with different product prices, Table 3.2 provides
examples with different product capacities. We can see that the equilibrium upgrade
probability in the stochastic model is closer to one when the product price differential
is larger, or when the high-quality product capacity is large, both indicating a smaller
probability that the firm runs out of high-quality products. Overall, we observe that
the equilibrium upgrade probability is increasing in the product price differential,
and increasing in the high-quality product capacity. When the equilibrium upgrade
probability in the stochastic model is closer to one, the equilibrium consumer segmen-
tation in the stochastic model is also closer to the equilibrium demand segmentation
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in the fluid model.
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[q∗(t)] Demand segmentation ∆Demand
High Upgrade Regular
1 0.9152 9.00% 25.20% 30.19% 2.03%
2 0.9640 9.00% 25.51% 30.20% 1.72%
5 0.9927 9.00% 26.49% 29.75% 0.73%
10 0.9989 9.00% 27.02% 29.47% 0.20%
20 1 9.00% 27.21% 29.37% 0.02%
∞ 1 9.00% 27.22% 29.36% –
Figure 3.3: A numerical example on the asymptotic convergence of consumer booking
equilibrium under the optimal upgrade price. (λ = 1, T = 10, KH = 5,
KR = 7, pH = 160, pR = 70, γ = 0.5, vR and vH are jointly uniformly
distributed over Ω = {(vR, vH) : 0 ≤ vR ≤ vH ≤ 200}; “∆Demand”
is defined as the expected percentage of consumers that would make a
different booking decision in the stochastic model than predicted by the
fluid model)
Table 3.3 provides an illustrative example for the asymptotic convergence of the
firm’s optimal upgrade price and revenue. The derivation of the stochastic revenue
function, Πs(p), is given in Section 3.9. By comparing the stochastic revenues using
the optimal upgrade price derived from the fluid model and using the optimal upgrade
price for the stochastic model, we can evaluate the performance of the fluid model.
From Table 3.3, we clearly see that by using the optimal upgrade price derived from
the fluid model, the firm’s revenue deviates by an almost negligible amount from the
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pH = 130 pH = 140 pH = 150 pH = 160
E
t
[q∗(t)] ∆Demand E
t
[q∗(t)] ∆Demand E
t
[q∗(t)] ∆Demand E
t
[q∗(t)] ∆Demand
pR = 60 0.9879 1.34% 0.9953 0.63% 0.9985 0.24% 0.9996 0.08%
pR = 70 0.9770 2.25% 0.9898 1.21% 0.9962 0.55% 0.9989 0.20%
pR = 80 0.9615 3.42% 0.9809 2.05% 0.9919 1.06% 0.9972 0.45%
pR = 90 0.8680 23.35% 0.9685 3.11% 0.9849 1.79% 0.9939 0.88%
Table 3.1: Numerical examples on the gap between the consumer booking equilibria
(under the optimal upgrade price) in the stochastic model and in the fluid
model with different product prices: the time-average equilibrium upgrade
probability (E
t
[q∗(t)]) and the expected percentage of consumers that would
make a different booking decision in the stochastic model than predicted
by the fluid model (∆Demand). (λ = 1, T = 100, KH = 50, KR = 70,
γ = 0.5, vR and vH are jointly uniformly distributed over Ω = {(vR, vH) :
0 ≤ vR ≤ vH ≤ 200})
KH = 40 KH = 50 KH = 60 KH = 70
E
t
[q∗(t)] ∆Demand E
t
[q∗(t)] ∆Demand E
t
[q∗(t)] ∆Demand E
t
[q∗(t)] ∆Demand
KR = 60 0.9487 3.05% 0.9919 1.06% 0.9997 0.05% 1.0000 0.00%
KR = 70 0.9487 3.06% 0.9919 1.06% 0.9997 0.05% 1.0000 0.00%
KR = 80 0.9487 3.06% 0.9919 1.06% 0.9997 0.05% 1.0000 0.00%
KR = 90 0.9487 3.06% 0.9919 1.06% 0.9997 0.05% 1.0000 0.00%
Table 3.2: Numerical examples on the gap between the consumer booking equilib-
ria (under the optimal upgrade price) in the stochastic model and in the
fluid model with different product capacities: the time-average equilib-
rium upgrade probability (E
t
[q∗(t)]) and the expected percentage of con-
sumers that would make a different booking decision in the stochastic
model than predicted by the fluid model (∆Demand). (λ = 1, T = 100,
pH = 150, pR = 80, γ = 0.5, vR and vH are jointly uniformly distributed
over Ω = {(vR, vH) : 0 ≤ vR ≤ vH ≤ 200})
real optimal revenue in the stochastic model even for very small problem sizes (less
than or equal to 0.1% even for n = 1). The optimal upgrade price itself may have some
error especially when the problem size is small, but our numerical studies indicate
that the revenue function in the stochastic model is quite flat in the region around
the optimal upgrade price, hence the deviation of the optimal revenue is significantly
smaller than the deviation of the optimal upgrade price. In Tables 3.4 and 3.5, we
examine the deviation of optimal upgrade price and optimal revenue in the stochastic
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model caused by the fluid solution with more examples. Table 3.4 provides examples
with different product prices, Table 3.5 provides examples with different product
capacities. We can see that similar to the observation from analyzing the consumer
booking equilibrium, the optimal upgrade price and revenue deviations caused by the
fluid solution are smaller when the product price differential is larger, or when the
high-quality product capacity is larger, both indicating a smaller probability that the
firm runs out of high-quality products. Overall we observe that the pricing heuristic
derived from the fluid model performs very well in terms of giving the firm close-
to-optimal revenues in the stochastic model. Thus, by studying the fluid model, we
can develop managerial insights that will carry through to the stochastic model and
provide an excellent heuristic for the stochastic problem.
n
Fluid solution Stochastic solution
∆p∗ = |p
∗
f−p∗s|
p∗s
∆Π∗ =
Πs(p∗s)−Πs(p∗f )
Πs(p∗s)p∗f Πs(p
∗
f ) p
∗
s Πs(p
∗
s)
1 36.7 620.7 40.3 621.1 8.96% 0.07%
2 36.7 1265.4 40.4 1266.4 9.13% 0.08%
5 36.7 3192.2 38.4 3192.8 4.42% 0.02%
10 36.7 6396.9 37.1 6397.0 1.28% 0.00%
20 36.7 12798.0 36.7 12798.0 0.11% 0.00%
Table 3.3: A numerical examples on the asymptotic convergence of optimal upgrade
price and revenue. (λ = 1, T = 10, KH = 5, KR = 7, pH = 160, pR = 70,
γ = 0.5, vR and vH are jointly uniformly distributed over Ω = {(vR, vH) :
0 ≤ vR ≤ vH ≤ 200})
3.6 Analysis of Optimal Upgrade Pricing
Now that we have obtained the optimal upgrade pricing strategy, we explore it
further and develop managerial and policy insights for firms. We are first interested in
when the conditional upgrade policy increases firms’ revenues and when it can actually
decrease revenues. We identify some benefits of conditional upgrades and show that
by optimally deciding when to offer upgrades and at which price to offer upgrades, the
firm benefits from offering conditional upgrades to more strategic consumers. Then,
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pH = 130 pH = 140 pH = 150 pH = 160
∆p∗ ∆Π∗ ∆p∗ ∆Π∗ ∆p∗ ∆Π∗ ∆p∗ ∆Π∗
pR = 60 7.07% 0.07% 3.45% 0.01% 1.36% 0.00% 0.43% 0.00%
pR = 70 12.53% 0.18% 7.20% 0.05% 3.40% 0.01% 1.28% 0.00%
pR = 80 20.25% 0.35% 13.31% 0.14% 7.42% 0.04% 3.34% 0.01%
pR = 90 31.36% 0.62% 22.89% 0.28% 14.77% 0.10% 7.90% 0.02%
Table 3.4: Numerical examples on the gap between the firm’s optimal upgrade prices
as well as revenues in the stochastic model and in the fluid model with
different product prices: the price error (∆p∗ = |p
∗
f−p∗s|
p∗s
) and the revenue
error (∆Π∗ =
Πs(p∗s)−Πs(p∗f )
Πs(p∗s)
). (λ = 1, T = 100, KH = 50, KR = 70, γ = 0.5,
vR and vH are jointly uniformly distributed over Ω = {(vR, vH) : 0 ≤ vR ≤
vH ≤ 200})
KH = 40 KH = 50 KH = 60 KH = 70
∆p∗ ∆Π∗ ∆p∗ ∆Π∗ ∆p∗ ∆Π∗ ∆p∗ ∆Π∗
KR = 60 16.26% 0.28% 7.42% 0.04% 0.41% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
KR = 70 16.27% 0.28% 7.42% 0.04% 0.41% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
KR = 80 16.27% 0.28% 7.42% 0.04% 0.41% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
KR = 90 16.27% 0.28% 7.42% 0.04% 0.41% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Table 3.5: Numerical examples on the gap between the firm’s optimal upgrade prices
as well as revenues in the stochastic model and in the fluid model with
different product capacities: the price error (∆p∗ = |p
∗
f−p∗s|
p∗s
) and the
revenue error (∆Π∗ =
Πs(p∗s)−Πs(p∗f )
Πs(p∗s)
). (λ = 1, T = 100, pH = 150,
pR = 80, γ = 0.5, vR and vH are jointly uniformly distributed over
Ω = {(vR, vH) : 0 ≤ vR ≤ vH ≤ 200})
we characterize when it is optimal to offer conditional upgrades for free. Finally,
we demonstrate the importance of accounting for strategic consumer behavior with
conditional upgrades by evaluating the cost of ignoring strategic consumer behavior.
3.6.1 When to Offer Upgrades?
The following result states when offering conditional upgrades at the optimal
price increases or decreases the firm’s revenue. For the conditional upgrade policy
to be strictly beneficial (i.e., p∗f < pH − pR), the product price differential should be
large enough. When the product price differential is small, it is optimal not to offer
upgrades (or alternatively set the upgrade price at p∗f = pH − pR).
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Theorem III.6. Offering conditional upgrades increases the revenue if
pH >
2u+ 3pR −
√
u2 + 9p2R
3
and decreases the revenue otherwise.
The fundamental trade-off regarding whether the firm should offer upgrades is as
follows. If the firm offers upgrades, some consumers, who book high-quality products
when the firm does not offer upgrades, will now book regular products and accept
upgrade offers instead. The firm’s revenue from direct sales of high-quality products
decreases, that is, the upgrade channel cannibalizes the direct sales of high-quality
products. This is the cannibalization effect of conditional upgrades. On the other
hand, some consumers who book regular products when the firm does not offer up-
grades will now accept upgrade offers, also some consumers who do not book any
product when the firm does not offer upgrades will now purchase regular products
and accept upgrade offers (these consumers’ valuations for regular (high-quality) prod-
ucts are lower than pR (pH), but their valuations for high-quality products are higher
than or equal to pR + p). These two types of consumers bring additional revenues
to the firm. This is the demand improvement effect of conditional upgrades. One
important factor that determines which of these two effects is stronger is the product
price differential. If the price differential is small and the firm offers upgrades, the
cannibalization effect is significant, as a lot of consumers will book high-quality prod-
ucts if the firm does not offer upgrades, and these consumers will shift to upgrades
under the optimal upgrade price (Theorem III.5). Moreover, since the high-quality
product price is already close to the regular product price, there will not be many
consumers who accept the upgrade offers, hence the demand improvement effect is
not significant. Therefore, the firm’s revenue is hurt if upgrades are offered in this
case.
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Thus, the firm benefits from offering conditional upgrades if the product price
differential is large enough. This finding has important implications for the companies
in travel industries regarding whether and when they should use the conditional
upgrade strategy. Travel managers tend to believe that upgrades should only be
offered between similar product types, as they feel that they may be giving consumers
too much benefit by offering them the opportunity to get a product that is much
better than the originally booked type. However, this common wisdom does not take
into account the consumers’ strategic behavior that they may deliberately book a
lower-quality product than desired in anticipation of getting upgraded later. Our
analysis suggests that as a response to such strategic consumer behavior, the firm
should be able to extract more revenues by offering upgrades between product types
that are priced not so closely, but also charging sufficiently large amounts for the
upgrades. We provide the following example for the stochastic model where as the
product price differential becomes smaller, offering upgrades switches from increasing
the firm’s revenue to decreasing the firm’s revenue: λ = 1, T = 100, KH = 70,
KR = 50, pR = 80, γ = 0.5, vR and vH are jointly uniformly distributed over
Ω = {(vR, vH) : 0 ≤ vR ≤ vH ≤ 200}. For this example, Theorem III.6 would
predict that offering upgrades benefits the firm when pH ≥ 110 and hurts the firm
when pH ≤ 109. From the numerical analysis for the stochastic model, we find that
offering upgrades benefits the firm when pH ≥ 111 and hurts the firm when pH ≤ 110,
which is very close to the result indicated by the fluid heuristic.
From our analysis above, we have seen two benefits of conditional upgrades. First,
the optimal conditional upgrade strategy can lead to demand expansion. Second,
offering upgrades can shift some consumers from regular products to high-quality
products. We use the following example (in the stochastic model) to illustrate these
two benefits of conditional upgrades: λ = 1, T = 100, KH = 70, KR = 50, pH = 150,
pR = 80, vR and vH are jointly uniformly distributed over Ω = {(vR, vH) : 0 ≤ vR ≤
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vH ≤ 200}. For this example, if the firm does not offer upgrades, 26.25% of consumers
book high-quality products and 29.75% of consumers book regular products. If the
firm offers upgrades to half of the consumers (i.e., γ = 0.5), 13.13% of consumers
book high-quality products directly, 27.41% of consumers book regular products and
accept the upgrade offers, and 23.09% of consumers book regular products without
upgrades. Compared to the case without upgrades where the total demand is 56%,
the firm increases the total demand to 63.63% by offering upgrades to half of the
consumers. Thus, the firm captures more demand overall (i.e., demand expansion
effect). Moreover, offering upgrades decreases the demand for regular products from
29.75% to 23.09% and increases the demand for high-quality products from 26.25%
to 40.54% (including the consumers who accept the upgrade offers). Thus, the firm
shifts some consumers from regular products to high-quality products (i.e., demand
segmentation reoptimization effect). We will identify more benefits of conditional
upgrades in later sections.
Theorem III.7. The optimal upgrade price and the optimal revenue are increasing
in γ.
How does the firm’s revenue change with the proportion of strategic consumers it
offers conditional upgrades to? Theorem III.7 states that the firm’s revenue becomes
higher when it offers conditional upgrades to more strategic consumers. Note that
Theorem III.7 incorporates the possibility that it is optimal not to offer conditional
upgrades, as the optimal upgrade price and revenue would be constant in γ in this case.
For a firm that sells conditional upgrades at the optimal upgrade price, the presence
of strategic consumers is actually not a bad thing. Although strategic consumers
create the cannibalization effect of conditional upgrades, they also allow the firm
to benefit from demand expansion and demand segmentation reoptimization. By
appropriately choosing the upgrade price, the firm can compensate the revenue loss
due to cannibalization by the revenue gains due to the benefits of conditional upgrades
74
and earn a higher revenue overall. Figure 3.4 plots the firm’s optimal revenue in
the stochastic model as a function of the proportion of strategic consumers it offers
conditional upgrades to, which is an increasing function. Therefore, given that the
upgrade price is properly chosen, the firm benefits from offering conditional upgrades
to as many consumers as possible even if consumers are strategic.
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Figure 3.4: Firm’s optimal revenue in the stochastic model as a function of the per-
centage of consumers offered upgrades. (λ = 1, T = 100, KH = 50,
KR = 70, pH = 150, pR = 80, vR and vH are jointly uniformly distributed
over Ω = {(vR, vH) : 0 ≤ vR ≤ vH ≤ 200})
3.6.2 Free Upgrades
Next, we consider the extreme case where it is optimal for the firm to offer con-
ditional upgrades for free. As we mentioned in the beginning, the recent trend is
that firms in the travel industry are offering fewer free upgrades and introducing paid
upgrades. The following theorem states that the optimal upgrade price is zero when
the regular products are very expensive (i.e., pR ≥ u/
√
3) and the firm has such an
overabundant high-quality product capacity (i.e., KH ≥ (λT/u2)[(u− pH + 2pR)(u−
pH) + γ(pH − pR)(2u− pH + pR)]) that it could satisfy all demand for both product
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types in expectation using only the high-quality product capacity when the upgrade
price is zero. Clearly, this is a very restrictive condition and is not very likely to be
satisfied in reality. Thus, our analysis shows that the conditional upgrades should
generally be fulfilled with fees, which is consistent with the industry trend.
Theorem III.8. p∗f = 0 if and only if pR ≥ u/
√
3 and KH ≥ (λT/u2)[(u − pH +
2pR)(u− pH) + γ(pH − pR)(2u− pH + pR)].
The trade-off that the firm is managing when giving free upgrades is as follows.
When upgrades are free, the firm will get a number of consumers, who would not have
booked any product at a higher upgrade price, to book regular products and accept
upgrade offers. In the mean time, the firm will earn less revenue from consumers
that would have accepted upgrade offers anyway at a higher upgrade price. As the
regular product price pR becomes higher, we can clearly see from Figure 3.2b that
the number of the first type of consumers discussed above becomes larger, and the
firm also earns more additional revenue from each of these consumers (at p = 0,
the firm earns pR from each consumer). However, the number of the second type of
consumers discussed above becomes smaller. Therefore, if the regular product price
is high enough (i.e., pR ≥ u/
√
3), the revenue improvement due to the first type
of consumers will dominate the revenue loss due to the second type of consumers.
Moreover, as Theorem III.5 states, the optimal upgrade price results in the upgrade
probability equal to one. Thus, for p = 0 to be optimal, we need the high-quality
product capacity to be larger than or equal to the expected demand for high-quality
products and upgrades, which results in KH ≥ (λT/u2)[(u − pH + 2pR)(u − pH) +
γ(pH−pR)(2u−pH +pR)]. We provide the following example for the stochastic model
where the optimal policy is to offer free upgrades when the regular product price pR
is high enough: λ = 1, T = 100, KH = 70, KR = 50, pH = 150, γ = 0.5, vR and vH
are jointly uniformly distributed over Ω = {(vR, vH) : 0 ≤ vR ≤ vH ≤ 200}. For this
example, Theorem III.8 would predict that p∗f = 0 when pR ≥ 116. We find the exact
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same result for the stochastic model (p∗s = 0 if and only if pR ≥ 116).
3.6.3 Cost of Ignoring Strategic Consumer Behavior
Finally, we investigate how important it is for the firm to take strategic consumer
behavior into consideration when offering conditional upgrades. We measure the
importance of accounting for strategic consumer behavior by the revenue loss (in the
stochastic model) if the firm mistakenly assumes consumers are myopic while they
are strategic. Myopic consumers do not consider future utilities from possibly getting
upgrades and make their booking decisions in a two-step way. A myopic consumer
first chooses between booking a high-quality product and booking a regular product
(ignoring the upgrade opportunity). In the first step, she books a high-quality product
if vH−pH ≥ max{vR−pR, 0}, books a regular product if vR−pR ≥ max{vH−pH , 0},
and does not book any product otherwise. If a myopic consumer books a regular
product, then upon receiving an upgrade offer, she accepts the offer if her utility from
getting upgraded dominates her utility from consuming the regular product. In the
second step, she accepts the upgrade offer if vH − pR − p ≥ vR − pR, or equivalently,
vH − vR ≥ p. Table 3.6 gives the revenue loss results if the firm mistakenly assumes
strategic consumers are myopic. As the results show, the cost of ignoring strategic
consumer behavior is non-negligible and can be very significant in most cases (revenue
loss exceeding 10%). Across all 16 examples given in Table 3.6, the average revenue
loss is 6.79%. According to recent data from Sageworks, a financial information
company, the net profit margin of U.S. hotel industry is 5% in 2013 and the five-year
average margin is −1% (Biery , 2014). Given the low net profit margin in the hotel
industry, the cost of ignoring strategic consumer behavior is significant.
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pH = 90 pH = 100 pH = 110 pH = 120
pR = 30 10.80% 8.45% 6.39% 4.52%
pR = 40 10.27% 8.16% 6.17% 4.40%
pR = 50 9.44% 7.57% 5.55% 3.83%
pR = 60 8.09% 6.96% 4.85% 3.19%
Table 3.6: Percentage revenue loss in the stochastic model if the firm prices con-
ditional upgrades assuming consumers are myopic while consumers are
strategic. (λ = 1, T = 100, KH = 70, KR = 50, γ = 1, vR and vH are
jointly uniformly distributed over Ω = {(vR, vH) : 0 ≤ vR ≤ vH ≤ 200})
3.7 Revenue Performance of Conditional Upgrades
In this section, we evaluate the conditional upgrade strategy’s revenue perfor-
mance. We will first consider a firm that is a price taker on product prices but can
set upgrade price, as we have assumed so far. An interesting question is how much of
the revenue potential does the conditional upgrade strategy capture compared to set-
ting product prices optimally? In Section 3.7.1, we compare the conditional upgrade
strategy to product price optimization. Our interesting finding is that conditional
upgrades as a lever can compensate for the firm’s lack of ability to optimize product
prices and even generate higher revenues than product price optimization. In Section
3.7.2, we compare conditional upgrades to an alternative way of offering upgrades,
in which case the firm offers last-minute upgrades at the end of the booking period
and can decide the upgrade price based on demand realizations during the booking
period. We find that the value of offering conditional upgrades in advance and col-
lecting consumers’ upgrading decisions in advance is greater than the value of pricing
flexibility for upgrades in most cases. Moreover, we will also consider a firm that
is not a price taker in the market. As dynamic pricing would be another strategy
that is naturally considered by such a firm, in Section 3.7.3, we compare the revenue
performance of conditional upgrades to the revenue performance of dynamic pricing.
Surprisingly, offering conditional upgrades outperforms dynamic pricing.
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3.7.1 Conditional Upgrades vs Product Price Optimization
For the fluid model, Corollary III.9 states that when profitable, offering conditional
upgrades to all consumers (which is the optimal strategy to offer upgrades, as shown in
Theorem III.7) enables the firm to capture all of the revenue potential from optimally
setting the price for high-quality products. Recall that as Theorem III.5 indicates,
when it is optimal to offer upgrades (i.e., when p∗f < pH − pR), consumers choose
to obtain high-quality products through upgrades, and the equilibrium outcome is
equivalent to the firm selling regular products at price pR and high-quality products
at price pR + p
∗
f . Thus, the high-quality product price is replaced by pR + p
∗
f which
results in a higher revenue (note that p∗f does not depend on pH). In this case, pR+p
∗
f
is also the optimal high-quality product price for a firm that is a price taker on regular
products. When it is optimal not to offer upgrades (i.e., when p∗f = pH−pR), however,
the firm may increase the revenue by increasing pH . Thus, the upgrade price can
“correct” the price for high-quality products when it is sub-optimally high. This is
consistent with our finding in Section 3.6.1 that offering conditional upgrades can
alter consumer segmentation and shift more consumers to high-quality products. By
offering upgrades, the firm can offer an effectively lower price for the high-quality
products that is somewhat disguised.
Corollary III.9. Consider two scenarios: 1) the firm takes both product prices as
given and offers conditional upgrades, 2) the firm only takes the regular product price
as given and does not offer conditional upgrades. With γ = 1, when it is optimal to
offer upgrades in the first scenario, these two scenarios result in the same revenue.
Next, we explore what happens with stochastic demand. In Table 3.7, we compare
the firm’s revenue when it is a price taker, ΠN,s, to 1) the revenue when the firm offers
upgrades at the optimal price (taking the product prices as given), Π∗s, and 2) the
revenue when the firm is a price taker on only regular products and can set the
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high-quality product price optimally, ΠN,s(p
∗
H,s). Interestingly, in all our numerical
examples for the stochastic model, we see that optimal upgrade pricing results in
strictly higher revenues than optimal high-quality product pricing. When demand
is stochastic and no upgrades are allowed, if the realized demand exceeds product
capacity for either type, the firm cannot capture this excess demand. However, with
upgrades, during the booking period, the firm does not allocate the consumers who
accept the upgrade offers to specific product types; after demand is fully realized, the
firm then gets to allocate more of these consumers to the product type that has weaker
demand. Thus, the firm is able to better match its capacity to demand and improve
capacity utilization. For example, suppose the firm is a price taker selling regular
products at price 90 and high-quality product at price 130. Suppose now that the
firm achieves flexibility to set price optimally for high-quality products. Optimizing
pH results in only a 0.13% improvement in revenue. However, if the firm keeps pH at
130, pR at 90, and offers conditional upgrades, it increases revenue by 1.30%. In all
of the examples in Table 3.7, the firm is able to obtain higher revenues by offering
paid upgrades than by being able to optimize the high-quality product price. Thus,
Table 3.7 clearly shows that the conditional upgrade strategy is a very valuable form
of flexibility for the firm, and in fact may be at least as valuable as the flexibility to
set price for one product type optimally.
In Table 3.8, we go one step further and compare the firm’s revenue when it is
a price taker, ΠN,s, to 1) the revenue when the firm offers upgrades at the optimal
price (taking the product prices as given), Π∗s, and 2) the revenue when the firm is
not a price taker and can set both product prices optimally, Π∗N,s. Interestingly, the
flexibility of conditional upgrades in better allocating capacity to stochastic demand
may even allow the firm to earn more revenue than optimizing both product prices
when the regular product price that the firm is forced to offer is not too far away from
optimal. For example, if the firm is forced to offer high-quality products at price 130
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pH = 130 pH = 140 pH = 150 pH = 160
∆Π∗s ∆ΠN,s(p
∗
H,s) ∆Π
∗
s ∆ΠN,s(p
∗
H,s) ∆Π
∗
s ∆ΠN,s(p
∗
H,s) ∆Π
∗
s ∆ΠN,s(p
∗
H,s)
pR = 60 4.57% 4.12% 10.44% 9.96% 18.65% 18.13% 29.75% 29.19%
pR = 70 2.93% 2.36% 8.36% 7.76% 16.28% 15.64% 27.27% 26.57%
pR = 80 1.67% 0.98% 6.58% 5.85% 14.36% 13.59% 25.43% 24.58%
pR = 90 1.30% 0.13% 4.96% 4.09% 12.67% 11.75% 23.97% 22.95%
Table 3.7: Percentage revenue improvements in the stochastic model from ΠN,s (i.e.,
the revenue from not offering upgrades and using the given product prices)
by 1) optimal upgrade pricing (∆Π∗s =
Π∗s−ΠN,s
ΠN,s
), and 2) optimal pricing
of high-quality products (∆ΠN,s(p
∗
H,s) =
ΠN,s(p
∗
H,s)−ΠN,s
ΠN,s
). (λ = 1, T = 100,
KH = 50, KR = 70, γ = 1, vR and vH are jointly uniformly distributed
over Ω = {(vR, vH) : 0 ≤ vR ≤ vH ≤ 200})
and regular products at price 100, optimizing pH and pR (the optimal product prices
are p∗H,s = 129.1 and p
∗
R,s = 92.7) results in only a 0.36% improvement in revenue.
However, if the firm keeps pH at 130, pR at 100, and offers conditional upgrades, it
increases revenue by 2.92%. In Table 3.8, Π∗s > Π
∗
N,s for at least 90 ≤ pR ≤ 100. Thus,
the conditional upgrade strategy is very effective in capturing the revenue potential
from being able to optimize product prices. Additionally, the benefit of conditional
upgrades in matching fixed capacities to stochastic demands is more significant when
the capacity-demand mismatch without upgrades is more severe. We can see this
from the examples given in Table 3.8. The optimal product prices in this case are
p∗H,s = 129.1 and p
∗
R,s = 92.7. As we move pH and pR away from optimal so that
the capacity-demand mismatch becomes more severe, the revenue improvement of
conditional upgrades increases.
3.7.2 Conditional Upgrades vs Last-Minute Upgrades
Now we consider another type of upgrades that the firm offers to consumers at
the last minute and compare it to conditional upgrades that are offered in advance.
In this case, the firm offers upgrades at the end of the booking period (e.g., at check-
in), and chooses the upgrade price after demand realizations during the booking
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pH = 130 pH = 140 pH = 150 pH = 160
∆Π∗s ∆Π
∗
N,s ∆Π
∗
s ∆Π
∗
N,s ∆Π
∗
s ∆Π
∗
N,s ∆Π
∗
s ∆Π
∗
N,s
pR = 70 2.93% 5.29% 8.36% 10.84% 16.28% 18.95% 27.27% 30.19%
pR = 80 1.67% 1.81% 6.58% 6.72% 14.36% 14.52% 25.43% 25.61%
pR = 90 1.30% 0.16% 4.96% 4.13% 12.67% 11.78% 23.97% 22.99%
pR = 100 2.92% 0.36% 3.49% 2.73% 11.07% 10.25% 22.71% 21.80%
Table 3.8: Percentage revenue improvements in the stochastic model from ΠN,s (i.e.,
the revenue from not offering upgrades and using the given product prices)
by 1) optimal upgrade pricing (∆Π∗s =
Π∗s−ΠN,s
ΠN,s
), and 2) optimal pricing
of both product types (∆Π∗N,s =
Π∗N,s−ΠN,s
ΠN,s
). (λ = 1, T = 100, KH = 50,
KR = 70, γ = 1, vR and vH are jointly uniformly distributed over Ω =
{(vR, vH) : 0 ≤ vR ≤ vH ≤ 200})
period. During the booking period, strategic consumers choose between booking a
high-quality product and booking a regular product based on the anticipated upgrade
probabilities and prices. We use a similar (stochastic) model to analyze last-minute
upgrades; the model and analysis are described in Section 3.10.
In Table 3.9, we compare the firm’s revenue when it is a price taker, ΠN,s, to 1)
the optimal revenue when the firm offers conditional upgrades, Π∗s, and 2) the opti-
mal revenue when the firm offers last-minute upgrades, Π∗LM,s. As Table 3.9 shows,
conditional upgrades result in higher revenues than last-minute upgrades in all cases.
Across all examples given in Table 3.9, on average, conditional upgrades improve the
revenue by 13.08%, whereas last-minute upgrades improve the revenue by only 2.36%
(offering last-minute upgrades may even decrease the firm’s revenue in some cases).
Although last-minute upgrades give the firm more pricing flexibility (i.e., the firm gets
to dynamically determine the upgrade price based on demand realizations during the
booking period), conditional upgrades give the firm other advantages that appear to
be more valuable. First, the firm has better flexibility in managing capacities with
conditional upgrades. By offering upgrades in advance and letting consumers reveal
their upgrading decisions in advance, the firm is able to better control the stopping
time of selling each product type and improve its capacity utilizations. With last-
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minute upgrades, the firm loses the ability to observe consumers’ upgrading decisions
in advance, and hence cannot improve capacity utilizations as effectively. Second,
with conditional upgrades, by committing to the upgrade price up front, the firm can
induce more consumers, who would not purchase any product without upgrades being
offered, to purchase from the firm. With last-minute upgrades, however, the demand
expansion effect is weakened. Across all examples given in Table 3.9, on average,
conditional upgrades generate 13.61% more demand than last-minute upgrades. Ad-
ditionally, with conditional upgrades, the firm can overbook regular products without
having to “bump” consumers during check-in, because by observing consumers’ up-
grading decisions in advance, the firm can overbook regular products as long as it
knows that enough consumers can be moved to high-quality products. However, if
upgrades are offered at check-in and the firm overbooks regular products, it has the
risk of having to bump some consumers. In this case, the firm chooses the upgrade
price at the end of the booking period based on its belief about the probability of
consumers (who have booked regular products) accepting the upgrade offer. It may
occur that not enough consumers are actually willing to pay for the upgrades at the
price chosen by the firm, so the firm will incur penalty costs from bumping consumers.
Note that in the examples given in Table 3.9, the penalty cost per consumer, c, is
equal to zero. So, we are comparing the conditional upgrade revenue to an upper
bound of the last-minute upgrade revenue.
3.7.3 Conditional Upgrades vs Dynamic Pricing
As we have seen, the flexibility of conditional upgrades in better allocating ca-
pacity to demand allows the product price-taking firm to achieve higher revenues
than being able to optimize product prices and offering last-minute upgrades in many
cases. Now, suppose the firm is not a price taker at all and can set both product
prices optimally. In Table 3.10, we compare the firm’s revenue from optimal product
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pH = 130 pH = 140 pH = 150 pH = 160
∆Π∗s ∆Π
∗
LM,s ∆Π
∗
s ∆Π
∗
LM,s ∆Π
∗
s ∆Π
∗
LM,s ∆Π
∗
s ∆Π
∗
LM,s
pR = 60 4.57% 0.05% 10.44% 4.03% 18.65% 5.03% 29.75% 14.86%
pR = 70 2.93% −0.03% 8.36% 0.05% 16.28% 0.68% 27.27% 5.98%
pR = 80 1.67% 0.23% 6.58% −0.06% 14.36% 0.09% 25.43% 5.69%
pR = 90 1.30% 0.83% 4.96% 0.21% 12.67% −0.01% 23.97% 0.19%
Table 3.9: Percentage revenue improvements in the stochastic model from ΠN,s (i.e.,
the revenue from not offering upgrades and using the given product prices)
by 1) offering conditional upgrades (∆Π∗s =
Π∗s−ΠN,s
ΠN,s
), and 2) offering last-
minute upgrades (∆Π∗LM,s =
Π∗LM,s−ΠN,s
ΠN,s
). (λ = 1, T = 100, KH = 50,
KR = 70, γ = 1, c = 0, vR and vH are jointly uniformly distributed over
Ω = {(vR, vH) : 0 ≤ vR ≤ vH ≤ 200})
pricing, Π∗N,s, to 1) the optimal revenue from the conditional upgrade strategy (using
the optimal static product prices), Π∗s, and 2) the optimal revenue from dynamic
pricing, Π∗D,s. We use the classic multiproduct dynamic pricing model in Gallego and
van Ryzin (1997) to compute the expected revenue from optimal dynamic pricing.10
Interestingly, we find that conditional upgrades generate more revenues than dynamic
pricing in all examples in Table 3.10. The firm gains different types of flexibility from
conditional upgrades and dynamic pricing. By using dynamic pricing, the firm can
adjust the allocation of consumers to different product types by changing product
prices during the booking period. However, the firm does not have the flexibility
to change product assignments after purchase. With conditional upgrades, the firm’s
product assignments of consumers who have accepted upgrade offers to different prod-
uct types are made after demand is fully realized. As Table 3.10 shows, the ex-post
allocation flexibility created by conditional upgrades has more revenue potential than
the pricing flexibility created by dynamic pricing. Therefore, for a firm that is not a
price taker and has the ability to set optimal static product prices, the conditional
upgrade strategy can serve as a substitute to dynamic pricing and in fact generate
10Note that in Gallego and van Ryzin (1997), consumers do not postpone their purchases due to
the anticipated future price drops. Thus, the dynamic pricing revenue we are comparing the upgrade
revenue to is an upper bound on dynamic pricing revenues (Levin et al., 2010).
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more revenues.
KH = 20 KH = 30 KH = 40 KH = 50
∆Π∗s ∆Π
∗
D,s ∆Π
∗
s ∆Π
∗
D,s ∆Π
∗
s ∆Π
∗
D,s ∆Π
∗
s ∆Π
∗
D,s
KR = 50 6.42% 5.19% 4.02% 2.43% 3.07% 2.21% 1.95% 1.75%
KR = 60 6.42% 5.20% 4.02% 2.43% 3.07% 2.21% 1.95% 1.75%
KR = 70 6.42% 5.20% 4.02% 2.43% 3.07% 2.21% 1.95% 1.75%
KR = 80 6.42% 5.20% 4.02% 2.43% 3.07% 2.21% 1.95% 1.75%
Table 3.10: Percentage revenue improvements in the stochastic model from Π∗N,s (i.e.,
the revenue from optimal product pricing without upgrades) by 1) optimal
upgrade pricing given the optimal product prices (∆Π∗s =
Π∗s−Π∗N,s
Π∗N,s
), and
2) optimal dynamic pricing (∆Π∗D,s =
Π∗D,s−Π∗N,s
Π∗N,s
). (λ = 1, T = 100,
γ = 1, vR and vH are jointly uniformly distributed over Ω = {(vR, vH) :
0 ≤ vR ≤ vH ≤ 200})
Even if the firm is a monopoly in the local market and can freely determine its
product prices, implementing variable pricing (i.e., charging different prices for the
same product consumed at different times) or dynamic pricing (i.e., changing the price
over time for the same product consumed at the same time) may still create consumer
dissatisfaction. Recall that hotels are having a hard time to convince consumers,
especially corporate travel buyers, to accept dynamic pricing. While variable pricing
has become more acceptable over time in travel related industries, most firms still
have constraints on how much they can freely adjust prices based on demand. For
example, if demand is very low on a given day, optimal pricing for that particular day
may result in the hotel setting severely discounted prices for its rooms. But many
hotels are reluctant to do that as they believe offering rooms below certain price
levels may undercut their image and damage their brand. Compared to changing
the product prices, changing the upgrade price may be a more benign strategy. The
hotel would not suffer from reputational effects as consumers would usually consider
upgrades as a benefit offered to them. Thus, overall we conclude that the conditional
upgrade strategy is a good alternative to unconstrained variable/dynamic pricing.
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3.8 Conclusion
In this essay, we study the conditional upgrade policy that has become popular
especially in the travel industry. We model the consumers’ strategic behavior of antic-
ipating the upgrade probability when making booking decisions and derive the firm’s
optimal upgrade price incorporating the strategic consumer behavior. We find that
offering conditional upgrades improves the firm’s revenue if and only if the product
price differential is not too small. Thus, in practice, firms should carefully decide
when to offer conditional upgrades and when to sell high-quality products only di-
rectly. We also find that the firm earns more revenue by offering conditional upgrades
to more strategic consumers.
We derive managerial insights about why the conditional upgrade strategy is ef-
fective in generating more revenues. First, conditional upgrades expand the firm’s
demand as some consumers, who wouldn’t buy any of the products without the up-
grade option, start purchasing when conditional upgrades are introduced. Second, the
optimal upgrade pricing strategy can work as a product price correction mechanism
and reoptimize the firm’s demand segmentation, i.e., more consumers become willing
to purchase high-quality products (including purchasing through upgrades). This is
especially helpful when the firm’s high-quality product demand is weak. By properly
offering conditional upgrades at the optimal upgrade price, the firm can capture at
least the revenue potential from optimizing the high-quality product price. Third, the
conditional upgrade strategy is one novel way of risk management. The extra flexi-
bility created by the upgrade channel allows the firm to better allocate its capacities
across product types to stochastic demands and improve utilization. We have seen
that the conditional upgrade strategy not only can compensate for the firm’s lack of
ability in setting its product prices optimally, but it can also result in even higher
revenues than optimized product prices. If the firm already has the ability of setting
static product prices optimally, we have observed that offering conditional upgrades
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can generate more revenue than using dynamic pricing. We have also seen that con-
ditional upgrades generally outperform last-minute upgrades. Finally, we have shown
that a simple fluid model can be very effective in estimating optimal upgrade prices for
the underlying stochastic model even in situations with small capacities and demand
rates.
3.9 Appendix III.1: Revenue Function in the Stochastic Model
In this section, we derive the stochastic revenue function. To differentiate the
demand processes from the ones used in Section 3.4 where we derive the consumer
booking equilibrium (which are the number of other consumers as seen by the acting
consumer), we use N∗i (t), i = H,U,R, instead of the previous Ni(t|q∗(·)) to denote
the demand processes for the firm when the consumer booking equilibrium is q∗(·).
Since now we are analyzing from the firm’s perspective, the environmental equivalence
property does not apply, hence the “+1” term in the stopping times does not exist.
Again, to represent this difference, we use τ ∗H , τ
∗
R, τ
∗
T , τˆ
∗, and τ ∗ to denote the stopping
times. Moreover, denote N ′H(t) as the demand process for high-quality products after
regular products are fully booked (N ′H(t) is a Poisson process with rate λ
a
H). Similarly,
denote N ′R(t) as the demand process for regular products after high-quality products
are fully booked (N ′R(t) is a Poisson process with rate λ
a
R). The expected revenue in
the stochastic model, Πs(p), is as follows:
Πs(p) = E
N∗H(t),N
∗
U (t),N
∗
R(t){
pR [N
∗
R(τ
∗) +N∗U(τ
∗)] + pmin {N∗U(τ ∗), KH −N∗H(τ ∗)}+ pHN∗H(τ ∗)
+1{τ ∗ = τ ∗R}pH E
N ′H(T−τ∗)
[
min {N ′H(T − τ ∗), KH −N∗H(τ ∗)−N∗U(τ ∗)}
]
+1{τ ∗ = τ ∗H}pR E
N ′R(T−τ∗)
[
min {N ′R(T − τ ∗), KR −N∗U(τ ∗)−N∗R(τ ∗)}
]}
.
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Now we further expand the above revenue function. Πs(p) can be written as
Πs(p) = Πs1(p) + Πs2(p) + Πs3(p) + Πs4(p), where
Πs1(p) = P(τ ∗H ≤ τ ∗T , τ ∗H ≤ T )Πs(p|τ ∗H ≤ τ ∗T , τ ∗H ≤ T ),
Πs2(p) = P(τ ∗R ≤ τ ∗T , τ ∗R ≤ T )Πs(p|τ ∗R ≤ τ ∗T , τ ∗R ≤ T ),
Πs3(p) = P(τ ∗H > τ ∗T , τ ∗R > τ ∗T , τ ∗T ≤ T )Πs(p|τ ∗H > τ ∗T , τ ∗R > τ ∗T , τ ∗T ≤ T ),
Πs4(p) = P(τ ∗H > T, τ ∗R > T, τ ∗T > T )Πs(p|τ ∗H > T, τ ∗R > T, τ ∗T > T ).
Each part of Πs(p) is derived as follows:
Πs1(p) =
T∫
0
fτ∗H (t)
KR−1∑
iR=0
KR−iR∑
iU=0
P(N∗R(t) = iR)P(N∗U(t) = iU)
·
{
pR(iR + iU) + pHKH + pR E
N ′R(T−t)
[
min{N ′R(T − t), KR − iR − iU}
]}
dt,
where fτ∗H (t) = P(N
∗
H(t) = KH − 1)λξ∗H(t).
Πs2(p) =
T∫
0
fτ∗R(t)
KH−1∑
iH=0
KH−iH∑
iU=0
P(N∗H(t) = iH)P(N∗U(t) = iU)
·
{
pR(KR + iU) + piU + pHiH
+pH E
N ′H(T−t)
[
min{N ′H(T − t), KH − iH − iU}
]}
dt,
where fτ∗R(t) = P(N
∗
R(t) = KR − 1)λξ∗R(t).
Πs3(p) =
T∫
0
fτ∗T (t)
KH−1∑
iH=0
KR−1∑
iR=0
(
KH +KR
iH
)(
KH +KR − iH
iR
)
·
{
E
0≤s≤t
[ξ∗H(s)]
}iH {
E
0≤s≤t
[ξ∗R(s)]
}iR {
E
0≤s≤t
[ξ∗U(s)]
}KH+KR−iH−iR
·
[
pR(KH +KR − iH) + p(KH − iH) + pHiH
]
dt,
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where fτ∗T (t) = P(N
∗
H(t) +N
∗
U(t) +N
∗
R(t) = KR +KH − 1)λ [ξ∗H(t) + ξ∗U(t) + ξ∗R(t)].
Πs4(p) =
KH−1∑
iH=0
KR−1∑
iR=0
KH+KR−iH−iR−1∑
iU=0
P(N∗H(T ) = iH)P(N∗R(T ) = iR)P(N∗U(T ) = iU)
·
[
pR(iR + iU) + pmin{iU , KH − iH}+ pHiH
]
.
3.10 Appendix III.2: Last-Minute Upgrades
In this section, we introduce the (stochastic) model when the firm offers last-
minute upgrades, and derive the consumer booking equilibrium and the firm’s optimal
revenue. To avoid too much repetition, we keep the description of the model elements
that are same as the conditional upgrade model to a minimum, and we focus on
explaining notations that are new to or different from the conditional upgrade model.
The firm offers upgrades and announces the upgrade price at the end of the book-
ing period (e.g., during check-in) instead of in advance. Consistent with the condi-
tional upgrade model, the firm offers upgrades to γ proportion of consumers (and
consumers know whether they will be offered upgrades or not). Also consistent with
the conditional upgrade model, the firm can overbook regular products during the
booking period. However, if there are more consumers who do not accept the upgrade
offers (i.e., they choose to consume the regular products) than the remaining capac-
ity of regular products by the end of the booking period, the firm incurs a penalty
cost c per consumer from “bumping” these consumers. At the end of the booking
period, the firm chooses the upgrade price p ≤ pH − pR based on its belief about the
probabilities that the consumers who have booked regular products will accept the
upgrade offers.
During the booking period, consumers choose which product type to book (high-
quality or regular) or not to book any product. When making booking decisions,
strategic consumers anticipate the optimal upgrade price that is going to be chosen
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by the firm at the end of the booking period as well as the corresponding upgrade
probability on every sample path of consumers’ arrival and booking processes. More
specifically, consumers’ rational expectations take into account the following: 1) the
probability that upgrades will be offered at the end of the booking period (because
the firm has unsold high-quality products by then), 2) the probability the consumer
will be willing to accept the upgrade offer (because the upgrade price that the firm
charges is low enough), 3) the probability that the consumer will get upgraded if more
consumers are willing to accept the upgrade offers than the remaining capacity of
high-quality products (same as in our conditional upgrade model, we assume random
rationing in this case).
Let at(vR, vH) denote the consumer’s utility-maximizing decision if she arrives
at time t, has valuations (vR, vH) and will be offered an upgrade. at(vR, vH) =
H represents booking a high-quality product, at(vR, vH) = R represents booking
a regular product (the consumer later may or may not accept the upgrade offer),
at(vR, vH) = N represents not booking any product. We now use the fixed-point
approach to derive the consumer booking equilibrium. Suppose all other consumers
except the acting consumer are using strategy at(vR, vH). For the acting consumer,
given that both product types are still available by her arrival time t, her utility
from booking a high-quality product is vH − pH which does not depend on other
consumers’ strategies used in the consumer booking game. Let uR(at(vR, vH)) denote
the acting consumer’s expected utility from booking a regular product upon arrival.
uR(at(vR, vH)) incorporates the potential utility gained from being upgraded at the
end of the booking period. Let b(at(vR, vH)) denote the resulting optimal strategy for
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the acting consumer. Then,
b(at(vR, vH)) =

H if vH − pH ≥ uR(at(vR, vH)) and vH ≥ pH ;
R if vH − pH < uR(at(vR, vH)) and uR(at(vR, vH)) ≥ 0;
N otherwise.
The equilibrium condition is that for every t and every (vR, vH), we must have
b(at(vR, vH)) = at(vR, vH). The strategy space has three dimensions, namely, the
arrival time dimension, and the two valuation dimensions. Note that different from
the conditional upgrade model, we cannot reduce the strategy space to only the arrival
time dimension by equivalently defining the anticipated upgrade probability as the
strategy used by consumers in the booking game, because with last-minute upgrades,
consumers’ probabilities to actually get upgraded also depend on their valuations. If
vH − vR is lower than the upgrade price announced at the end of the booking period,
the consumer will not accept the upgrade offer, and hence the upgrade probability is
zero; another consumer with vH−vR higher than the upgrade price will have a higher
upgrade probability.
Given at(vR, vH), the probabilities of any other consumer that will be offered an
upgrade booking each type of product are as follows:
ξγH(t|at(vR, vH)) =
∫∫
Ω
1{at(vR, vH) = H}f(vR, vH) dvR dvH ,
ξγR(t|at(vR, vH)) =
∫∫
Ω
1{at(vR, vH) = R}f(vR, vH) dvR dvH .
The probabilities of any other consumer that will not be offered an upgrade booking
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each type of product are as follows:
ξ′H(t) =
∫∫
Ω
1{a′t(vR, vH) = H}f(vR, vH) dvR dvH ,
ξ′R(t) =
∫∫
Ω
1{a′t(vR, vH) = R}f(vR, vH) dvR dvH ,
where a′t(vR, vH) denotes the utility-maximizing decision of a consumer that will not
be offered an upgrade:
a′t(vR, vH) =

H if vH − vR ≥ pH − pR and vH ≥ pH ,
R if vH − vR < pH − pR and vR ≥ pR,
N otherwise.
The arrival processes of other consumers, NH(t|at(vR, vH)) and NR(t|at(vR, vH)),
are Poisson processes with rates λH(t|at(vR, vH)) = λγξγH(t|at(vR, vH))+λ(1−γ)ξ′H(t)
and λR(t|at(vR, vH)) = λγξγR(t|at(vR, vH)) +λ(1−γ)ξ′R(t), respectively. The stopping
time of the booking game is τ(at(vR, vH)) = min{τˆ(at(vR, vH)), T}, where τˆ(at(vR, vH)) =
min {τH(at(vR, vH)), τT (at(vR, vH))}, and τH(at(vR, vH)) = inf{t ≥ 0 : NH(t|at(vR, vH)) ≥
KH}, τT (at(vR, vH)) = inf{t ≥ 0 : NH(t|at(vR, vH)) + NR(t|at(vR, vH)) + 1 ≥ KH +
KR}.
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uR(at(vR, vH)) is derived as follows:
uR(at(vR, vH))
= E
NH(t|at(vR,vH)),NR(t|at(vR,vH))|NH(t|at(vR,vH))<KH ,NH(t|at(vR,vH))+NR(t|at(vR,vH))<KH+KR{
1 {t ≤ τ(at(vR, vH))} ·
{
1 {τ(at(vR, vH)) = τH(at(vR, vH))} · (vR − pR) +
1 {τ(at(vR, vH)) 6= τH(at(vR, vH))}
·
[
(1− q(NH(t|at(vR, vH)), NR(t|at(vR, vH)) + 1)) · (vR − pR)
+q(NH(t|at(vR, vH)), NR(t|at(vR, vH)) + 1)
·(vH − vR − p∗(NH(t|at(vR, vH)), NR(t|at(vR, vH)) + 1))
]}}
.
q(NH(t|at(vR, vH)), NR(t|at(vR, vH)) + 1) is the probability that the acting consumer
accepts the upgrade offer and gets upgraded on any sample path, p∗(NH(t|at(vR, vH)),
NR(t|at(vR, vH))+1) is the optimal upgrade price chosen by the firm at the end of the
booking period based on demand realizations on any sample path. The “+1” term
represents the acting consumer. Note that consistent with the conditional upgrade
model, in the above derivation, the expectation taken over each sample path is con-
ditional expectation (i.e., conditional on that by the acting consumer’s arrival time,
both product types are still available).
Next, we derive q(NH(t|at(vR, vH)), NR(t|at(vR, vH))+1) and p∗(NH(t|at(vR, vH)),
NR(t|at(vR, vH)) + 1). We have
q(NH(t|at(vR, vH)), NR(t|at(vR, vH)) + 1) =
1 {vH − vR ≥ p∗(NH(t|at(vR, vH)), NR(t|at(vR, vH)) + 1)}
·
NR(τ(at(vR,vH))|at(vR,vH))∑
i=0
P(i other consumers accept upgrades)
·min
{
[KH −NH(τ(at(vR, vH))|at(vR, vH))]+
i+ 1
, 1
}
.
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We still need to derive P(i other consumers accept upgrades). Let ηt(p|at(vR, vH))
denote the probability that a consumer who arrives at time t and books a regular
product will accept the upgrade offer with upgrade price p. We have
ηt(p|at(vR, vH)) =
∫∫
Ω
1{at(vR, vH) = R}1{vH − vR ≥ p}f(vR, vH) dvR dvH
ξγR(t|at(vR, vH))
.
Further, define η(p|at(vR, vH)) = E
t
ηt(p|at(vR, vH)). We assume the acting consumer
anticipate the other consumers’ acceptance of the upgrade offers as a binomial distri-
bution with probability η(p|at(vR, vH)).11 Thus,
P(i other consumers accept upgrades) =
NR(τ(at(vR,vH))|at(vR,vH))∑
j=i
(
NR(τ(at(vR, vH))|at(vR, vH))
j
)
γj(1− γ)NR(τ(at(vR,vH))|at(vR,vH))−j
·
(
j
i
)
[η(p|at(vR, vH))]i[1− η(p|at(vR, vH))]j−i.
p∗(NH(t|at(vR, vH)), NR(t|at(vR, vH)) + 1) is the maximizer of the net revenue
earned at check-in, which is the difference between the revenue from collecting upgrade
fees and the cost from bumping consumers due to insufficient regular product capacity.
When τ(at(vR, vH)) 6= τH(at(vR, vH)), let ΠT (p|NH(t|at(vR, vH)), NR(t|at(vR, vH))+1)
denote the firm’s expected net revenue from selling upgrades at check-in on any sample
11An alternative way is to allow the acting consumer to form a heterogeneous binomial be-
lief about the acceptance of the upgrade offer from each of the other consumers. For any
other consumer with arrival time tj(j = 1, 2, ..., NR(τ(at(vR, vH))|at(vR, vH))), the probability of
accepting the upgrade offer is ηtj (p
∗(NH(t|at(vR, vH)), NR(t|at(vR, vH)) + 1)|at(vR, vH)), where
t1, t2, ..., tNR(τ(at(vR,vH))|at(vR,vH)) denote the arrival times of other consumers who have booked
regular products on any sample path. By using this approach, the computational burden of P(i
other consumers accept upgrades) is significantly larger. The approach we take can be considered as
an approximation by assuming that consumers have limited computational capability in the booking
game. If the problem size is large enough, the equilibrium booking strategy of consumers becomes
time-independent, in which case our approach produces the same result as this alternative approach
(the examples we give in this essay have large enough problem sizes so that this occurs).
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path. We have
ΠT (p|NH(t|at(vR, vH)), NR(t|at(vR, vH)) + 1)
=
NR(t|at(vR,vH))+1∑
i=0
P(i consumers accept upgrades)
·
{
p ·min{i, [KH −NH(τ(at(vR, vH))|at(vR, vH))]+}
−c · {NR(τ(at(vR, vH))|at(vR, vH)) + 1
−min{i, [KH −NH(τ(at(vR, vH))|at(vR, vH))]+}−KR}+}.
P(i other consumers accept upgrades) is calculated using the same approach when
we derive q(NH(t|at(vR, vH)), NR(t|at(vR, vH)) + 1). Note that when τ(at(vR, vH)) =
τH(at(vR, vH)) (soNH(τ(at(vR, vH))|at(vR, vH)) = KH), p∗(NH(t|at(vR, vH)), NR(t|at(vR, vH))+
1) and ΠT (p|NH(t|at(vR, vH)), NR(t|at(vR, vH)) + 1) are irrelevant, because the firm
does not earn any revenue from upgrades (also, the firm does not incur penalty cost,
because τ(at(vR, vH)) = τH(at(vR, vH)) implies that the firm does not overbook regu-
lar products). Moreover, in this case, we naturally have q(NH(t|at(vR, vH)), NR(t|at(vR, vH))+
1) = 0.
We have characterized the consumer book equilibrium. Then, we can calculate
the firm’s optimal expected revenue, Π∗LM,s, as follows:
Π∗LM,s = E
N∗H(t),N
∗
R(t)
{
pRN
∗
R(τ
∗) + pHN∗H(τ
∗)
+1{τ ∗ 6= τ ∗H} · ΠT (p∗(N∗H(t), N∗R(t))|N∗H(t), N∗R(t))
+1{τ ∗ = τ ∗H}·R E
N ′R(T−τ∗)
[
min {N ′R(T − τ ∗), KR −N∗R(τ ∗)}
]}
.
The revenue function can be expanded conditional on τ ∗ in the same way as the
revenue function from conditional upgrades in Section 3.9.
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CHAPTER IV
Strategic Pricing of Ancillary Services: To Bundle
or to Unbundle?
4.1 Introduction
Many firms provide an ancillary service in addition to a main service to enhance
the experience of consumers. When taking a flight, consumers may need to transport
bags at the same time or have a meal during the flight. When staying at a hotel,
consumers may need to have breakfast or use internet connection. In many service
industries, such as travel industries, consumers book the main service in advance, at
which time they may be uncertain about whether they are going to actually need
the ancillary service from the firm or not and about their exact valuations for it. As
the travel date approaches, consumers resolve the uncertainty. Different consumers
can have different valuations for the ancillary service, some of them may end up not
wanting the ancillary service at all.
Historically, most airline ancillary services were bundled with the main service,
and the whole service was sold at a single price. In the last ten years, there has been
a trend in the airline industry of unbundling several ancillary services from the main
service and charging separate fees for them. Take the baggage service for example.
After American Airlines started charging for checked bags in 2008, many other airlines
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have followed rapidly (Maynard , 2008). According to the Bureau of Transportation
Statistics,1 the 15 largest airlines in the U.S. combined collected $3.35 billion in
baggage fees in 2013. According to IdeaWorksCompany research,2 the global airline
non-ticket revenue in 2013 reached $31.5 billion, which consisted of a la carte charges
(e.g., baggage, food, seat preference), commissions on travel-oriented services (e.g.,
hotel or car rental bookings), and the sale of frequent flier points, etc. This revenue
has increased 12-fold since 2007 ($2.45 billion). In 2013, the global average airline
ancillary service revenue per passenger was $16.
However, even for the same type of ancillary services, different firms make different
decisions regarding bundling or unbundling. For example, while many airlines have
unbundled the checked baggage service, Southwest Airlines is still offering the first
two checked bags for free, which means that the baggage fee is built into the ticket
price. Also, unbundling certain ancillary services is more common compared to other
ancillary services. For example, compared to checked bags, airlines are much more
conservative in unbundling carry-on bags. The main questions we are going to study
in this essay are whether a firm should unbundle the ancillary service, and what
types of ancillary services a firm should unbundle. On the one hand, by unbundling
the ancillary service, the firm gains pricing flexibility from being able to charge a
separate price for the ancillary service and extracts more consumer surplus. On the
other hand, the firm incurs inconvenience costs by unbundling the ancillary service,
which may include the additional labor cost to process the ancillary service payments,
the cost of congestion (e.g., if an airline has to process the payments for carry-on
bags at the gate, its flights could be easily delayed, resulting in an undesirable on-
time performance record), and the potential profit loss because of consumers’ loss of
goodwill from having to pay for the ancillary service. Thus, for unbundling to be the
1http://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/rita.dot.gov.bts/files/subject areas/airline information/
baggage fees/html/2013.html
2http://www.ideaworkscompany.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Press-Release-89-Ancillary-
Revenue-Top-10.pdf
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optimal strategy for the firm, the inconvenience cost that is incurred should not be
significant. We answer the question of whether and when the firm should unbundle the
ancillary service by analyzing models that capture the above fundamental trade-off.
In this essay, we consider a firm that sells a main service and an ancillary service
to two types of consumers (e.g., business travelers and leisure travelers) with differ-
ent valuations for the main service and different likelihoods of needing the ancillary
service. We first study the optimal ancillary service strategy for a firm that can
price-discriminate when selling the main service, that is, the firm can charge different
main service prices to different consumer types. Main service price discrimination
is common in the airline industry. It is common airline practice to charge business
travelers, who usually book tickets closer to the travel date and have a higher will-
ingness to pay, a higher price than leisure travelers, who usually book tickets well in
advance and have a lower willingness to pay. We are going to examine the effects of
several important factors on the firm’s optimal ancillary service strategy. First, in
Section 4.4, we study how the optimal strategy is determined by the firm’s operating
costs, demand portfolio (i.e., proportions of different types of consumers), and the
consumer valuation structure (i.e., which consumer type is more likely to purchase
the ancillary service). Second, due to the temporal separation between consumers’
purchases of the main service and their purchases of the ancillary service, whether
consumers make forward-looking decisions (i.e., accounting for future utilities from
the ancillary service when purchasing the service bundle or main service in advance)
or not affects the firm’s decision of whether to bundle or unbundle the ancillary ser-
vice. In Section 4.5, we study the effect of having myopic consumers who do not
consider potential ancillary service utilities when making the main service purchasing
decision. Third, we are interested in how the firm’s bundling (unbundling) decision
is affected by its supply chain structure. In particular, in Section 4.6, we study how
using intermediaries such as online travel agencies affects the firm’s optimal strategy
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for the ancillary service.
We find that it is optimal for a price-discriminating firm to unbundle the ancillary
service if consumers’ likelihoods of purchasing the ancillary service are low enough,
and it is optimal to bundle if consumers’ likelihoods of purchasing the ancillary ser-
vice is high enough. The firm is more likely to benefit from unbundling an ancillary
service with a higher marginal cost or with a lower inconvenience cost. Moreover,
if the consumers that value the main service higher (i.e., high-type consumers) are
more likely to purchase the ancillary service (which indicates that consumers’ valua-
tions for the main service and the ancillary service are positively correlated), a firm
is more likely to bundle the ancillary service as its proportion of high-type consumers
increases. If low-type consumers (i.e., consumers that do not value the main ser-
vice highly) are more likely to purchase the ancillary service (which indicates that
consumers’ valuations for the main service and the ancillary service are negatively
correlated), a firm is more likely to unbundle the ancillary service as its proportion
of high-type consumers increases.
After the firm unbundles the ancillary service, the optimal main service price is
lower than the optimal bundle price, but the total price to purchase both the main
service and the ancillary service is higher than the optimal bundle price. The price
reduction for purchasing the main service (i.e., the difference between the optimal
bundle price when the firm bundles and the optimal main service price when the
firm unbundles) is more significant for the consumer type with a higher likelihood of
needing the ancillary service. For airlines, because leisure travelers are more likely to
have bags to check compared to business travelers, the fare reduction after airlines
start charging for checked bags should be more significant for leisure travelers. This
phenomenon in the airline industry has been empirically observed by researchers
(Brueckner et al., 2014).
Moreover, we find that the existence of myopic consumers and the firm’s use of
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intermediaries both make unbundling more profitable compared to bundling. It is op-
timal to unbundle the ancillary service if myopic consumers account for a large enough
proportion of all consumers. Because consumers are more likely to ignore future pur-
chases of small-item ancillary services (e.g., purchasing a can of coke during the flight)
when purchasing the service bundle or main service in advance (i.e., consumers are
more likely to be myopic), firms usually charge for small-item ancillary services. How-
ever, we show that regardless of whether the firm bundles or unbundles the ancillary
service, its total profit increases with the proportion of forward-looking consumers.
Unbundling the ancillary service also allows the firm to gain more profits back from
the intermediaries. When the firm sells through intermediaries, unbundling becomes
more profitable relative to bundling as the intermediaries’ commission increases or
the intermediaries’ market share increases.
Although main service price discrimination is common in the airline industry, it
is much less common in other travel industries. For example, many hotels, espe-
cially economy hotels, do not charge different room rates to different consumers. In
Section 4.7, we study the optimal ancillary service strategy for firms that do not
price-discriminate when selling the main service. In this case, the firm charges a
uniform main service price to both consumer types. By comparing the results for a
uniform-pricing firm to the results for a price-discriminating firm, we develop insights
about how the firm’s ability to price-discriminate when selling the main service affects
its optimal ancillary service strategy.
We find a very interesting relationship between a firm’s optimal ancillary service
strategy and its ability to price-discriminate when selling the main service. For a
uniform-pricing firm, it is optimal to unbundle the ancillary service if the consumers
that value the main service higher have a high enough likelihood of purchasing the
ancillary service. However, for a price-discriminating firm, it is optimal to unbundle
the ancillary service if the consumers that value the main service higher have a low
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enough likelihood of purchasing the ancillary service. Compared to a uniform-pricing
firm, bundling (unbundling) is more likely to be the optimal strategy for a price-
discriminating firm if consumers’ valuations for the main service and the ancillary
service are positively (negatively) correlated. Moreover, if firms use uniform pricing
for the main service, the way that the consumer valuation structure affects the differ-
entiation of optimal ancillary service strategies across firms is reversed from the case
of discriminatory pricing. In the case of uniform pricing, if consumers’ valuations
for the main service and the ancillary service are positively (negatively) correlated,
unbundling (bundling) is more likely to be the optimal ancillary service strategy for
firms with higher proportions of high-type consumers. This is exactly the opposite of
the result for a price-discriminating firm.
4.2 Literature Review
Although there are not many papers that study ancillary pricing (also called
add-on pricing in some papers), researchers have used both competition models and
monopolistic models to address related issues. Ellison (2005), Gabaix and Laibson
(2006), and Shulman and Geng (2013) study the competition between firms that
sell the ancillary service with separate charges. Papers that study ancillary service
pricing under monopolistic settings include Allon et al. (2011) and Fruchter et al.
(2011). Allon et al. (2011) study airlines’ baggage pricing problem and find that the
firm should set the fee for the baggage service at the same level the social planner
would. Their result also suggests that the way in which airlines have implemented
baggage fees is more consistent with attempts to control consumers behavior (i.e.,
reduce baggage needs) than segmenting consumers based on their need to check a
bag. Fruchter et al. (2011) consider a firm that charges the same price to different
consumer segments and find that a free add-on (i.e., bundling the ancillary service) is
more profitable than offering it for a fee (i.e., unbundling the ancillary service) if one
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consumer segment has a high valuation for the add-on but a relatively low valuation
for the primary service, and another segment has a higher valuation for the primary
service but places no value on the add-on. This essay is one of the first to study the
question of whether the firm should unbundle the ancillary service in the first place,
and this essay is the first to study this question for both a uniform-pricing firm and
a price-discriminating firm.
A related stream of literature studies commodity bundling. By analyzing a bundling
setting with two commodities, Adams and Yellen (1976), McAfee et al. (1989), and
Schmalensee (1984) provide the insight that a higher degree of negative correlation
between consumers’ valuations for the two commodities makes bundling more prof-
itable relative to unbundled sales. We find consistent results for a uniform-pricing
firm. However, allowing for main service price discrimination fundamentally changes
the previous finding from the bundling literature. We find that whereas it is optimal
for a uniform-pricing firm to unbundle the ancillary service if the consumers that
value the main service higher have a high enough likelihood of purchasing the an-
cillary service (which indicates a positive correlation between consumers’ valuations
for the main service and their valuations for the ancillary service), it is optimal for a
price-discriminating firm to unbundle the ancillary service if the consumers that value
the main service higher have a low enough likelihood of purchasing the ancillary ser-
vice. Main service price discrimination makes unbundling less (more) likely to be the
optimal ancillary service strategy if consumers’ valuations for the main service and
the ancillary service are positively (negatively) correlated. Thus, the correlation ef-
fect found by previous bundling literature becomes very different with firm’s ability to
charge discriminatory prices for the main service. Recently, researcher have explored
more topics regarding bundling, such as bundling with channel interaction (e.g., Bhar-
gava, 2012, Chakravarty et al., 2013, Girju et al., 2013, Cao et al., 2015), bundling
information goods (e.g., Bakos and Brynjolfsson, 1999, Geng et al., 2005), bundling
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vertically differentiated products (e.g., Banciu et al., 2010, Honhon and Pan, 2014),
and the effect of bundling on firm’s ordering decision (e.g., Cao et al., 2014). Although
our focus in studying ancillary pricing appears at first sight to have similarities to
issues studied in commodity bundling, there are significant differences between the
two. In the setting studied by the traditional commodity bundling literature, each
commodity can be sold separately (e.g., a retailer that sells toothbrush-toothpaste
bundles can sell the two products separately). In the ancillary pricing setting, the
ancillary service cannot be sold by itself. Consumers can purchase the ancillary ser-
vice only if they have already purchased the main service, and the purchase of the
ancillary service often occurs later than the purchase of the main service.
There is also a related stream of literature on two-part pricing. Two-part pricing
corresponds to the situation where the price of a service is composed of two parts –
a lump-sum fee for the fixed part of the service (e.g., cover charge of a bar), and a
per-unit charge for the variable part of the service (e.g., per-drink fee). Pioneered
by Oi (1971) and Schmalensee (1981), the most important issue that the two-part
pricing literature has focused on is when the optimal per-unit price should be above
or below the marginal cost of providing the service. Rosen and Rosenfield (1997) find
that whether the optimal per-unit price is above or below its marginal cost depends
on whether the average consumer has higher or lower demand for the variable part of
the service than the marginal consumer. If the average consumer has higher demand
for the variable part of the service than the marginal consumer, the firm should set the
per-unit price above the marginal cost; and vice versa. A more recent paper, Png and
Wang (2010), finds that the result also depends on the correlation between marginal
and total benefits from the service. The per-unit price should be set above the
marginal cost if marginal and total benefits from the service are positively correlated;
and vice versa. In the ancillary service pricing setting, we find that for a firm that does
not price discriminate by charging different prices to different consumer types, the
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result depends on the underlying consumer valuation structure (i.e., the correlation
between consumers’ valuations for the main service and the ancillary service) in a way
that appears to be consistent with the two-part pricing results. Moreover, we also
find that the result becomes very different for a firm that price-discriminates when
selling the main service. In this case, if consumers are forward-looking (i.e., they
take future utilities from the ancillary service into consideration when purchasing the
service bundle or main service in advance) as is the case studied by previous two-
part pricing literature, then the optimal ancillary service price is always equal to the
marginal cost. However, if there exists a significant proportion of myopic consumers
(who do not take future utilities into consideration), the optimal ancillary service
price is higher than the marginal cost.
Thus, as our literature review indicates, a key differentiator of this paper is that
we study a price-discriminating firm’s optimal bundling (unbundling) and pricing
decisions for the ancillary service and how the results are changed compared to a
uniform-pricing firm. Interestingly, we find that some key findings from the previous
bundling and two-part pricing literature are reversed when one considers a price-
discriminating firm instead of a uniform-pricing firm.
4.3 Model
The firm sells a main service and an ancillary service to two types of consumers
that have different valuations for the service. There are λH consumers that value
the main service at vH and λL consumers that value the main service at vL, where
vH > vL. In travel industries, the λH consumers can be considered as business
travelers and the λL consumers can be considered as leisure travelers. Throughout
this chapter, we refer to consumers with main service valuation vH as high-type
consumers, and consumers with main service valuation vL as low-type consumers.
Consumers have random valuations for the ancillary service. Let uH and uL denote
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the (random) valuations for the ancillary service of high-type and low-type consumers,
respectively.3 The ancillary service valuations uH and uL have support [u, u¯], where
u¯ > 0 and u < 0. We assume u¯ ≤ vL (i.e., consumers’ valuations for the ancillary
service cannot exceed their valuations for the main service) and vL+ u¯ ≤ vH (i.e., any
low-type consumer’s valuation for the whole service does not exceed any high-type
consumer’s valuation for the whole service). Note that we allow consumers’ valuations
for the ancillary service to be negative. A negative valuation for the ancillary service
means that the consumer will not use the ancillary service even if it is offered for
free. For example, some consumers do not have bags to check for the flight. Even
if the firm does not charge for checked bags, these consumers still will not use the
ancillary service. The cumulative distribution functions of uH and uL are denoted
by FH(·) and FL(·), and the probability density functions are denoted by fH(·) and
fL(·). For expositional simplicity, we will assume that uH and uL are both uniformly
distributed over [0, u¯] but have different probability densities (we do not assume a
specific functional form for the density over [u, 0)). For i = H,L, the probability
density function of ui is given by fi(x) = βi/u¯ for 0 ≤ x ≤ u¯. Furthermore, define
βi = F¯i(0) for i = H,L. βi measures type-i consumers’ likelihood of purchasing the
ancillary service. If βH ≥ βL, high-type consumers are more likely to purchase the
ancillary service than low-type consumers for any price that the firm charges for the
ancillary service. Thus, in this case, consumers’ valuations for the main service and
their valuations for the ancillary service exhibit a positive correlation. If βH < βL,
low-type consumers are more likely to purchase the ancillary service than high-type
consumers for any price that the firm charges for the ancillary service. Thus, in this
3In most two-part pricing settings, the fixed part of the service is a permission for entry (e.g.,
entry to park as in Oi , 1971, entry to health club and bar as in Hayes, 1987). Thus, the models used
by these two-part pricing papers usually assume that consumers have a single valuation for the whole
service (or a budget to consume the fixed part as well as the variable part of the service). Under
the ancillary service pricing setting, since the main service usually generates the primary utility for
consumers, most previous papers allow consumers to have separate valuations for the main service
and the ancillary service. Similarly, we also allow consumers to have two valuations, one for the
main service and one for the ancillary service.
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case, consumers’ valuations for the main service and their valuations for the ancillary
service exhibit a negative correlation. Therefore, the relationship between βH and
βL defines the consumer valuation structure. As we will see, this relationship is an
important factor in determining the firm’s optimal strategy for the ancillary service.
Consumers make the purchasing decision in two stages. In the first stage, con-
sumers decide whether to purchase the service bundle (in the bundling case), or
whether to purchase the main service (in the unbundling case) before their valua-
tions for the ancillary service is realized. Then, after their valuations for the ancillary
service are realized, consumers decide whether to use the ancillary service (in the
bundling case), or whether to purchase the ancillary service (in the bundling case).
We first assume consumers are forward-looking, that is, when making the purchasing
decision for the service bundle or main service in advance, they take future utilities
from the ancillary service into consideration. In Section 4.5, we incorporate myopic
consumers (who do not consider future utility from the ancillary service when making
the purchasing decision for the service bundle or main service in advance) as well and
study the effect of myopic consumers on the firm’s optimal strategy for the ancillary
service.
The firm’s key decision is whether to sell the whole service as a bundle, or to un-
bundle the ancillary service from the main service and sell the two services separately.
In the basic model, we assume that the firm can price-discriminate and charge differ-
ent prices for the service bundle and main service to different types of consumers. For
example, in the airline industry, leisure travelers usually plan their trip in advance
and business travelers usually make reservations close to the travel date. Because of
this demand characteristic, airlines have implemented price discrimination by chang-
ing prices over time (i.e., inter-temporal price discrimination). However, firms usually
charge the same price for the ancillary service to consumers paying different prices
for the main service. For example, if you buy a coach ticket, the price of a meal
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(most airlines in the U.S. charge for a meal in coach on domestic flights) does not
depend on how much you paid for the ticket. Thus, consistent with industry practice,
we assume that the firm charges a uniform ancillary service price to both types of
consumers when the ancillary service is unbundled. In the bundling case, the firm
charges price pbH to high-type consumers and pbL to low-type consumers for the ser-
vice bundle. In the unbundling case, the firm charge prices pmH and pmL to two types
of consumers for the main service and pa for the ancillary service. We require pa > 0
in the unbundling case because if pa = 0, the unbundling case degenerates to the
bundling case. In Section 4.7, we consider the case where the firm charges a uniform
price for the main service and study how main service price discrimination affects the
optimal strategy for the ancillary service.
The marginal cost of providing one unit of main service is cm (0 < cm < vL). The
marginal cost of providing one unit of ancillary service is ca (0 < ca < u¯). Moreover,
the firm incurs an inconvenience cost c(·) due to consumers’ separate purchases of
the ancillary service when the firm unbundles it. Note that the marginal cost and the
inconvenience cost are two different types of costs the firm incurs with the ancillary
service. The marginal cost is incurred whenever a consumer uses the ancillary service,
no matter whether the ancillary service is bundled or unbundled. For example, the
marginal cost of airline baggage service would include the fuel cost and labor cost
(e.g., loading and unloading the bag). On the other hand, the inconvenience cost
is incurred because the ancillary service is purchased separately. If the ancillary
service is unbundled, the inconvenience costs may include the additional labor cost
to process the ancillary service payments and the cost of congestion. For example,
passengers paying for carry-on bags at the gate can delay the boarding process and
affect airlines’ on-time performances. Finally, the inconvenience cost may include
firm’s potential profit loss because of consumers’ loss of goodwill that is caused by
unbundling. For example, by studying consumer perception at a travel resort, Naylor
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and Frank (2001) find that not receiving an all-inclusive package lessens perceptions
of value for first-time guests. We define the inconvenience cost c(·) as a function of the
number of consumers who purchase the ancillary service in the unbundling case. We
assume c(0) = c′(0) = 0, c′(·) ≥ 0 and c′′(·) ≥ 0. In practice, it would be difficult to
significantly reduce the marginal cost, but it may be possible to significantly reduce
the inconvenience cost (e.g., by using mechanisms that induce consumers to pay for
the ancillary service in advance). The firm’s goal is to choose the optimal bundling
(unbundling) strategy and price the main service and the ancillary service optimally
so that the total profit from selling the whole service is maximized.
4.4 Optimal Pricing Strategy
In this section, we derive and analyze the firm’s optimal ancillary service pricing
strategy. We analyze the bundling case and the unbundling case separately, and then
compare these two cases to obtain the optimal strategy. First, consider the bundling
case. For each consumer type i = H,L, given that a consumer purchases the service
bundle, she uses the ancillary service if ui ≥ 0 after ui is realized. Thus, type-i
consumers’ expected utility from purchasing the service bundle is vi + E(ui)
+ − pbi.
Therefore, the firm’s optimal bundle prices are p∗bH = vH + E(uH)
+ and p∗bL = vL +
E(uL)
+. Moreover, the firm incurs marginal costs for the ancillary service used by
consumers who have non-negative valuations for the ancillary service. The firm does
not incur inconvenience cost in the bundling case. Thus, the optimal profit in the
bundling case is
Π∗b = [vH + E(uH)
+ − cm]λH + [vL + E(uL)+ − cm]λL − ca[λHF¯H(0) + λLF¯L(0)].
Note that if vi + E(ui)
+ − cm − caF¯i(0) < 0 for type-i consumers, the firm should
not sell to this consumer type. We assume vL +E(uL)
+ − cm − caF¯L(0) ≥ 0, that is,
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the firm earns profits by selling to low-type consumers. Since this condition implies
vH + E(uH)
+ − cm − caF¯H(0) > 0, the firm also earns profits by selling to high-
type consumers. Allowing the possibility that the firm may want to only sell to
some consumer type does not result in different insights regarding the firm’s optimal
ancillary service strategy.
Second, consider the unbundling case. For each consumer type i = H,L, given
that a consumer purchases the main service, she purchases the ancillary service if
ui ≥ pa after ui is realized. Thus, type-i consumers’ expected utility from purchasing
the main service is vi− pmi +E(ui− pa)+. The firm should choose the optimal prices
such that the individual rationality constraints for both consumer types are binding,
i.e., vH − pmH + E(uH − pa)+ = 0 and vL − pmL + E(uL − pa)+ = 0. Moreover, the
firm incurs marginal and inconvenience costs from those consumers who purchase the
ancillary service (i.e., those who have ui ≥ pa). Thus, the firm’s profit maximization
problem in the unbundling case can be reduced to a single-variable optimization
problem of the ancillary service price pa > 0 with the following profit function:
Πu(pa) = (pmH − cm)λH + (pmL − cm)λL
+(pa − ca)[λHF¯H(pa) + λLF¯L(pa)]− c(λHF¯H(pa) + λLF¯L(pa))
= [vH + E(uH − pa)+ − cm]λH + [vL + E(uL − pa)+ − cm]λL
+(pa − ca)[λHF¯H(pa) + λLF¯L(pa)]− c(λHF¯H(pa) + λLF¯L(pa)).
Note that the firm’s optimization problem is well-defined, because as the following
theorem indicates, the optimal ancillary service price p∗a is always strictly positive.
Theorem IV.1. (i) In the unbundling case, the optimal ancillary service price p∗a is
the solution to p∗a = ca + c
′(λHF¯H(p∗a) + λLF¯L(p
∗
a)).
(ii) For each consumer type i = H,L, the optimal prices satisfy p∗mi < p
∗
bi <
p∗mi + p
∗
a.
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(iii) The price reduction from the optimal bundle price to the optimal main service
price when the firm unbundles is greater for the consumer type with a higher likelihood
of purchasing the ancillary service (i.e., if βH ≥ βL, p∗bH − p∗mH ≥ p∗bL − p∗mL; if
βH < βL, p
∗
bH − p∗mH < p∗bL − p∗mL).
Theorem IV.1(i) characterizes the optimal ancillary service price in the unbundling
case, which is given by the condition that marginal benefit is equal to total marginal
cost (p∗a is the marginal benefit of selling the ancillary service, ca + c
′(λHF¯H(p∗a) +
λLF¯L(p
∗
a)) is the total marginal cost of selling the ancillary service). In our basic
model, consumers make forward-looking decisions when purchasing the main service,
i.e., they take future utilities from the ancillary service into consideration. In Sec-
tion 4.5, we consider a model that also has myopic consumers who do not make
forward-looking purchasing decisions. As we will show, when myopic consumers ex-
ist, the firm’s optimal ancillary service price can be higher than the total marginal
cost. Theorem IV.1(ii) states that compared to the optimal bundle price, in the un-
bundling case, the firm should charge a lower main service price but a higher total
price including the ancillary service to both types of consumers. Moreover, Theorem
IV.1(iii) states that the consumer type with a higher likelihood of purchasing the an-
cillary service should see a more significant price reduction of the main service when
the firm unbundles the ancillary service. For airlines, since business travelers usually
check fewer bags than leisure travelers,4 our result indicates that the fare reduction
resulting from unbundling the baggage service should be more significant for leisure
travelers. Our results in Theorem IV.1(ii) and (iii) are consistent with the empirical
findings of Brueckner et al. (2014). Brueckner et al. (2014) find that after airlines
started charging for baggage fees, leisure fares (as measured by the 25th percentile
fare) fell by one-half to one-third of the baggage fee. Correspondingly, the full trip
4Checked bags per passenger at airport ticket counters increased to 0.677 in 2013, up from 0.668
in 2012; John Heimlich, A4A’s chief economist, said one factor is that more leisure travelers were
flying in 2013, and they tend to check more bags per person than business travelers (Schaal , 2014a).
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price for a passenger paying the baggage fee rose by one-half to two-thirds of the
baggage fee. Their empirical analysis also reveals that the fare impact of imposing
a baggage fee is larger at the lower percentiles (i.e., leisure travelers) and smaller at
the higher percentiles (i.e., business travelers), which is exactly what we find in The-
orem IV.1(iii). Thus, our model explains the empirical findings of Brueckner et al.
(2014). Next, we determine which strategy is more profitable for the firm, bundling
or unbundling.
Theorem IV.2. There exists a decreasing threshold function β¯H(βL) such that un-
bundling is more profitable than bundling if and only if βH ≤ β¯H(βL).
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Figure 4.1: Optimal strategy and threshold β¯H(βL) (vH = 300, vL = 200, u¯ = 50,
u = −20, cm = 150, ca = 20, c(x) = 0.5x2; solid curve: λH = 30, λL = 70;
dashed curve: λH = 50, λL = 50)
The trade-off between bundling and unbundling the ancillary service is as follows.
On the one hand, unbundling the ancillary service gives the firm more flexibility
and allows the firm to extract more consumer surplus. On the other hand, to the
extent that consumers postpone paying for the ancillary service till the last minute,
unbundling may result in higher inconvenience costs. Theorem IV.2 states that it is
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optimal to unbundle the ancillary service when consumers’ likelihoods of purchasing
the ancillary service are low enough. A lower likelihood of consumers purchasing the
ancillary service keeps the inconvenience cost less significant. For example, airlines
usually charge for the ancillary services that are needed by very few consumers, such as
pet fee. On the other hand, with a high enough likelihood of consumers purchasing the
ancillary service, it is optimal for the firm to bundle the ancillary service into the main
service. For example, since everyone needs to eat during long international flights,
airlines usually offer “free” meals (i.e., meal price is included in flight ticket price) for
international flights that are long enough (while they usually do not offer inclusive
meals for domestic flights). Figure 4.1 illustrates when bundling or unbundling the
ancillary service is the optimal strategy through one example and shows the threshold
function β¯H(βL).
Theorem IV.3. (i) Consider two scenarios with inconvenience costs c1(x) and c2(x),
respectively. Suppose c′1(x) ≤ c′2(x) ∀x > 0, then β¯H1(βL) ≥ β¯H2(βL). Moreover, if the
inconvenience cost is negligible (i.e., c(·) = 0), unbundling is always more profitable
than bundling (i.e., β¯H(βL) = 1).
(ii) Consider two scenarios with ancillary service marginal costs ca1 and ca2, re-
spectively. Suppose ca1 < ca2, then β¯H1(βL) ≤ β¯H2(βL).
(iii) Consider two scenarios. In the first scenario, the demand sizes are λH1 and
λL1. In the second scenario, the demand sizes are λH2 and λL2. Suppose λH1 +λL1 =
λH2 + λL2 = λ and λH1 < λH2 (hence λL1 > λL2). Then, β¯H1(βL) ≥ β¯H2(βL) in the
region of βH ≥ βL and β¯H1(βL) < β¯H2(βL) in the region of βH < βL; β¯H1(βL) and
β¯H2(βL) intersect on the 45
◦ line βH = βL.
Theorem IV.3 describes how the optimal bundling (unbundling) decision is af-
fected by the firm’s operating costs and demand portfolio (Figure 4.1 illustrates the
directions of change, for the threshold function β¯H(βL), that are caused by different
factors). As expected, a higher inconvenience cost makes bundling more favorable
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(i.e., the threshold β¯H(βL) becomes smaller). In the extreme case where the firm
does not incur any inconvenience cost, it is always more profitable to unbundle the
ancillary service. On the contrary, a higher marginal cost of ancillary service makes
unbundling more favorable (i.e., the threshold β¯H(βL) becomes larger), because un-
bundling the ancillary service results in fewer consumers using the ancillary service
and reduces the marginal costs incurred compared to the bundling case. One could
argue that an increase of fuel expenses increases the marginal cost of transporting
bags. Interestingly, the airlines started unbundling the checked baggage service in
2008, when the fuel prices went up by 91.5% from the previous year (Maynard ,
2008). Moreover, to reduce fuel expenses, airlines chose to unbundle checked bags
instead of carry-on bags because the marginal cost of a carry-on bag is smaller than
a checked bag. Carry-on bags are usually lighter and consume less fuel, and do not
need labor for loading or unloading. Additionally, after airlines started charging for
checked bags, some consumers may try to avoid checked bag fees by carrying more
luggage on to the plane rather than checking it. Thus, the firm may have an increased
consumer likelihood of having a carry-on bag. Theorem II.6 then indicates that it
will become less likely that unbundling the carry-on baggage service is profitable.
Theorem IV.3(iii) characterizes how the optimal decision is affected by firm’s de-
mand portfolio. The threshold function β¯H(βL) is less steep for a firm with a higher
proportion of high-type consumers (β¯H(βL) spins counterclockwise as the proportion
of high-type consumers increases). If high-type consumers are more likely to purchase
the ancillary service than low-type consumers (i.e., βH ≥ βL), then increasing the pro-
portion of high-type consumers expands the region in which bundling is optimal. If
low-type consumers are more likely to purchase the ancillary service than high-type
consumers (i.e., βH < βL), then increasing the proportion of high-type consumers ex-
pands the region in which unbundling is optimal. Therefore, if consumers’ valuations
for the main service and the ancillary service are positively correlated, bundling is
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more likely to be the optimal strategy for a firm with more high-type consumers than
a firm with fewer high-type consumers; if consumers’ valuations for the main service
and the ancillary service are negatively correlated, unbundling is more likely to be
the optimal strategy for a firm with more high-type consumers than a firm with fewer
high-type consumers.
Consider airline baggage policies for example. Since business travelers are less
likely to check bags than leisure travelers (i.e., βH < βL), Theorem IV.3(iii) indicates
that unbundling is more likely to be optimal for airlines with higher proportions of
business travelers (e.g., legacy airlines) than airlines with lower proportions of business
travelers (e.g., low-cost airlines). As of 2014, legacy airlines charge for checked bags;
the airline that stands firm on not charging for checked bags is Southwest (Southwest
does not charge for the first or second checked bag) which is a low-cost carrier (some
other low-cost airlines, including Spirit and Frontier, unbundle the baggage service
under a different pricing structure; we discuss this case in the next paragraph). Addi-
tionally, after some firms unbundle the ancillary service, consumers with higher needs
for the ancillary service may switch to the firms that are still bundling the ancillary
service for their lower total prices, and consumers without ancillary service needs may
switch to the unbundling firms for their lower main service prices. This would result
in an increase in consumers’ likelihood of using the ancillary service for the bundling
firms, and a decrease in consumers’ likelihood of purchasing the ancillary service for
the unbundling firms. Thus, following from Theorem II.6, firms’ different decisions
regarding bundling (unbundling) the ancillary service will be consolidated. This type
of consumer self-selection regarding airlines’ checked bag fees (which is empirically
supported by Nicolae et al., 2013) provides another reason for Southwest to bundle
the checked bags.5 Moreover, the bundling firms can increase the bundle price due
5So far, there is not clear evidence that Southwest will unbundle the baggage service in short-
term. Southwest’s CEO Gary Kelly declared during the company’s 2013 fourth quarter earnings call
that Southwest Airlines won’t begin to charge fees for first and second checked bags in 2014 (Schaal ,
2014b).
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to the increased consumer valuations for the ancillary service.6 Another reason for
Southwest to bundle the baggage service is its non-dependency on intermediary sales
channels, which we will discuss in Section 4.6.
In Theorem IV.3(i), we have shown that in order to benefit from unbundling, the
firm needs to reduce the inconvenience cost. One way to reduce the inconvenience cost
is to induce consumers to pay for the ancillary service in advance. Spirit and Frontier
Airlines have recently started to unbundle the baggage service while resorting to a
new pricing structure for the ancillary service with late-payment penalty. Spirit and
Frontier are now charging baggage fees contingent on when consumers pay for their
bags. The later a consumer pays for the bag, the higher the fee is. For example, Spirit
charges $100 for any bag (checked and carry-on) that is paid for at the gate, which
is three to four times higher than the baggage fees other airlines normally charge
and Spirit’s advance baggage fee itself. The following explanation has been given by
Spirit’s spokesperson: “The fee is intentionally set high to encourage customers to
reserve their bags in advance, and it is meant to deter customers from waiting until
they get to the boarding gate. When customers wait until the boarding gate, this
delays the boarding process for everyone.” (Brown, 2012) Because the new pricing
structure significantly reduces the inconvenience cost, Spirit and Frontier also charge
for carry-on bags. Being recognized as the airline with the lowest fares, Spirit may
not lose too many consumers even if its consumers are dissatisfied with the high late-
payment penalty, because price-sensitive consumers are not very likely to get even
lower ticket prices elsewhere if they refuse to accept the new baggage policy and pay
in advance.7 So far, Spirit’s implementation of the new baggage policy appears to be
6Henrickson and Scott (2012) consider the top 150 domestic routes from 2007 to 2009, and find
that a one dollar increase in baggage fees reduces airline ticket prices on the fee-charging airlines by
$0.24 and increases Southwest Airlines’ ticket prices on routes in which they compete with baggage-
fee-charging airlines by $0.73.
7With the lowest fares, Spirit unbundles the ancillary services the most aggressively. Spirit
charges separate fees for carry-on bags and other ancillary services including printing a boarding
pass which are unconventional to consumers. In all, there are about 70 fees enumerated in detail
on Spirit’s website for consumers to navigate (Mouawad , 2013). In 2012, Spirit collected $19.99 per
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a success. However, resorting to a pricing structure with the late-payment penalty
may be riskier for other airlines.
4.5 Myopic Consumers
In this section, we investigate the effect of myopic consumers on the firm’s optimal
strategy for the ancillary service. In travel industries, consumers usually purchase the
service bundle (when the firm bundles the ancillary service) or the main service (when
the firm unbundles the ancillary service) in advance. Different from forward-looking
consumers who take future utilities from the ancillary service into consideration when
purchasing the service bundle or main service in advance, myopic consumers do not
consider future utilities. Although our model in Section 4.4 assumed that all con-
sumers were forward-looking, for many ancillary services that do not cost significant
amounts of money, consumers are likely to be myopic. For example, it would be very
unusual that a consumer takes the possible purchase of a can of coke during the flight
(and the price of a can of coke) into consideration when booking the ticket several
months in advance.8
To capture the effect of myopic consumers, we now introduce a model with a
more general demand composition comprised of both forward-looking and myopic
consumers. We assume αH proportion of high-type consumers and αL proportion
of low-type consumers are forward-looking, the other consumers are myopic. In the
bundling case, type-i (i = H,L) myopic consumers are willing to pay vi for the service
bundle when making purchasing decisions in advance, which is lower than forward-
looking consumers’ willingness to pay, vi +E(ui)
+. For each consumer type i = H,L,
passenger in baggage fees which is the highest in the industry, whereas Delta collected $7.44 per
passenger which is about average for the industry (Mutzabaugh, 2013). Spirit’s ancillary revenue
makes up more than 30% of its total revenue (Trejos, 2012).
8Previous empirical research has looked into consumers’ behavior of delaying purchases strate-
gically, which is also a type of forward-looking behavior. For example, using airline data, Li et al.
(2014) find that across markets, 5.2% to 19.2% of the population exhibits the behavior of delaying
purchases strategically (measured by the first and third quartiles).
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the firm can choose to price the service bundle at pbi = vi + E(ui)
+ to induce only
forward-looking consumers to purchase, or at pbi = vi to induce both forward-looking
and myopic consumers to purchase. Thus, the firm has four price combinations to
choose from: “HH”, “HL”, “LH”, “LL”, where the former notation refers to the price
for high-type consumers and the latter refers to the price for low-type consumers, “H”
means pricing high and “L” means pricing low. The resulting profits are as follows,
where we add a subscript “m” to represent the case with myopic consumers, and use
the superscript to represent the price choice of the firm:
ΠHH∗b,m = [vH + E(uH)
+ − cm]αHλH + [vL + E(uL)+ − cm]αLλL
−ca[αHλHF¯H(0) + αLλLF¯L(0)],
ΠHL∗b,m = [vH + E(uH)
+ − cm]αHλH + (vL − cm)λL − ca[αHλHF¯H(0) + λLF¯L(0)],
ΠLH∗b,m = (vH − cm)λH + [vL + E(uL)+ − cm]αLλL − ca[λHF¯H(0) + αLλLF¯L(0)],
ΠLL∗b,m = (vH − cm)λH + (vL − cm)λL − ca[λHF¯H(0) + λLF¯L(0)].
The optimal profit in the bundling case is Π∗b,m = max(Π
HH∗
b,m ,Π
HL∗
b,m ,Π
LH∗
b,m ,Π
LL∗
b,m ).
In the unbundling case, type-i (i = H,L) myopic consumers are willing to pay
vi for the main service when making purchasing decisions in advance, and forward-
looking consumers have a higher willingness to pay, vi + E(ui − pa)+. For each
consumer type i = H,L, the firm can choose to price the main service at pmi =
vi+E(ui−pa)+ to induce only forward-looking consumers to purchase, or at pmi = vi
to induce both forward-looking and myopic consumers to purchase, hence also leading
to four price combinations. The resulting profits are as follows, as functions of the
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ancillary service price:
ΠHHu,m(pa) = [vH + E(uH − pa)+ − cm]αHλH + [vL + E(uL − pa)+ − cm]αLλL
+(pa − ca)[αHλHF¯H(pa) + αLλLF¯L(pa)]− c(αHλHF¯H(pa) + αLλLF¯L(pa)),
ΠHLu,m(pa) = [vH + E(uH − pa)+ − cm]αHλH + (vL − cm)λL
+(pa − ca)[αHλHF¯H(pa) + λLF¯L(pa)]− c(αHλHF¯H(pa) + λLF¯L(pa)),
ΠLHu,m(pa) = (vH − cm)λH + [vL + E(uL − pa)+ − cm]αLλL
+(pa − ca)[λHF¯H(pa) + αLλLF¯L(pa)]− c(λHF¯H(pa) + αLλLF¯L(pa)),
ΠLLu,m(pa) = (vH − cm)λH + (vL − cm)λL
+(pa − ca)[λHF¯H(pa) + λLF¯L(pa)]− c(λHF¯H(pa) + λLF¯L(pa)).
The optimal profit in the unbundling case is Π∗u,m = max
(
ΠHHu,m(p
∗
a),Π
HL
u,m(p
∗
a),Π
LH
u,m(p
∗
a),
ΠLLu,m(p
∗
a)
)
.
Theorem IV.4. In the unbundling case, the optimal ancillary service price is strictly
higher than the total marginal cost if the firm sells to both forward-looking and myopic
consumers; the optimal ancillary service price is equal to the total marginal cost if the
firm only sells to forward-looking consumers.
In the unbundling case, Theorem IV.4 states that as long as the firm sells to
myopic consumers (either high-type or low-type), it should price the ancillary service
above the marginal cost.9 Unlike forward-looking consumers, myopic consumers’
decisions on purchasing the main service and purchasing the ancillary service are made
independently. Thus, when selling to myopic consumers, the firm no longer wants to
decrease the ancillary service price to the marginal cost so that it could extract more
9In fact, we can characterize the condition for the firm to price the ancillary service above or
equal to the marginal cost. It can be shown that there exist two threshold functions, α˜H(αL) and
α˜L(αH), such that Π
∗
u,m = Π
HH∗
u,m (hence the optimal ancillary service price is equal to the marginal
cost) if αH > α˜H(αL) and αL > α˜L(αH), and Π
∗
u,m 6= ΠHH∗u,m (hence the optimal ancillary service
price is above the marginal cost) otherwise.
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consumer surplus overall by increasing the main service price accordingly. In reality,
“small-item” ancillary services are usually priced well-above their marginal costs, e.g.,
a can of coke is priced more than 10 times the cost of it if ordered during the flight.
Since consumers are myopic, the firm extracts high margins from selling the ancillary
service.
Theorem IV.5. (i) If unbundling is more profitable when all consumers are forward-
looking (i.e., αH = αL = 1), then it is more profitable for all αH and αL.
(ii) If bundling is more profitable when all consumers are forward-looking (i.e.,
αH = αL = 1), then there exist two thresholds αˆH , αˆL and a decreasing threshold
function α¯H(αL) such that when αH ≤ αˆH , αL ≤ αˆL, and αH ≤ α¯H(αL), unbundling
is more profitable.
Now we compare the unbundling profit to the bundling profit when some of the
firm’s consumers are myopic. Theorem IV.5 states that as the firm’s proportion
of myopic consumers increases, it may become optimal for the firm to switch from
bundling to unbundling but not the other way around. If it is optimal to unbundle
the ancillary service when all consumers are forward-looking, then it is also optimal
to unbundle the ancillary service with any proportion of myopic consumers. If it is
optimal to bundle the ancillary service when all consumers are forward-looking, we
find a sufficient condition so that the firm should actually unbundle the ancillary
service when the proportion of myopic consumers is significant enough (i.e., αH and
αL are small enough). When selling to myopic consumers, the firm does not capture
any consumer surplus from the ancillary service in the bundling case, because myopic
consumers’ utilities from the ancillary service do not affect their willingness to pay
for the service bundle. However, by unbundling the ancillary service, the firm is
able to capture myopic consumers’ surplus from the ancillary service, because the
firm induces myopic consumers to actually pay for the ancillary service. Thus, the
existence of myopic consumers may switch the firm’s optimal ancillary service strategy
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from bundling to unbundling but not the other way around.
Theorem IV.6. The optimal profits from bundling and unbundling are both increas-
ing in the proportion of forward-looking consumers, αH and αL.
Theorem IV.6 states that regardless of whether the firm bundles or unbundles
the ancillary service, its profit becomes higher when more consumers are forward-
looking. For a firm that sells an ancillary service in addition to a main service,
having more forward-looking consumers is beneficial because by accounting for future
utilities from the ancillary service, forward-looking consumers are willing to pay more
for the service bundle and main service than myopic consumers when purchasing in
advance. Thus, the firm benefits from providing guidance to consumers for their
ancillary service needs and making the information of the ancillary services easily
accessible to consumers. Notice that forward-looking (strategic) consumers play a
different role in the ancillary service pricing setting than in the markdown pricing
setting which has been extensively studied by previous literature. Although forward-
looking consumers have been perceived as harmful to firms that salvage product
leftovers at the end of the selling season, they actually benefit firms that manage the
sales of a main service and an ancillary service simultaneously.
4.6 Selling Through Intermediaries
Online travel agencies (OTAs) constitute one sales channel of firms operating
in travel industries. Travel firms’ contracts with OTAs are usually subject to rate
parity which requires that the firm charges the same price to consumers in all its sales
channels. For historical reasons, hotels pay higher commissions to OTAs compared
to airlines and car rental companies.10 Industry research shows that hotel bookings
10One explanation is that many hoteliers surrendered to the temptations of the indirect channel
during the recession, and have been accommodating the OTAs with bigger discounts; in Quarter
3 of 2010, OTA share of the online bookings for the top 30 hotel brands increased to 37.5%, from
25.4% in Quarter 3 of 2008 (Starkov , 2010).
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constitute an average of 30% of OTA booking volume but generate over 60% of
OTA booking revenue, whereas air tickets and car rental companies comprise 51%
of OTA booking volume but generate 12% of OTA booking revenue (Starkov , 2010).
Moreover, independent hotels are more OTA-dependent than branded hotel chains.
According to Starkov (2013), more than 42% of roomnights for independent hotels
are reserved online. Only 24% of these roomnights are reserved via hotel websites,
whereas 76% are reserved via OTAs. In 2012, branded hotels received 38.7% of
roomnight reservations online, with 68% via hotel websites and 32% via OTAs. While
hotels are dependent on OTAs as an important sales channel, they are very much
concerned about the high commissions paid to OTAs and are seeking ways to earn
more profits back. Most of the solutions that have been proposed by industry analysts
focus on enhancing brand loyalty and affinity with better marketing tactics (e.g.,
Mayock , 2011, Weston, 2013). However, it could be worthwhile to explore how firms
could earn profits back from OTAs with better pricing strategies.
In this section, we investigate the effect of selling through intermediaries on the
optimal selection of bundling or unbundling the ancillary service. We now analyze
a model where γH proportion of high-type consumers and γL proportion of low-type
consumers purchase directly from the firm, the other consumers purchase from the
intermediaries. The firm pays a commission of τ (which is defined as a percentage of
the revenue collected by the OTA) to the OTA for each unit of sale.11 In the bundling
11There are two models that firms have been using to contract with OTAs: the merchant model
and the agency model. In the merchant model, the OTAs purchase products from the firm at a
negotiated wholesale rate (usually discounted by 20% to 30%). Then they mark the price back
up and resell the products to consumers. Consumers pay up front to the OTAs. The merchant
model has been used by Hotels.com, Orbitz and Travelocity. In the agency model, an OTA gets
a commission from the firm for every product sold through its platform. Consumers pay to the
firm and are allowed to pay at checkout. The agency model has been adopted by some OTAs
recently. It has been used by Booking.com, and has been tested by Expedia with the Expedia
Traveler Preference Program. Because of the more convenient payment time for consumers, the
agency model is expected to be used more often. For our purpose of study, the equivalence of firm
profits from these two models can be easily proved. Thus, we use a unified framework to study the
effect of selling through intermediaries. τ can be interpreted as the commission that the firm pays
to the OTA for each unit of sale (agency model), or alternatively, the discount rate that the firm
offers to the OTA (merchant model).
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case, the firm earns 1 − τ fraction of the bundle price. In the unbundling case, the
firm earns 1− τ fraction of the main service price and the full ancillary service price
because consumers pay for the ancillary service directly to the firm.
Theorem IV.7. The difference between the optimal unbundling profit and the optimal
bundling profit is increasing in the intermediary commission τ , and decreasing in the
proportion of direct sales, γH and γL.
Theorem IV.7 states that as the OTA’s commission increases, or as consumers shift
from purchasing directly from the firm to purchasing from the OTA (i.e., γH and/or
γL decrease), unbundling the ancillary service becomes more profitable relative to
bundling. When the firm bundles the ancillary service into the main service, it has to
pay commissions to the OTA for the whole service price. By unbundling the ancillary
service, the firm only pays commissions to the OTA for the main service price and
still collects the full price of the ancillary service. Thus, unbundling the ancillary
service helps firms earn more revenues back from OTAs, which is what a lot of travel
firms are trying to achieve now. For a firm that is facing a higher OTA commission
or is more dependent on OTAs (i.e., OTAs account for a larger proportion of the
firm’s sales), unbundling the ancillary service is more valuable. Southwest Airlines is
the only major U.S. carrier that does not use OTAs (i.e., Southwest’s γH = γL = 1).
Following our analysis in this section, bundling the baggage service is more likely to
be optimal for Southwest than other airlines.
In Sections 4.4 - 4.6, we have analyzed when a price-discriminating firm benefits
from unbundling the ancillary service and how a firm should choose the optimal
ancillary service price. Our results provide some explanations for the interesting
phenomenon in the airline industry that while most airlines charge for checked bags,
Southwest Airlines provides this ancillary service for free. First, Southwest is the only
major U.S. airline that does not use online travel agencies to sell tickets. Second, as
a low-cost airline, Southwest has a larger proportion of leisure travelers who have
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higher checked baggage needs. Third, as other airlines started to charge for checked
bags, consumers with higher baggage needs may switch to Southwest and result in
an overall increase in Southwest’s baggage demand. This would consolidate bundling
as Southwest’s optimal strategy.
So far, we have considered a firm that can price-discriminate when selling the
main service. An interesting question is how the optimal strategy for the ancillary
service is affected by the firm’s ability to price-discriminate when selling the main
service. Compared to airlines, price discrimination for the main service is much less
used in other industries such as hotels. In the next section, we analyze a firm that
does not price-discriminate (i.e., uses uniform pricing) when selling the main service
and characterize how this firm would price ancillary services. This in turn enables
us to contrast our results to the case where the firm can price discriminate and we
find that the ability to price discriminate plays a key role in the decision whether
it is optimal to bundle ancillary services. Since previous literature on commodity
bundling has focused on the case where the firm uses uniform pricing when selling both
commodities, our findings will also shed light on whether the insights for commodity
bundling carry through to the ancillary service setting and how the insights become
different if the firm uses or is unable to use discriminatory pricing.
4.7 Uniform Pricing of Main Service
In this section, we study the optimal strategy for the ancillary service for a firm
that does not price-discriminate when selling the main service and compare the results
to the case of a price-discriminating firm. We consider a firm that charges a uniform
price for the main service to both types of consumers. Note that under discriminatory
pricing, both types of consumers are served. Under uniform pricing, it may be optimal
to serve only high-type consumers. However, to make a fair comparison, we consider
a uniform-pricing firm that serves both types of consumers, that is, the firm charges
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the uniform price at low-type consumers’ willingness to pay. In the bundling case,
the firm sells the bundle at price p∗b = vL + E(uL)
+.12 We add a second subscript of
“n” to denote the case where the firm does not price-discriminate. The optimal profit
in the bundling case is
Π∗b,n = [vL + E(uL)
+ − cm](λH + λL)− ca[λHF¯H(0) + λLF¯L(0)].
In the unbundling case, the firm sells the main service at price pm which should satisfy
pm = vL + E(uL − pa)+. The profit function in the unbundling case is
Πu,n(pa) = [vL + E(uL − pa)+ − cm](λH + λL)
+(pa − ca)[λHF¯H(pa) + λLF¯L(pa)]− c(λHF¯H(pa) + λLF¯L(pa)),
and the optimal ancillary service price is denoted by p∗a,n. In this section, we as-
sume c′′′(·) ≥ 0 which holds at least if the inconvenience cost is polynomial with
non-negative coefficients or exponential. This assumption is only needed to ensure
the quasi-concavity of Πu,n(pa) (hence to guarantee that the optimal solution p
∗
a,n is
unique), and is not needed for the rest of the analysis in this section. The following
theorem compares the optimal ancillary service price under uniform pricing, p∗a,n, to
the optimal ancillary service price under discriminatory pricing, p∗a.
Theorem IV.8. If high-type consumers are more likely to purchase the ancillary
service than low-type consumers (i.e., βH ≥ βL), the optimal ancillary service price
under uniform pricing is greater than the optimal ancillary service price under dis-
criminatory pricing (i.e., p∗a,n ≥ p∗a); otherwise, the result reverses (i.e., if βH < βL,
p∗a,n < p
∗
a).
12Note that u¯ ≤ vH − vL ensures that when pb = vL +E(uL)+, high-type consumers purchase the
service bundle as well, that is, charging at low-type consumers’ willingness to pay induces high-type
consumers to purchase as well even if high-type consumers may value the ancillary service lower.
This also holds in the unbundling case.
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Theorem IV.8 states that compared to the discriminatory-pricing case, the firm
should charge a higher ancillary service price under uniform pricing when high-type
consumers are more likely to purchase the ancillary service than low-type consumers,
or equivalently, consumers’ valuations for the main service and the ancillary service
are positively correlated. The firm should charge a lower ancillary service price under
uniform pricing when low-type consumers are more likely to purchase the ancillary
service than high-type consumers, or equivalently, consumers’ valuations for the main
service and the ancillary service are negatively correlated. Recall from Section 4.4 that
under discriminatory pricing, the optimal ancillary service price, p∗a, is equal to the
total marginal cost of providing the ancillary service. Thus, Theorem IV.8 indicates
that under uniform pricing, the optimal ancillary service price should be above the
total marginal cost in the case of a positive correlation and below the total marginal
cost in the case of a negative correlation. This result appears to be consistent with
the previous findings in two-part pricing literature (e.g., Rosen and Rosenfield , 1997,
Png and Wang , 2010).
Under discriminatory pricing, the firm is able to extract full surplus ex ante from
both types of consumers. Under uniform pricing, the firm only extracts full sur-
plus from low-type consumers and leaves some surplus from high-type consumers
un-captured. Different from a price-discriminating firm, a uniform-pricing firm needs
to adjust the main service price and the ancillary service price to extract more surplus
from high-type consumers, while keeping low-type consumers’ individual rationality
constraint binding. If high-type consumers are more likely to purchase the ancillary
service than low-type consumers, to capture more of the high-type consumers’ sur-
plus from the ancillary service, the firm should increase the ancillary service price and
decrease the main service price accordingly. Thus, compared to the discriminatory-
pricing case, the firm’s optimal ancillary service price is higher under uniform pricing.
On the other hand, if low-type consumers are more likely to purchase the ancillary
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service than high-type consumers, the firm’s optimal ancillary service price under uni-
form pricing is lower than the optimal ancillary service under discriminatory pricing.
Therefore, the effect of main service price discrimination on the optimal ancillary
service price depends on the correlation between consumers’ valuations for the main
service and the ancillary service in a way that is described in Theorem IV.8.
Theorem IV.9. Under uniform pricing, there exists an increasing threshold function
β¯H,n(βL) such that unbundling is more profitable than bundling if and only if βH ≥
β¯H,n(βL).
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Figure 4.2: Optimal strategy and threshold β¯H,n(βL) in the uniform pricing case
(vH = 300, vL = 200, u¯ = 50, u = −20, cm = 150, ca = 20, c(x) = 0.5x2,
λH = 30, λL = 70)
Now we compare firm’s optimal bundling (unbundling) decisions under uniform
pricing and discriminatory pricing. Theorem IV.9 characterizes the firm’s optimal
strategy under uniform pricing. Recall that we characterized the regions where
bundling and unbundling are optimal in Theorem II.6 and Figure 4.1 for the discriminatory-
pricing case. It is easy to see the differences. First, under uniform pricing, unbundling
is more profitable than bundling if high-type consumers’ likelihood of purchasing the
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ancillary service is high enough; whereas under discriminatory pricing, unbundling is
more profitable if high-type consumers’ likelihood of purchasing the ancillary service
is low enough. Second, the threshold function that separates the bundling region
and the unbundling region is an increasing function under uniform pricing and a de-
creasing function under discriminatory pricing. Figure 4.2 illustrates when bundling
or unbundling the ancillary service is optimal for a uniform-pricing firm through the
same example used in Figure 4.1. By comparing Figure 4.2 to Figure 4.1, we can
clearly see the above differences. Theorem IV.9 essentially states that for a uniform-
pricing firm, it is optimal to unbundle the ancillary service if high-type consumers’
likelihood of purchasing the ancillary service is high enough and low-type consumers’
likelihood of purchasing the ancillary service is low enough, which is equivalent to re-
quiring that the correlation between consumers’ main service valuations and ancillary
service valuations is positive enough. Thus, although the ancillary service setting is
naturally different from the bundling setting that has been studied by previous lit-
erature (the ancillary service cannot be sold separately), our result in Theorem IV.9
for a uniform-pricing firm is consistent with the bundling literature finding. How-
ever, if the firm is able to price-discriminate when selling the main service, the above
“correlation effect” goes away, and for unbundling to be the optimal strategy, both
consumer types’ likelihoods of purchasing the ancillary service should be low enough.
Under uniform pricing, if the firm bundles the ancillary service into the main ser-
vice, it prices the bundle at low-type consumers’ willingness to pay and both types of
consumers purchase the bundle. If high-type consumers are very likely to purchase
the ancillary service while low-type consumers are very unlikely to purchase the an-
cillary service, bundling the ancillary service would mean that the firm is leaving
too much un-captured surplus to high-type consumers. In this case, the firm should
unbundle and charge a high price for the ancillary service to capture more surplus
from high-type consumers. On the other hand, if high-type consumers are very un-
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likely to purchase the ancillary service while low-type consumers are very likely to
purchase the ancillary service, the firm benefits from bundling the ancillary service.
If the firm unbundles in this case, it will charge a low price for the ancillary service
(following from Theorem IV.8), which would not bring in a lot revenue but result
in too much inconvenience cost. Overall, unbundling the ancillary service assists the
firm in capturing more surplus from high-type consumers at the expense of distorting
the prices charged to low-type consumers. A positive enough correlation between
consumers’ valuations for the main service and the ancillary service indicates that
high-type consumers have significantly more surplus from the ancillary service com-
pared to low-type consumers, and hence the firm should capture it by unbundling the
ancillary service.
Under discriminatory pricing, by charging a different price to high-type consumers
for the service bundle or main service, the firm can capture the surplus from high-
type consumers without distorting the prices charged to low-type consumers. Thus,
the above explanation for the uniform pricing case no longer holds. Even if high-type
consumers are very likely to purchase the ancillary service and low-type consumers
are very unlikely to purchase the ancillary service, by bundling the ancillary service,
the firm can still capture the ancillary service surplus of high-type consumers by
charging at their willingness to pay. Similarly, even if high-type consumers are very
unlikely to purchase the ancillary service and low-type consumers are very likely to
purchase the ancillary service, by unbundling the ancillary service, the firm can still
avoid charging an ancillary service price that is too low (the optimal ancillary service
price is always equal to the total marginal cost).
Theorem IV.10. (i) If high-type consumers are more likely to purchase the ancillary
service than low-type consumers (i.e., βH ≥ βL), when unbundling is more profitable
under discriminatory pricing, it is also more profitable under uniform pricing (i.e.,
when Π∗u ≥ Π∗b , we also have Π∗u,n ≥ Π∗b,n).
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(ii) If low-type consumers are more likely to purchase the ancillary service than
high-type consumers (i.e., βH < βL), when unbundling is more profitable under
uniform pricing, it is also more profitable under discriminatory pricing (i.e., when
Π∗u,n ≥ Π∗b,n, we also have Π∗u ≥ Π∗b).
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Figure 4.3: Comparison of optimal strategies under discriminatory pricing and uni-
form pricing (vH = 300, vL = 200, u¯ = 50, u = −20, cm = 150, ca = 20,
c(x) = 0.5x2, λH = 30, λL = 70; Region A: unbundle in both cases;
Region B: bundle in both cases; Region C: bundle under discriminatory
pricing, unbundle under uniform pricing; Region D: unbundle under dis-
criminatory pricing, bundle under uniform pricing)
Theorem IV.10 goes one step further and directly compares the optimal bundling
(unbundling) strategies for a uniform-pricing firm and a price-discriminating firm.
If high-type consumers are more likely to purchase the ancillary service than low-
type consumers, or equivalently, if consumers’ valuations for the main service and
the ancillary service are positively correlated, bundling is more likely to be the opti-
mal ancillary service strategy for a price-discriminating firm than a uniform pricing
firm. If low-type consumers are more likely to purchase the ancillary service than
high-type consumers, or equivalently, if consumers’ valuations for the main service
and the ancillary service are negatively correlated, unbundling is more likely to be
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the optimal ancillary service strategy for a price-discriminating firm than a uniform
pricing firm. Figure 4.3 illustrates the result in Theorem IV.10 by plotting together
the threshold functions under uniform pricing and discriminatory pricing. As Figure
4.3 shows, when consumers’ valuations are positively correlated (i.e., in the region
above the dotted line), the bundling region is larger for a price-discriminating firm;
when consumers valuations are negatively correlated (i.e., in the region below the
dotted line), the unbundling region is larger for a price-discriminating firm.
Therefore, when a firm switches from uniform pricing to discriminatory pricing
for the main service, it should re-evaluate its policy for the ancillary service. For
a firm managing an ancillary service that involves a positive consumer valuation
correlation, a shift from unbundling to bundling may be needed; for a firm managing
an ancillary service that involves a negative consumer valuation correlation, a shift
from bundling to unbundling may be needed. Firms in several industries, such as
sports game organizers and hotels, are currently trying to enforce inter-temporal
price discrimination. Along with the adoption of main service price discrimination, it
is important for these firms to identify which of their consumer segments values the
ancillary service more and adjust the strategy for the ancillary service accordingly.
Theorem IV.11. Consider two scenarios. In the first scenario, the demand sizes
are λH1 and λL1. In the second scenario, the demand sizes are λH2 and λL2. Suppose
λH1 + λL1 = λH2 + λL2 = λ and λH1 < λH2 (hence λL1 > λL2). Then, β¯H,n1(βL) ≥
β¯H,n2(βL) in the region of βH ≥ βL and β¯H,n1(βL) < β¯H,n2(βL) in the region of βH <
βL; β¯H,n1(βL) and β¯H,n2(βL) intersect on the 45
◦ line βH = βL.
Finally, we study how the optimal ancillary service strategy differs for different
firms and compare the result to our previous result in the discriminatory-pricing case.
Theorem IV.11 characterizes how the optimal strategy is affected by the firm’s de-
mand portfolio in the uniform-pricing case. If high-type consumers are more likely to
purchase the ancillary service than low-type consumers (i.e., βH ≥ βL), then increas-
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ing the proportion of high-type consumers expands the region in which unbundling
is optimal. If low-type consumers are more likely to purchase the ancillary service
than high-type consumers (i.e., βH < βL), then increasing the proportion of high-type
consumers expands the region in which bundling is optimal. If consumers’ valuations
for the main service and the ancillary service are positively correlated, compared to
a firm with fewer high-type consumers, a firm with more high-type consumers has
more incentive to capture the ancillary service surplus from high-type consumers,
hence unbundling is more likely to be the optimal ancillary service strategy. On the
other hand, if consumers’ valuations for the main service and the ancillary service
are negatively correlated, bundling is more likely to be the optimal ancillary service
strategy for a firm with more high-type consumers.
Different from the airline industry where it is very common that consumers in dif-
ferent segments pay different prices for the same type of seats, discriminatory pricing
of room rates is much less used in the hotel industry. Moreover, the most common an-
cillary services offered by hotels (e.g., breakfast, in-room internet connection) would
usually involve a positive correlation between consumers’ main service valuations and
ancillary service valuations. Wealthier consumers are more likely to purchase these
ancillary services from the hotel, whereas less wealthy consumers may seek cheaper
outside options (e.g., having breakfast in a nearby fast-food store at a lower price).
Thus, Theorem IV.11 indicates that unbundling is more likely to be optimal for ho-
tels with higher proportions of wealthier consumers (e.g., luxury hotels) than hotels
with lower proportions of wealthier consumers (e.g., economy hotels). The current
industry practice is that luxury hotels usually charge for such ancillary services and
economy hotels usually offer them for free. Our result here provides an explanation
for this interesting phenomenon.
Interestingly, if we compare Theorem IV.11 to Theorem IV.3(iii) which charac-
terizes how the optimal strategy is affected by the firm’s demand portfolio in the
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discriminatory-pricing case, we see that the result is exactly reversed. Again, the
fundamental reason is that the ancillary service price plays a different role in the
uniform-pricing case than it does in the discriminatory-pricing case. Different from
a discriminatory-pricing firm, a uniform-pricing firm uses the ancillary service price
as a lever to capture more of the high-type consumers’ surplus that is not captured
by the uniform main service price. Table 4.1 summarizes the findings from this pa-
per about the effect of the firm’s demand portfolio on its optimal strategy for the
ancillary service. It characterizes how the vertical differentiation of optimal ancillary
service policies in an industry is jointly determined by firms’ use of main service price
discrimination as well as consumers’ valuation structure.
Uniform pricing Discriminatory pricing
Positive consumer Higher λH%⇒ unbundle Higher λH%⇒ bundle
valuation correlation Lower λH%⇒ bundle Lower λH%⇒ unbundle
Negative consumer Higher λH%⇒ bundle Higher λH%⇒ unbundle
valuation correlation Lower λH%⇒ unbundle Lower λH%⇒ bundle
Table 4.1: Comparison of the effects of firm’s demand portfolio on the optimal
strategy for the ancillary service in the uniform-pricing case and in the
discriminatory-pricing case
4.8 Conclusion
In this paper, we study whether and when a firm that sells a main service as well
as an ancillary service benefits from charging separately for the ancillary service. We
consider several important factors that affect this decision, including both firm char-
acteristics (operating costs, demand portfolio, supply chain structure) and consumer
characteristics (valuation structure, forward-looking or myopic). By analyzing a firm
that price-discriminates when selling the main service, we find that it may be more
profitable to unbundle the ancillary service because of the following three reasons: 1)
consumers have low ancillary service needs, 2) a large proportion of consumers are
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myopic instead of forward-looking, 3) the firm is highly dependent on intermediaries
to make sales. Our findings provide some explanations for airline ancillary service
policies.
Moreover, we study how the firm’s ability to price-discriminate when selling the
main service affects its optimal strategy for the ancillary service. We find that some
classic findings from the previous commodity bundling literature and two-part pricing
literature actually do not carry through to the discriminatory-pricing case. Thus, our
paper offers unique contributions to the existing literature. We find that whereas it is
optimal for a uniform-pricing firm to unbundle the ancillary service if the consumers
that value the main service higher have a high enough likelihood of purchasing the
ancillary service, it is optimal for a price-discriminating firm to unbundle the ancil-
lary service if the consumers that value the main service higher have a low enough
likelihood of purchasing the ancillary service. Firm’s ability to price-discriminate
when selling the main service makes bundling (unbundling) more likely to be the
optimal strategy for the ancillary service when consumers’ valuations for the main
service and the ancillary service are positively (negatively) correlated. This paper
also provides the insight that firms’ use of main service price discrimination and con-
sumers’ valuation structure jointly determine the optimal ancillary service policies in
an industry.
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CHAPTER V
Conclusion
This dissertation studies three topics in the arising fields of strategic-level revenue
management and consumer-driven operations management. The results and findings
provide managerial and policy insights to firms regarding the optimal selection of
pricing policies.
In the first essay, I look into the event industry (i.e., sports games and concerts)
and study a crucial issue in the industry – whether the existence of a resale market
is beneficial or harmful to the event ticket providers. Three pricing policies are con-
sidered, including fixed pricing, multiperiod pricing, and option pricing. I find that
contrary to what common wisdom may suggest, event ticket providers could benefit
from the existence of a resale market in many cases under the currently used pricing
policies (fixed and multiperiod pricing). Thus, efforts to move to paperless ticketing
are likely to hurt not only consumers but also event ticket providers in many cases.
I also find that by using a novel pricing policy with ticket options, an event ticket
provider can eliminate consumer resale of tickets and reduce speculator resale of tick-
ets. Option pricing not only results in the highest revenues for event ticket providers
but also gives consumers greater choice. Therefore, my findings indicate that event
organizers should not support paperless ticketing but instead consider novel pricing
strategies such as ticket options.
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In the second essay, I look into the hotel industry and study a type of conditional
upgrades that are recently offered by many major hotels. I consider a model that in-
corporates consumers’ strategic behavior of anticipating the upgrade probability when
making booking decisions, and analyze the firm’s optimal upgrade policy. My analy-
sis reveals three benefits of conditional upgrades. First, conditional upgrades expand
the firm’s demand. Second, the upgrade price can correct the original suboptimal
product price and reoptimize the firm’s demand segmentation. Third, conditional
upgrades give the firm more flexibility to match stochastic demand to supply and
hence improve utilization. Conditional upgrades can effectively compensate for the
firm’s lack of ability in setting product prices optimally. For a firm that has the ability
to set optimal static product prices, offering conditional upgrades can generate more
revenue than using dynamic pricing.
In the third essay, I look into the airline and other travel industries and study
whether a firm that sells a main service and also an ancillary service should separately
charge for the ancillary service. First, I find that a firm that price-discriminates when
selling the main service should unbundle the ancillary service because consumers have
low ancillary service needs, or a large proportion of consumers are myopic instead of
forward-looking, or the firm is highly dependent on intermediaries to make sales. I
also study how the firm’s ability to price-discriminate when selling the main service
affects its optimal ancillary service policy. I find that whereas it is optimal for a
uniform-pricing firm to unbundle the ancillary service if the consumers that value
the main service higher have a high enough likelihood of purchasing the ancillary
service, it is optimal for a price-discriminating firm to unbundle the ancillary service
if the consumers that value the main service higher have a low enough likelihood
of purchasing the ancillary service. In the case of uniform pricing, if consumers’
valuations for the main service and the ancillary service are positively (negatively)
correlated, unbundling (bundling) is more likely to be the optimal strategy for firms
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with higher proportions of high-type consumers. In the case of discriminatory pricing,
if consumers’ valuations for the main service and the ancillary service are positively
(negatively) correlated, bundling (unbundling) is more likely to be the optimal strat-
egy for firms with higher proportions of high-type consumers. This is exactly the
opposite of the result for uniform-pricing firms.
The areas of strategic-level revenue management and consumer-driven operations
management are rich with opportunities to explore the interface between operations
management and other fields, such as economics and marketing. For example, one
can use game theory models to incorporate consumer behaviors into operations man-
agement problems and study the interactions between firms and consumers. One can
also use industrial organization models (e.g., price discrimination) to study firms’
strategic-level pricing decisions. There are more interesting research questions in
these areas that are worth studying analytically and empirically.
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APPENDIX A
Proofs of Theorems and Lemmas in Chapter II
Lemma A.1. Under fixed pricing, given that the capacity provider’s price is pf and
that z consumers and y speculators have purchased tickets in period 1, the equilibrium
resale price in period 2 is
rf (z, y) =

r¯(z, y) if pf > r¯(z, y),
pf if r(z, y) < pf ≤ r¯(z, y),
r(z, y) if pf ≤ r(z, y),
where r¯(z, y) is the solution to (λ1 − z + λ2)F¯ (r¯) = zF ((1 − τ)r¯) + y and r(z, y) is
the solution to (λ1 − z + λ2)F¯ (r) = (C − z − y) + zF ((1− τ)r) + y.
Proof of Lemma A.1
In period 2, speculators resell tickets at the same price with consumers, because
otherwise, the party with the lower price will raise it to gain more margin and if
the party with the higher price cannot make sales, it will reduce the price to make
sales. The provider has C − z − y remaining capacity, and λ1 − z + λ2 consumers
arrive, including the period 1 consumers that were not satisfied or decided to wait.
(λ1 − z + λ2)F¯ (pf ) is the number of consumers that are willing to buy the ticket if
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the ticket price is pf . Also, zF ((1− τ)rf ) is the number of period 1 consumers that
would like to resell their tickets if the resale market price is rf , because a period 1
consumer will want to resell her ticket if her valuation is smaller than the payoff from
resale, (1− τ)rf .
If pf > r¯(z, y), we have (λ1 − z + λ2)F¯ (pf ) < zF ((1− τ)pf ) + y. In this case, the
equilibrium resale price is rf (z, y) = r¯(z, y) which is lower than the capacity provider’s
price pf . All demand is satisfied by the resale market. If r(z, y) < pf ≤ r¯(z, y), we
have zF ((1− τ)pf ) + y ≤ (λ1 − z + λ2)F¯ (pf ) < C − z + zF ((1− τ)pf ). In this case,
resellers enter the resale market in the order of increasing valuations up to the one
with valuation (1 − τ)pf , because otherwise the resale price will be higher than pf ,
hence the capacity provider will make sales first and the resellers with high valuations
will not be able to make sales. Thus, the equilibrium resale price is rf (z, y) = pf in
this case. If pf ≤ r(z, y), we have (λ1− z+λ2)F¯ (pf ) ≥ C− z+ zF ((1− τ)pf ). In this
case, the equilibrium resale price is rf (z, y) = r(z, y) which is higher than or equal to
the capacity provider’s price pf . The capacity provider sells tickets first and he sells
out his capacity, the resale market captures the residual demand.
Proof of Theorem II.1
In the first part of the proof, we derive the period 1 consumers’ purchasing de-
cisions in equilibrium based on the equilibrium resale price given by Lemma A.1.
Then, in the second part of the proof, we derive the capacity provider’s optimal
fixed price p∗f . If a period 1 consumer buys a ticket, her payoff in period 2 is
the maximum of her payoff from using the ticket, V , and her payoff from reselling
the ticket, (1 − τ)rf (z, y). Thus, her payoff from buying a ticket in period 1 is
S1f (z, y) = −pf + E[max(V, (1 − τ)rf (z, y))]. If a period 1 consumer waits, then she
can obtain a ticket in period 2 only if her valuation is high enough. As Lemma A.1
indicates, if pf > r¯(z, y), she can buy a ticket from the resale market at price r¯(z, y)
if V > r¯(z, y). If r(z, y) < pf ≤ r¯(z, y), she can buy a ticket from either the resale
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market or the capacity provider at price pf if V > pf . If pf ≤ r(z, y), she can buy
a ticket from the capacity provider at price pf if V > r˜(z, y) where r˜(z, y) is the
solution to (λ1−z+λ2)F¯ (r) = C−z−y, she can buy a ticket from the resale market
at a higher price r(z, y) if r(z, y) < V ≤ r˜(z, y), and she may not obtain a ticket
otherwise. Thus, a period 1 consumer’s payoff from waiting is
S2f (z, y) =

E[V − r¯(z, y)]+ if pf > r¯(z, y),
E(V − pf )+ if r(z, y) < pf ≤ r¯(z, y),∫∞
r˜(z,y)
(v − pf ) dF (v) +
∫ r˜(z,y)
r(z,y)
[v − r(z, y)] dF (v) if pf ≤ r(z, y).
Note that the upper bound of z is z¯ = min(λ1, C), as z cannot exceed the total
number of period 1 consumers or the provider’s capacity.
Next, we will show that any z ∈ (0, z¯) cannot be an equilibrium. The Implicit
Function Theorem gives that r¯(z, y) is decreasing in z, r(z, y) and r˜(z, y) are increasing
in z:
∂r¯
∂z
= − F¯ (r¯) + F ((1− τ)r¯)
(λ1 − z + λ2)f(r¯) + (1− τ)zf((1− τ)r¯) ≤ 0,
∂r
∂z
=
F¯ ((1− τ)r)− F¯ (r)
(λ1 − z + λ2)f(r) + (1− τ)zf((1− τ)r) ≥ 0,
∂r˜
∂z
=
F (r˜)
(λ1 − z + λ2)f(r˜) > 0.
First, consider the case of pf > r(z, y). y
∗ = 0 in this case because speculators
will incur a loss if entering the market. If pf > r¯(z, 0), S
1
f (z, 0) − S2f (z, 0) = −pf +
E[max(V, (1− τ)r¯(z, 0))]− E[V − r¯(z, 0)]+ < −r¯(z, 0) + E[max(V, (1− τ)r¯(z, 0))]−
E[V − r¯(z, 0)]+ = E[max(V, (1 − τ)r¯(z, 0))] − E[max(V, r¯(z, 0))] < 0. Also, S1f (z, 0)
is decreasing in z and S2f (z, 0) is increasing in z. Thus, we have sup0≤z≤z¯(S
1
f (z, 0)) <
inf0≤z≤z¯(S2f (z, 0)), hence z
∗ = 0. Similarly, if r(z, y) < pf ≤ r¯(z, 0), S1f (z, 0) and
S2f (z, 0) stay constant with respect to z and S
1
f (z, 0)−S2f (z, 0) = −pf +E[max(V, (1−
τ)pf )] − E(V − pf )+ < 0, hence we also have z∗ = 0. Second, consider the case of
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pf ≤ r(z, y). Note that in this case, the equilibrium resale price is r(z, y) which is
independent of y. We have y∗(z) = C − z if pf < (1 − τ ′)r(z, y) and y∗(z) = 0
otherwise. S1f (z, y
∗(z)) is increasing in z and since
dS2f (z, y
∗(z))
dz
= [pf − r(z, y∗(z))]f(r˜(z, y∗(z))) dr˜(z, y
∗(z))
dz
−[F (r˜(z, y∗(z)))− F (r(z, y∗(z)))] dr(z, y
∗(z))
dz
≤ 0,
S2f (z, y
∗(z)) is decreasing in z. Thus, if a small portion of period 1 consumers who
are currently waiting deviate to buying tickets, more such deviations will occur; and
vice versa. Therefore, z∗ = z¯ and z∗ = 0 are the only possible equilibria. To induce
z∗ = z¯, pf needs to satisfy1 pf ≤ r(z¯, y∗(z¯)) and S1f (z¯, y∗(z¯)) ≥ S2f (0, y∗(0)). The
equilibrium resale price is r(z¯, y∗(z¯)) = r∗f , hence Part (i) of the theorem is proved.
Additionally, since the equilibrium resides in the case of pf ≤ r(z, y), the proof of
Lemma A.1 indicates that the provider sells out his capacity, hence his revenue is
pfC.
Now we derive p∗f . Note that r(0, y
∗(0)) = ps and r(z¯, y∗(z¯)) = r∗f . For ps <
pf ≤ r∗f , S2f (0, y∗(0)) = E(V − pf )+. In this case, S1f (z¯, y∗(z¯)) ≥ S2f (0, y∗(0)) becomes
−pf + E[max(V, (1 − τ)r∗f )] ≥ E(V − pf )+, or equivalently, E[max(V, (1 − τ)r∗f )] ≥
E[max(V, pf )], which can be simplified to pf ≤ max((1− τ)r∗f , vmin). Consider [(λ1−
C)++λ2]F¯ (r
∗
f ) = (C−λ1)++min(λ1, C)F ((1−τ)r∗f ) which defines r∗f . As τ increases,
the rhs decreases, so we need to increase r∗f to maintain equality. Both the lhs and
the rhs become smaller when the equality is reached again. Thus, as τ increases, r∗f
increases and (1−τ)r∗f decreases. When τ = 0, (1−τ)r∗f = ps, hence ps > (1−τ)r∗f for
any τ > 0. Since ps > vmin, we have pf > ps > max((1− τ)r∗f , vmin) which contradicts
1We assume when period 1 consumers are indifferent between buying tickets and waiting, they
buy immediately. The capacity provider can resolve the consumer indifference by reducing pf by an
infinitesimally small amount.
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S1f (z¯, y
∗(z¯)) > S2f (0, y
∗(0)). Therefore, ps < pf ≤ r∗f is not feasible.
For pf ≤ ps, y∗(0) = C if pf < (1−τ ′)ps and y∗(0) = 0 otherwise; y∗(z¯) = (C−λ1)+
if pf < (1 − τ ′)r∗f and y∗(z¯) = 0 otherwise. Since ps < r∗f , when y∗(z¯) = 0, we must
also have y∗(0) = 0. In this case, S2f (0, y
∗(0)) =
∫∞
ps
(v − pf ) dF (v), and we can
rewrite S1f (z¯, y
∗(z¯)) ≥ S2f (0, y∗(0)) as pf +
∫∞
ps
(v − pf ) dF (v) ≤ E[max(V, (1− τ)r∗f )],
the binding solution of which is pnf (the superscript of “n” refers to no speculators
in equilibrium). Since the lhs of the above inequality is increasing in pf , p
∗
f = p
n
f
in this case. y∗(z¯) = 0 indeed occurs if pnf ≥ (1 − τ ′)r∗f or τ ′ ≥ τ¯ ′f (τ). Thus,
y∗(z¯) = 0 if τ ′ ≥ τ¯ ′f (τ) and y∗(z¯) = (C − λ1)+ otherwise, Part (iii) of the theorem
is proved. Finally, we consider the case of τ ′ < τ¯ ′f (τ) where y
∗(z¯) = (C − λ1)+.
If pnf ≥ (1 − τ ′)ps, y∗(0) = 0 hence we still have p∗f = pnf in this case. If pnf <
(1 − τ ′)ps, y∗(0) = C hence we have S2f (0, y∗(0)) = E(V − ps)+ and S1f (z¯, y∗(z¯)) ≥
S2f (0, y
∗(0)) becomes pf ≤ E[max(V, (1 − τ)r∗f )] − E(V − ps)+. Thus, we have p∗f =
min
(
E[max(V, (1− τ)r∗f )]− E(V − ps)+, (1− τ ′)ps
)
when τ ′ < τ¯ ′f (τ). Combining all
the cases above, we obtain the optimal fixed price given in Part (ii) of the theorem.
Finally, we have shown that r∗f is increasing in τ and we prove in Theorem II.2 that
p∗f is decreasing in τ . Then, since p
∗
f = r
∗
f = ps when τ = 0, it follows that p
∗
f < r
∗
f .
The proof is completed.
Proof of Theorem II.2
We showed in the proof of Theorem II.1 that (1− τ)r∗f is decreasing in τ . Recall
that pnf is the solution to p
n
f +
∫∞
ps
(v−pnf ) dF (v) = E[max(V, (1−τ)r∗f )]. Since the lhs
is increasing in pnf , p
n
f is decreasing in τ . Thus, p
∗
f is decreasing in τ . p
∗
f is decreasing
in τ ′ because p∗f is decreasing in τ
′ when p∗f = (1 − τ ′)ps and stays constant in τ ′
otherwise. The remaining results follow directly.
Lemma A.2. Under multiperiod pricing, given that z consumers and y speculators
have purchased tickets in period 1, in equilibrium, the capacity provider’s period 2
price p2(z, y) and the resale price rm(z, y) are given by p2(z, y) = rm(z, y) = r(z, y).
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Proof of Lemma A.2
p2(z, y) = rm(z, y) in equilibrium because otherwise, the party with the lower
price will raise it to gain more margin, and if the party with the higher price cannot
make sales, it will reduce the price to make sales. Moreover, the equilibrium prices
are equal to r(z, y) which is the marketing clearing price in period 2 where the total
supply comes from both the capacity provider and the resale market. If the prices
are lower than r(z, y), both parties have the incentive to increase the price and earn
more revenue. If the prices are higher than r(z, y) so that the provider has un-sold
capacity, since he does not ration capacity in period 2, he will decrease p2(z, y) to
sell more tickets. In this case, more resellers will enter the market and rm(z, y) is
decreased to p2(z, y) until the market is cleared.
Proof of Theorem II.3
We follow the same approach of deriving the optimal pricing policy under fixed
pricing. Period 1 consumers’ payoffs from purchasing tickets in period 1 and wait-
ing under multiperiod pricing are S1m(z, y) = −p1 + E[max(V, (1 − τ)r(z, y))] and
S2m(z, y) = E[V − r(z, y)]+, respectively. r(z, y) is increasing in z as derived in
the proof of Theorem II.1. Thus, S1m(z, y) is increasing in z while S
2
m(z, y) is de-
creasing in z, hence the only possible equilibria are z∗ = z¯ and z∗ = 0. To in-
duce z∗ = z¯, p1 needs to satisfy S1m(z¯, y
∗(z¯)) ≥ S2m(0, y∗(0)) or p1 ≤ E[max(V, (1 −
τ)r(z¯, y∗(z¯)))]−E[V − r(0, y∗(0))]+ = E[max(V, (1− τ)p∗2)]−E(V − ps)+ (note that
r(z, y) is independent of y). Part (i) of the theorem follows from Lemma A.2. More-
over, y∗(z¯) = (C − λ1)+ if p1 < (1 − τ ′)p∗2 and y∗(z¯) = 0 otherwise. As the provider
sells out the capacity with z∗ = z¯, his revenue is Πm(p1) = p1C if p1 < (1 − τ ′)p∗2
and Πm(p1) = p1 min(λ1, C) + p
∗
2(C − λ1)+ otherwise. Since Πm(p1) is increasing in
p1, p
∗
1 = E[max(V, (1− τ)p∗2]−E(V − ps)+. In the proof of Theorem II.1, we showed
that p∗2 is increasing in τ and (1 − τ)p∗2 is decreasing in τ , hence p∗1 is decreasing in
τ . Then, since p∗1 = p
∗
2 = ps when τ = 0, we have p
∗
1 < p
∗
2. Part (ii) of the theorem is
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proved. Finally, Part (iii) holds because p∗1 < (1− τ ′)p∗2 is equivalent to τ ′ < τ¯ ′m(τ).
Proof of Theorem II.4
Part (i) is proved in the proof of Theorem II.3. When τ > τ¯m(τ
′), the optimal
revenue from multiperiod pricing is Π∗m = p
∗
1C, hence it is decreasing in τ . Part (ii)
is proved.
Now we prove Part (iii). As τ ≤ τ¯m(τ ′), we have y∗(z¯) = 0. If C ≤ λ1, Π∗m = p∗1C
which is decreasing in τ . Next, consider λ1 < C < λ1 +λ2. For τ ≥ τˆ(C), (1− τ)p∗2 ≤
vmin and p
∗
2 is the solution to λ2F¯ (p
∗
2) = C − λ1. In this case, p∗2 is independent of τ
and so is Π∗m = E[min(V, ps)]λ1 + p
∗
2(C − λ1). For τ < τˆ(C), (1 − τ)p∗2 > vmin and
Π∗m = {E[max(V, (1− τ)p∗2)]− E(V − ps)+}λ1 + p∗2(C −λ1), where p∗2 is the solution
to λ2F¯ (p
∗
2) = C − λ1F¯ ((1− τ)p∗2). Taking derivative with respect to τ on both sides
of this equation yields
d[(1− τ)p∗2]
dτ
= − λ2f(p
∗
2)
λ1f((1− τ)p∗2)
dp∗2
dτ
.
Thus
dΠ∗m
dτ
= λ1F ((1− τ)p∗2)
d[(1− τ)p∗2]
dτ
+ (C − λ1) dp
∗
2
dτ
=
dp∗2
dτ
[
C − λ1 − λ2F ((1− τ)p
∗
2)f(p
∗
2)
f((1− τ)p∗2)
]
. (A.1)
Since f(·) is decreasing, as τ increases, f(p∗2) decreases, F ((1 − τ)p∗2) decreases and
f((1− τ)p∗2) increases, hence the terms within the bracket in (A.1) are increasing in
τ . Then, since dp∗2/ dτ > 0, Π
∗
m is quasi-convex in τ for τ ≤ τ¯m(τ ′). When τ = 0, the
terms in the bracket become C − λ1 − λ2F (ps), as p∗2 = ps when τ = 0. We consider
C − λ1− λ2F (ps) as a function of C. Since ps is decreasing in C, C − λ1− λ2F (ps) is
increasing in C. If C = λ1, C−λ1−λ2F (ps) = −λ2F (ps) < 0; if C = λ1+λ2, ps = vmin
and C −λ1−λ2F (ps) = λ2 > 0. Thus, there exists a threshold C¯ (λ1 < C¯ < λ1 +λ2)
such that, Π∗m is decreasing in τ at τ = 0 if λ1 < C < C¯ and Π
∗
m is increasing in τ
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at τ = 0 if C¯ ≤ C < λ1 + λ2. Thus, due to quasi-convexity, we conclude that for
τ ≤ τ¯m(τ ′), Π∗m is decreasing in τ if C ≤ λ1 and increasing in τ if C ≥ C¯; otherwise,
Π∗m may be decreasing or first decreasing then increasing in τ . The result in Part
(iii) of the theorem regarding which τ gives the highest revenue follows from the
monotonicity results we obtained above as well as Part (ii). The τ ′ that maximizes
the revenue is τ ′ = τ because we already know that the revenue decreases when
speculators enter the market.
Lemma A.3. Under option pricing, given that the strike price is p and that z con-
sumers and y speculators have purchased options in period 1, in equilibrium, the
capacity provider’s period 2 price po(z, y) and the resale price ro(z, y) are given by
po(z, y) = ro(z, y) = inf{r ≥ vmin : (λ1 − z + λ2)F¯ (r) ≤ C − zF¯ (max((1− τ)r, p))}.
Proof of Lemma A.3
Define V¯ = max(V, (1 − τ)ro) and F¯V¯ (t) = P (V¯ > t). In period 2, zF¯V¯ (p)
consumers exercise the options, zF¯V¯ (p)P (V ≤ (1 − τ)ro|V¯ > p) consumers resell
the tickets, y1p<(1−τ ′)ro speculators exercise the options then resell the tickets. Thus,
the provider’s remaining capacity to sell in period 2 is C − zF¯V¯ (p) − y1p<(1−τ ′)ro .
Following the proof of Lemma A.2, we have po(z, y) = ro(z, y) = inf{r ≥ vmin :
(λ1 − z + λ2)F¯ (r) ≤ [C − zF¯V¯ (p) − y1p<(1−τ ′)ro ] + zF¯V¯ (p)P (V ≤ (1 − τ)r|V¯ >
p)}+y1p<(1−τ ′)ro . For any r, [C−zF¯V¯ (p)−y1p<(1−τ ′)ro ]+zF¯V¯ (p)P (V ≤ (1−τ)r|V¯ >
p) + y1p<(1−τ ′)ro = C − zF¯V¯ (p)P (V > (1− τ)r|V¯ > p) = C − zP (V > (1− τ)r, V¯ >
p) = C − zF¯ (max((1− τ)r, p)).
Proof of Theorem II.5
To improve readability, we divide this long proof into four steps. In Step 1, we
derive period 1 consumers’ purchasing decisions in equilibrium. In Step 2, we show
that consumers do not resell tickets in equilibrium. In Step 3, we derive the optimal
strike price p∗. In Step 4, we show how the optimal prices and revenue change with
respect to τ .
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Step 1: Period 1 consumers’ payoffs from buying options in period 1 and waiting
are S1o(z, y) = −x+E[max(V, (1− τ)po(z, y))− p]+ and S2o(z, y) = E[V − po(y, z)]+,
respectively, where po(z, y) is independent of y. Note that p < (1 − τ)po(z, y) is
equivalent to p < (1 − τ)r(z, y). If p < (1 − τ)r(z, y), as shown in the main text,
option pricing is equivalent to multiperiod pricing, so the proof of Theorem II.3
implies that the only possible equilibria are z∗ = z¯ or z∗ = 0. If p ≥ (1 − τ)r(z, y),
S1o(z, y) = −x + E(V − p)+ and po(z, y) = inf{r ≥ vmin : (λ1 − z + λ2)F¯ (r) ≤
C − zF¯ (p)}. We have several subcases to discuss for p ≥ (1 − τ)r(z, y). Define
pˆ(z) = inf{p ≥ vmin : λ1 + λ2 ≤ C + zF (p)}. If p > pˆ(z), po(z, y) = vmin and
S1o(z, y) < S
2
o(z, y), hence z
∗ = 0. If p ≤ pˆ(z), the provider sells out his remaining
capacity in period 2. In this case, p > po(z, y) if and only if p > ps. If p > ps, we
still have S1o(z, y) < S
2
o(z, y), hence z
∗ = 0. Otherwise, po(z, y) is increasing in z, so
S2o(z, y) is decreasing in z. Thus, if a small portion of period 1 consumers who are
currently buying options deviate to waiting, more such deviations will occur, then we
know z∗ = z¯ and z∗ = 0 are the only possible equilibria. Combining all the cases
discussed above, we conclude that for any p, the only possible equilibria are z∗ = z¯
and z∗ = 0. z∗ = 0 is always a possible equilibrium. z∗ = z¯ is a possible equilibrium
only if p ≤ min(pˆ(z¯), ps) = ps as we can easily prove pˆ(z¯) > ps; in this case, the
provider’s capacity is sold out.
To induce z∗ = z¯, x and p need to satisfy p ≤ ps as well as S1o(z¯, y∗(z¯)) ≥
S2o(0, y
∗(0)) or −x+E[max(V, (1− τ)po(z¯, y∗(z¯)))− p]+ ≥ E(V − ps)+. The capacity
provider’s revenue is Πo(x, p) = x[z¯ + y
∗(z¯)] + p[z¯F¯V¯ (p) + y∗(z¯)] + po(z¯, y∗(z¯))[C −
z¯F¯V¯ (p)− y∗(z¯)], where y∗(z¯) = (C−λ1)+ if x+ p < (1− τ ′)po(z¯, y∗(z¯)) and y∗(z¯) = 0
otherwise. Since Πo(x, p) is increasing in x, x
∗(p) = E[max(V, (1 − τ)po(z¯, y∗(z¯))) −
p]+−E(V − ps)+. Note that p ≤ ps ensures x ≥ 0. We focus on Πo(p) = Πo(x∗(p), p)
from now on.
Step 2: Next, we show that in equilibrium, we must have p∗ ≥ (1− τ)po(z¯, y∗(z¯)),
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or equivalently, p∗ ≥ (1 − τ)p∗2, so that consumers do not resell tickets. When p <
(1− τ)p∗2, Πo(p) = {E[max(V, (1− τ)p∗2)]−E(V −ps)+}[z¯+y∗(z¯)] +p∗2[C− z¯−y∗(z¯)].
Since x∗(p) + p is increasing in p and po(z¯, y∗(z¯)) = p∗2 is independent of p in this
case, as we increase p, y∗(z¯) may shift from (C − λ1)+ to 0. When this occurs,
Πo(p) becomes larger because x
∗(p) + p = E[max(V, (1 − τ)p∗2)] − E(V − ps)+ <
E[max(V, p∗2)]−E(V − p∗2)+ = p∗2. Other than when y∗(z¯) shifts from (C −λ1)+ to 0,
Πo(p) is constant in p. Thus, Πo(p) is increasing in p for p < (1− τ)p∗2. On the other
hand, when p ≥ (1− τ)p∗2, Πo(p) = [E(V − p)+−E(V − ps)+][z¯ + y∗(z¯)] + p[z¯F¯ (p) +
y∗(z¯)] + po(z¯, y∗(z¯))[C − z¯F¯ (p)− y∗(z¯)]. Then, we have
lim
p↓(1−τ)p∗2
Πo(p)− lim
p↑(1−τ)p∗2
Πo(p) = τp
∗
2z¯F ((1− τ)p∗2) ≥ 0.
Thus, p ≥ (1− τ)p∗2 results in a higher revenue than p < (1− τ)p∗2, hence the optimal
strike price satisfies p∗ ≥ (1− τ)po(z¯, y∗(z¯)), in which case x∗ = E(V − p∗)+−E(V −
ps)
+ and po(z¯, y
∗(z¯)) is indeed given by Part (ii) of the theorem. The characterization
of p∗o and r
∗
o then follows from Lemma A.3.
Step 3: Now we derive p∗. We first derive pn which is the optimal strike price in
the absence of speculators. If p ≤ vmin, po is independent of p, and so is Πo(p) =
E[min(V, ps)] min(λ1, C) + po(C − λ1)+. We then restrict pn to be no less than vmin,
hence the feasible region of p becomes max((1 − τ)p∗2, vmin) ≤ p ≤ ps and we have
Πo(p) = [E(V − p)+ −E(V − ps)+ + pF¯ (p)] min(λ1, C) + po(p)[C −min(λ1, C)F¯ (p)].
When po(p) = vmin which occurs for larger enough p, it is easy to see that Πo(p) is
decreasing in p, hence this case does not result in the optimal solution. We then know
that at optimality, po is the solution to [(λ1−C)+ + λ2]F¯ (po) = C −min(λ1, C)F¯ (p).
The Implicit Function Theorem gives
dpo
dp
= − min(λ1, C)f(p)
[(λ1 − C)+ + λ2]f(po) .
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Taking derivative of Πo(p) with respect to p gives
dΠo
dp
= min(λ1, C)f(p)(po − p)− min(λ1, C)f(p)[C −min(λ1, C)F¯ (p)]
[(λ1 − C)+ + λ2]f(po)
= min(λ1, C)f(p)
[
po − p− F¯ (po)
f(po)
]
.
Note that the second equality follows from [(λ1−C)++λ2]F¯ (po) = C−min(λ1, C)F¯ (p).
Since po is decreasing in p and F (·) has an increasing failure rate, po−p− F¯ (po)/f(po)
is decreasing in p, hence Πo(p) is quasi-concave. Then, if Πo(p) is decreasing at
p = max((1 − τ)p∗2, vmin), we have pn = max((1 − τ)p∗2, vmin); otherwise, we have
pn > max((1− τ)p∗2, vmin).
We need to determine the sign of po − p − F¯ (po)/f(po) at p = (1 − τ)p∗2. At
p = (1 − τ)p∗2, po = p∗2 and po − p − F¯ (po)/f(po) = τp∗2 − F¯ (p∗2)/f(p∗2). Consider
τp∗2 − F¯ (p∗2)/f(p∗2) as a function of τ . Since p∗2 is increasing in τ , τp∗2 − F¯ (p∗2)/f(p∗2)
is increasing in τ . When τ = 0, τp∗2 − F¯ (p∗2)/f(p∗2) = −F¯ (p∗2)/f(p∗2) < 0. When
τ = 1, τp∗2 − F¯ (p∗2)/f(p∗2) = p∗2 − F¯ (p∗2)/f(p∗2) > 0 if C ≤ λ1 because p∗2 = ∞ if
C ≤ λ1. However, if λ1 < C < λ1 + λ2, p∗2 is given by F¯ (p∗2) = (C − λ1)/λ2, hence
p∗2 is finite. Then it may occur that p
∗
2 − F¯ (p∗2)/f(p∗2) ≤ 0. Define rˆ as the solution
to rˆf(rˆ) = F¯ (rˆ) and define Cˆ ∈ (λ1, λ1 + λ2) as the solution to F¯ (rˆ) = (C − λ1)/λ2.
Then, when τ = 1, if λ1 < C < Cˆ, we have p
∗
2 > rˆ and p
∗
2 − F¯ (p∗2)/f(p∗2) > 0 which
also occurs if C ≤ λ1; if Cˆ ≤ C < λ1 + λ2, we have p∗2 ≤ rˆ and p∗2 − F¯ (p∗2)/f(p∗2) ≤ 0.
Thus, if Cˆ ≤ C < λ1 + λ2, po − p − F¯ (po)/f(po) ≤ 0 for any τ . If C < Cˆ, define
τ˜(C) ∈ (0, 1) as the solution to τp∗2 = F¯ (p∗2)/f(p∗2). Then po − p − F¯ (po)/f(po) ≤ 0
for τ ≤ τ˜(C) and po − p− F¯ (po)/f(po) > 0 for τ > τ˜(C).
The above analysis implies that if Cˆ ≤ C < λ1 + λ2 or if C < Cˆ and τ < τ˜(C),
dΠo/ dp < 0 for all p > (1 − τ)p∗2. However, whether pn = (1 − τ)p∗2 or not depends
on whether (1− τ)p∗2 ≥ vmin or not, so we need to determine whether τ˜(C) or τˆ(C) is
larger. We evaluate the sign of τˆ(C)p∗2 − F¯ (p∗2)/f(p∗2) by varying C. If C ≥ Cˆ, p∗2 ≤
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F¯ (p∗2)/f(p
∗
2) hence τˆ(C)p
∗
2 < F¯ (p
∗
2)/f(p
∗
2), so τˆ(C) < τ˜(C). If C ≤ λ1, p∗2 =∞ hence
τˆ(C)p∗2 > F¯ (p
∗
2)/f(p
∗
2), so τˆ(C) > τ˜(C). Moreover, as C increases, p
∗
2 decreases and
τˆ(C) decreases, hence τˆ(C)p∗2− F¯ (p∗2)/f(p∗2) decreases. Thus, there exists a threshold
C˜ ∈ (λ1, Cˆ) such that τˆ(C) > τ˜(C) if C < C˜ and τˆ(C) ≤ τ˜(C) if C˜ ≤ C < λ1 + λ2.
Based on the above results, we can characterize pn for different levels of C and
τ . If C < C˜, pn = (1 − τ)p∗2 when τ ≤ τ˜(C). When τ > τ˜(C), Πo(p) first increases
then decreases in p for p > (1 − τ)p∗2. Thus, pn > (1 − τ)p∗2 and pn is the solution
to the first-order condition, po − pn − F¯ (po)/f(po) = 0. Note that in this case,
pn is independent of τ ; also, pn is indeed feasible (i.e., pn ≤ ps), because when
τ = τ˜(C), pn = [1 − τ˜(C)]p∗2 < ps. On the other hand, if C˜ ≤ C < λ1 + λ2, since
τˆ(C) ≤ τ˜(C), when τ ≤ τˆ(C), we have pn = (1− τ)p∗2. When τˆ(C) < τ ≤ τ˜(C), since
(1 − τ)p∗2 < vmin, we have pn = vmin. When τ > τ˜(C), pn remains constant at vmin.
Therefore, if C˜ ≤ C < λ1 + λ2, pn = max((1− τ)p∗2, vmin).
Now that we have found pn, we proceed to characterize p∗ by incorporating the
case where speculators enter the market in equilibrium. Consider po as a function
of p. If x∗(pn) + pn = E[max(V, pn)] − E(V − ps)+ ≥ (1 − τ ′)po(pn) or τ ′ ≥ 1 −
{E[max(V, pn)] − E(V − ps)+}/po(pn), we have y∗(z¯) = 0 and p∗ = pn. If τ ′ <
1−{E[max(V, pn)]−E(V − ps)+}/po(pn), define p¯ as the solution to E[max(V, p)]−
E(V − ps)+ = (1 − τ ′)po(p). Since E[max(V, p)] − E(V − ps)+ is increasing in p
while (1 − τ ′)po(p) is decreasing in p, p¯ > pn. For (1 − τ)p∗2 ≤ p < p¯, we have
y∗(z¯) = (C−λ1)+ and Πo(p) = [E(V −p)+−E(V −ps)+]C+p[min(λ1, C)F¯ (p)+(C−
λ1)
+] + po(p) min(λ1, C)F (p). Denote p
s = arg max(1−τ)p∗2≤p<p¯ (Πo(p)) as the optimal
strike price when speculators exist in equilibrium. For p ≥ p¯, we have y∗(z¯) = 0.
Since Πo(p) is decreasing in p for p ≥ p¯, arg maxp≥p¯ (Πo(p)) = p¯. Now we need
to compare Πo(p
s) and Πo(p¯) to determine p
∗. Since p¯ is decreasing in τ ′, Πo(p¯)
is increasing in τ ′ while Πo(ps) is decreasing in τ ′. Thus, there exists a threshold
τ¯ ′o(τ) ≤ 1− {E[max(V, pn)]− E(V − ps)+}/po(pn) such that p∗ = p¯ and y∗(z¯) = 0 if
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τ¯ ′o(τ) ≤ τ ′ < 1−{E[max(V, pn)]−E(V −ps)+}/po(pn), p∗ = ps and y∗(z¯) = (C−λ1)+
if τ ′ < τ¯ ′o(τ). Part (iii) of the theorem is proved.
By now, we have fully characterized the optimal prices: 1) p∗ = pn if τ ′ ≥ 1 −
{E[max(V, pn)] − E(V − ps)+}/po(pn), p∗ = p¯ if τ¯ ′o(τ) ≤ τ ′ < 1 − {E[max(V, pn)] −
E(V − ps)+}/po(pn), p∗ = ps if τ ′ < τ¯ ′o(τ); 2) x∗ = E(V − p∗)+ − E(V − ps)+; 3)
p∗o = r
∗
o = inf{r ≥ vmin : [(λ1 − C)+ + λ2]F¯ (r) ≤ (C − λ1)+ + min(λ1, C)F (p∗)}.
Moreover, y∗(z¯) = (C − λ1)+ if τ ′ < τ¯ ′o(τ) and y∗(z¯) = 0 otherwise.
Step 4: To complete the proof, we derive how the optimal prices and revenue
change in τ . p∗ is decreasing in τ because either p∗ = (1 − τ)p∗2 which is decreasing
in τ or p∗ stays constant in τ . Thus, x∗ and p∗o are increasing in τ . Part (i) of the
theorem is proved. Furthermore, x∗ + p∗ is decreasing in τ . Since x∗ + p∗ = p∗o when
τ = 0, we have x∗ + p∗ < p∗o, hence Part (ii) of the theorem is proved.
Finally, we derive how the optimal revenue Π∗o changes in τ . First, consider the
case of p∗ = pn. When τ > τ˜(C) or τ > τˆ(C), pn is independent of τ , hence so is Π∗o.
On the other hand, when τ ≤ min(τ˜(C), τˆ(C)), pn = (1− τ)p∗2 and po = p∗2, hence we
have Π∗o = {E[V − (1− τ)p∗2]+ − E(V − ps)+ + (1− τ)p∗2F¯ ((1− τ)p∗2)}min(λ1, C) +
p∗2[C −min(λ1, C)F¯ ((1 − τ)p∗2)]. Using a similar approach to derive dΠ∗m/ dτ in the
proof of Theorem II.4, we obtain
dΠ∗o
dτ
=
dp∗2
dτ
· [(λ1 − C)+ + λ2] ·
[
F¯ (p∗2)− τp∗2f(p∗2)
]
.
For τ ≤ τ˜(C), we have τp∗2 ≤ F¯ (p∗2)/f(p∗2), then dp∗2/ dτ > 0 implies dΠ∗o/ dτ ≥ 0.
Second, if p∗ = p¯, p∗ is independent of τ , hence so is Π∗o. Third, if p
∗ = ps, p∗ and Π∗o
are independent of τ if ps > (1− τ)p∗2; if ps = (1− τ)p∗2, we have
dΠ∗o
dτ
=
dΠo
dp
∣∣∣∣
p=(1−τ)p∗2
· d[(1− τ)p
∗
2]
dτ
≥ 0,
because ps = (1 − τ)p∗2 implies ( dΠo/ dp)|p=(1−τ)p∗2 ≤ 0 and we already know d[(1 −
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τ)p∗2]/ dτ < 0. Therefore, Π
∗
o is increasing in τ overall. Furthermore, because the
existence of speculators decreases Π∗o, we conclude that Π
∗
o is maximized when τ =
τ ′ = 1. Part (iv) of the theorem is proved.
Proof of Theorem II.6
Since pn ≥ (1 − τ)p∗2 and po(pn) ≤ p∗2, we have τ¯ ′o(τ) ≤ 1 − {E[max(V, pn)] −
E(V − ps)+}/po(pn) ≤ 1 − p∗1/p∗2 = τ¯ ′m(τ). τ¯ ′m(τ) < τ¯ ′f (τ) because p∗2 = r∗f and
p∗1 = E[max(V, (1 − τ)p∗2)] − E(V − ps)+ = pnf +
∫∞
ps
(v − pnf ) dF (v) − E(V − ps)+ =
pnf +
∫∞
ps
(ps − pnf ) dF (v) > pnf .
Proof of Theorem II.7
First of all, we must have b∗ ≤ min(λ1, C). If C > λ1, the revenue does not
change if speculators do not enter the market in equilibrium; if speculators enter the
market in equilibrium, as we decrease b from C to λ1, the capacity provider shifts
sales from period 1 to period 2 where the price is higher, hence his revenue increases.
The analysis in Section 2.5 implies that the revenue is Πm(b) = {E[max(V, (1 −
τ)p∗2(b))]−E(V − ps)+}b+ p∗2(b)(C − b), where p∗2(b) is given by (λ1− b+λ2)F¯ (p∗2) =
C − bF¯ ((1− τ)p∗2).
Next, we show that Πm(b) is concave in b. Taking derivative gives
dΠm
db
= [(1− τ)F ((1− τ)p∗2)b+C− b] ·
dp∗2
db
+E[max(V, (1− τ)p∗2)]−E(V −ps)+−p∗2,
where dp∗2/ db = ∂r/∂z is derived in the proof of Theorem II.1. Define ∆v = vmax −
vmin. With uniform distribution, we have ps = vmax − C∆v/(λ1 + λ2) and
dΠm
db
=
(1− τ)2(λ1 + λ2)
[(λ1 + λ2)vmax − C∆v]∆v · (p
∗
2)
3
+
{
τC∆v − (λ1 + λ2)(vmax − τvmin)
[(λ1 + λ2)vmax − C∆v]∆v −
(1− τ)2
2∆v
}
· (p∗2)2
+
1
2∆v
[
v2max −
C2∆v2
(λ1 + λ2)2
]
.
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Then we have
d
dp∗2
(
dΠm
db
)
=
p∗2
[(λ1 + λ2)vmax − C∆v]∆v ·B0,
where B0 = 3(1− τ)2(λ1 + λ2)p∗2− (1− τ)2[(λ1 +λ2)vmax−C∆v]− 2(λ1 + λ2)(vmax−
τvmin) + 2τC∆v. When τ = 0, B0 = −2C∆v < 0; when τ = 1, B0 = 2(C − λ1 −
λ2)∆v < 0. Thus, if we can show B0 is convex in τ , we know B0 < 0 for all τ . Taking
derivative of B0 with respect to τ gives
∂B0
∂τ
=
(λ1 + λ2)vmax − C∆v
(λ1 + λ2 − τb)2 ·B1,
where B1 = (1− τ)[−6(λ1 +λ2)(λ1 +λ2− τb) + 3(1− τ)(λ1 +λ2)b+ 2(λ1 +λ2− τb)2].
Since (λ1 + λ2 − τb)2 is decreasing in τ , it remains to show B1 is increasing in τ , or
equivalently,
∂B1
∂τ
= −6b2τ 2 + 2[(λ1 + λ2)b+ 2b2]τ + 4(λ1 + λ2)(λ1 + λ2 − b) ≥ 0.
This is true because ∂B1/∂τ = 4(λ1 + λ2)(λ1 + λ2 − b) > 0 when τ = 0, ∂B1/∂τ = 0
when τ = 1, and ∂B1/∂τ is concave in τ . By now we have shown that dΠm/ db is
decreasing in p∗2. Since dp
∗
2/ db ≥ 0, the chain rule then gives d2Πm/ db2 ≤ 0, hence
we conclude that Πm(b) is concave in b.
Now that we have proved concavity, we derive the monotonicity of Π∗m with respect
to τ . First, if b∗ is attained at an interior point, the Envelope Theorem gives
dΠ∗m
dτ
=
∂Πm
∂τ
∣∣∣∣
b=b∗
= − dp
∗
2
dτ
· (λ1 + λ2)vmax − C∆v
τ(p∗2)2
· [α(p∗2)2 + βp∗2 + γ],
where
α =
1− τ 2
2∆v
≥ 0, β = −vmax
∆v
< 0, γ =
1
2∆v
[
v2max −
C2∆v2
(λ1 + λ2)2
]
> 0.
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Note that in the above derivation, the first-order condition is used to simplify the
algebra. We already know dp∗2/ dτ ≥ 0 and it is easy to see that (λ1+λ2)vmax > C∆v,
hence we only need to show α(p∗2)
2 + βp∗2 + γ ≤ 0 to conclude that Π∗m is increasing
in τ . Recall that p∗2 > ps. As the problem degenerates for p
∗
2 > vmax, we restrict
p∗2 to p
∗
2 ≤ vmax. Moreover, −β/2α = vmax/(1 − τ 2) > vmax. Thus, it suffices to
show α(p∗2)
2 + βp∗2 + γ ≤ 0 at p∗2 = ps = vmax − C∆v/(λ1 + λ2). This is true as
αp2s + βps + γ = −τ 2p2s/(2∆v) < 0. Second, if b∗ = min(λ1, C), we have the same
optimal revenue function as in the basic model. For τ ≥ τˆ(C), Π∗m stays constant
in τ . For τ < τˆ(C), to show Π∗m is increasing in τ , (A.1) implies that with uniform
distribution, we need to show (C−λ1)+− [(λ1−C)+ +λ2]F ((1−τ)p∗2) ≥ 0. Note that
b∗ = min(λ1, C) implies dΠm/ db ≥ 0 at b = min(λ1, C). With uniform distribution,
this results in
[(1− τ)F ((1− τ)p∗2) min(λ1, C) + (C − λ1)+] ·
τp∗2
[(λ1 − C)+ + λ2] + (1− τ) min(λ1, C)
≥ −E[max(V, (1− τ)p∗2)] + E(V − ps)+ + p∗2
> −E[max(V, (1− τ)p∗2)] + E[max(V, p∗2)]
≥ τp∗2F ((1− τ)p∗2),
where the second inequality follows from ps < p
∗
2 and the third inequality follows from
the fact that the derivative of E[max(V, t)] is F (t). Thus, (C − λ1)+ − [(λ1 − C)+ +
λ2]F ((1− τ)p∗2) ≥ 0. Therefore, overall Π∗m is increasing in τ 2.
2Note that the feasible region for b is b > 0. For any  > 0 where  can be arbitrarily small, when
b∗ is attained at b∗ =  for the optimization problem over  ≤ b ≤ min(λ1, C), Π∗m is constant in τ ,
so overall Π∗m is still increasing in τ .
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APPENDIX B
Proofs of Theorems and Lemmas in Chapter III
Lemma B.1. For any a1, a2, a3, b1, b2, b3 ∈ [−1, 1], we have
(i) |a1a2 − b1b2| ≤ |a1 − b1|+ |a2 − b2|.
(ii) |a1a2a3 − b1b2b3| ≤ |a1 − b1|+ |a2 − b2|+ |a3 − b3|.
Proof of Lemma B.1
(i) |a1a2 − b1b2| = |a2(a1 − b1) + b1(a2 − b2)| ≤ |a1 − b1|+ |a2 − b2|.
(ii) |a1a2a3 − b1b2b3| = |a2a3(a1 − b1) + a3b1(a2 − b2) + b1b2(a3 − b3)| ≤ |a1 − b1|+
|a2 − b2|+ |a3 − b3|.
Lemma B.2. Let Nλ1 and Nλ2 be two Poisson variables with means λ1 and λ2,
respectively. n ≥ 0 is an integer. Then, for every n, there exist αc(n), αp(n) ∈ (0, 1]
such that
(i)
∣∣P(Nλ1 ≤ n)− P(Nλ2 ≤ n)∣∣ ≤ αc(n) |λ1 − λ2|.
(ii)
∣∣P(Nλ1 = n)− P(Nλ2 = n)∣∣ ≤ αp(n) |λ1 − λ2|.
Moreover, αc(n) is decreasing in n.
Proof of Lemma B.2
(i) The case of n ≥ 1 is proved by Caldentey and Vulcano (2007) (Lemma A3
in online appendix). In particular, αc(n) = P(Nn = n). When n = 0,
∣∣P(Nλ1 ≤
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0)− P(Nλ2 ≤ 0)
∣∣ = ∣∣e−λ1 − e−λ2∣∣ ≤ sup
λ>0
{e−λ} |λ1 − λ2| = |λ1 − λ2|, hence αc(0) = 1.
It is easy to see that αc(n) ∈ (0, 1]. αc(n) is decreasing in n because αc(n+1)/αc(n) =
(1 + 1/n)ne−1 < 1.
(ii) When n = 0, αp(n) = αc(n) = 1. When n ≥ 1,
∣∣P(Nλ1 = n)− P(Nλ2 = n)∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣e−λ1λn1n! − e−λ2λn2n!
∣∣∣∣ ≤ |λ1 − λ2|n! supλ>0
{∣∣∣∣ d(e−λλn)dλ
∣∣∣∣} .
We have d(e
−λλn)
dλ
= e−λλn−1(n−λ). Thus, d(e−λλn)
dλ
> 0 for 0 < λ < n and d(e
−λλn)
dλ
< 0
for λ > n. Moreover, d
2(e−λλn)
dλ2
= e−λλn−2[λ2− 2nλ+n(n− 1)]. Solving d2(e−λλn)
dλ2
= 0
yields λ = n − √n and λ = n + √n. Since d(e−λλn)
dλ
∣∣∣
λ=0
= 0 and it follows from
L’Hospital’s Rule that limλ→∞
d(e−λλn)
dλ
= 0, we know that supλ>0
{∣∣∣ d(e−λλn)dλ ∣∣∣} is
attained at either λ = n−√n or λ = n+√n. Thus,
sup
λ>0
{∣∣∣∣ d(e−λλn)dλ
∣∣∣∣} = max{e−(n−√n)(n−√n)n−1√n, e−(n+√n)(n+√n)n−1√n} ,
and hence
αp(n) = max
{
e−(n−
√
n)(n−√n)n−1√n
n!
,
e−(n+
√
n)(n+
√
n)n−1
√
n
n!
}
=
max
{
P(Nn−√n = n),P(Nn+√n = n)
}
√
n
.
It is easy to see that αp(n) ∈ (0, 1].
Lemma B.3. For any a, b ∈ [−1, 1] and integer n ≥ 0, we have |an − bn| ≤ n|a− b|.
Proof of Lemma B.3
|an − bn| = |a− b| · ∣∣∑n−1i=0 aibn−1−i∣∣ ≤ |a− b| ·∑n−1i=0 |aibn−1−i| ≤ n|a− b|.
Proof of Theorem III.2
In order to show the existence of q∗(·), we need to prove that the mapping b(q(·))
from Q to Q has the fixed-point property. By the Schauder-Tychonoff Fixed-Point
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Theorem, we need to prove: 1) Q is convex and compact, 2) b(q(·)) is continuous.
Convexity ofQ is easy to verify. To prove compactness, by the Arzela-Ascoli Theorem,
we need to prove that Q is closed, bounded, and equicontinuous. Closedness and
boundedness of Q are easy to verify. To prove equicontinuity, first pick a q(·) from Q.
For any t1, t2 ∈ [0, T ], we have |q(t1)− q(t2)| ≤ sup0≤t≤T{|q′(t)|} |t1 − t2|. Next, let
q¯′ = supq(·)∈Q sup0≤t≤T{|q′(t)|}. Note that q¯′ is finite because each q(·) is bounded.
Then, for any  > 0, there exists δ = /q¯′ such that if |t1 − t2| < δ, then for all
q(·) ∈ Q, |q(t1)− q(t2)| ≤ q¯′|t1 − t2| < . Thus, we have proved equicontinuity of Q.
Next, we prove that b(q(·)) is a continuous mapping. In order to obtain a sufficient
condition for the uniqueness of q∗(·), we will prove a stronger result that b(q(·))
is Lipschitz continuous, that is, there exists a constant α¯ ≥ 0 such that for any
q1(·), q2(·) ∈ Q,
∥∥b(q1(·)) − b(q2(·))∥∥∞ ≤ α¯∥∥q1(·) − q2(·)∥∥∞. For a given arrival time
t, we start by bounding
∣∣b(q1(·))− b(q2(·))∣∣ from above as follows:
∣∣b(q1(·))− b(q2(·))∣∣ = ∣∣g(q1(·))h(q2(·))− g(q2(·))h(q1(·))∣∣
h(q1(·))h(q2(·))
≤
∣∣g(q1(·))− g(q2(·))∣∣+ ∣∣h(q1(·))− h(q2(·))∣∣
h(q1(·))h(q2(·)) , (B.1)
where the inequality follows from Lemma B.1(i).
We analyze (B.1) part by part. We first bound the denominator of (B.1) from
below as follows:
h(q1(·)) ≥ P(NH(T |q1(·)) < KH , NR(T |q1(·)) < KR,
NH(T |q1(·)) +NU(T |q1(·)) +NR(T |q1(·)) < KH +KR)
≥ P(Nλ(T ) < KH , Nλ(T ) < KR, Nλ(T ) < KH +KR)
= P (Nλ(T ) < min {KH , KR}) def== αh,
where Nλ(t) denotes the Poisson process with rate λ. The above bound is also valid
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for h(q2(·)), hence
h(q1(·))h(q2(·)) ≥ α2h. (B.2)
Now, consider the numerator of (B.1). To bound |h(q1(·))− h(q2(·))| from above,
we can write h(q(·)) as
h(q(·)) =
KH−1∑
iH=0
KR−1∑
iR=0
P(NH(t|q(·)) = iH)P(NR(t|q(·)) = iR)
·P(NU(t|q(·)) < KH +KR − iH − iR).
Then, we have
∣∣h(q1(·))− h(q2(·))∣∣
≤
KH−1∑
iH=0
KR−1∑
iR=0
P(NR(t|q1(·)) = iR)
·∣∣P(NH(t|q1(·)) = iH)P(NU(t|q1(·)) < KH +KR − iH − iR)
−P(NH(t|q2(·)) = iH)P(NU(t|q2(·)) < KH +KR − iH − iR)
∣∣
≤
KH−1∑
iH=0
KR−1∑
iR=0
P(NR(t|q1(·)) = iR)
∣∣P(NH(t|q1(·)) = iH)− P(NH(t|q2(·)) = iH)∣∣
+
KH−1∑
iH=0
KR−1∑
iR=0
P(NR(t|q1(·)) = iR)
∣∣P(NU(t|q1(·)) < KH +KR − iH − iR)
−P(NU(t|q2(·)) < KH +KR − iH − iR)
∣∣,
where the first step follows from the fact that NR(t|q(·)) does not depend on q(·), and
the second step follows from Lemma B.1(i). Define ξH(t|q(·)) = γξγH(t|q(·)) + (1 −
γ)ξ′H(t|q(·)), ξU(t|q(·)) = γξγU(t|q(·)), ξR(t|q(·)) = γξγR(t|q(·)) + (1−γ)ξ′R(t|q(·)) as the
proportions of total demand rate λ for NH(t|q(·)), NU(t|q(·)), NR(t|q(·)), respectively.
We can bound
∣∣P(NH(t|q1(·)) = iH)−P(NH(t|q2(·)) = iH)∣∣ as follows. Using Lemma
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B.2(ii) yields
∣∣P(NH(t|q1(·)) = iH)− P(NH(t|q2(·)) = iH)∣∣
≤ αp(iH)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
t∫
0
λ[ξH(s|q1(·))− ξH(s|q2(·))] ds
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ αp(iH)λ
t∫
0
∣∣ξH(s|q1(·))− ξH(s|q2(·))∣∣ ds
≤ αp(iH)λT
∥∥ξH(t|q1(·))− ξH(t|q2(·))∥∥∞.
Similarly, We can use Lemma B.2(i) to obtain
∣∣P(NU(t|q1(·)) < KH +KR− iH− iR)−
P(NU(t|q2(·)) < KH +KR − iH − iR)
∣∣ ≤ αc(KH +KR − 1− iH − iR)λT∥∥ξU(t|q1(·))−
ξU(t|q2(·))
∥∥
∞. Combining these two inequalities leads to
∣∣h(q1(·)) − h(q2(·))∣∣ ≤
αH1(t)
∥∥ξH(t|q1(·))− ξH(t|q2(·))∥∥∞ + αU1(t)∥∥ξU(t|q1(·))− ξU(t|q2(·))∥∥∞, where
αH1(t) = λT
KH−1∑
iH=0
KR−1∑
iR=0
P(NR(t|q1(·)) = iR)αp(iH),
αU1(t) = λT
KH−1∑
iH=0
KR−1∑
iR=0
P(NR(t|q1(·)) = iR)αc(KH +KR − 1− iH − iR).
We further bound αH1(t) and αU1(t) as follows:
αH1(t) = λT P(NR(t|q1(t)) < KR)
KH−1∑
iH=0
αp(iH) ≤ λT
KH−1∑
iH=0
αp(iH)
def
== αH1.
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Similarly,
αU1(t) ≤ λT
KH−1∑
iH=0
KR−1∑
iR=0
P(NR(t|q1(·)) = iR)αc(KH − iH)
= λT P(NR(t|q1(·)) < KR)
KH−1∑
iH=0
αc(KH − iH)
≤ λT
KH∑
iH=1
αc(iH)
def
== αU1,
where the first inequality follows from Lemma B.2(i) that αc(n) is decreasing in n.
Thus, we have obtained that
∣∣h(q1(·))−h(q2(·))∣∣ ≤ αH1∥∥ξH(t|q1(·))−ξH(t|q2(·))∥∥∞+αU1∥∥ξU(t|q1(·))−ξU(t|q2(·))∥∥∞.
(B.3)
Next, we bound |g(q1(·))− g(q2(·))| from above. If τH(q(·)) ≤ τT (q(·)) and τH(q(·)) ≤
T , then g(q(·)) = 0. Thus, we can write g(q(·)) as g(q(·)) = g1(q(·))+g2(q(·))+g3(q(·)),
where
g1(q(·)) = P(τR(q(·)) ≤ τT (q(·)), τR(q(·)) ≤ T )g(q(·)|τR(q(·)) ≤ τT (q(·)), τR(q(·)) ≤ T ),
g2(q(·)) = P(τH(q(·)) > τT (q(·)), τR(q(·)) > τT (q(·)), τT (q(·)) ≤ T )
·g(q(·)|τH(q(·)) > τT (q(·)), τR(q(·)) > τT (q(·)), τT (q(·)) ≤ T ),
g3(q(·)) = P(τH(q(·)) > T, τR(q(·)) > T, τT (q(·)) > T )
·g(q(·)|τH(q(·)) > T, τR(q(·)) > T, τT (q(·)) > T ).
Now we consider each term of g(q(·)). Define mR(t|q(·)) =
∫ T
0
λξR(t|q(·)) dt as
the mean value function of NR(t|q(·)). Define fτR(q(·))(t) as the probability density
function of τR(q(·)), and fτT (q(·))(t) as the probability density function of τT (q(·)). We
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have
fτR(q(·))(t) =
e−mR(t|q(·))[mR(t|q(·))]KR−1λξR(t|q(·))
(KR − 1)! = P(NR(t|q(·)) = KR−1)λξR(t|q(·)),
and similarly,
fτT (q(·))(t) = P(NH(t|q(·)) +NU(t|q(·)) +NR(t|q(·)) = KH +KR − 2)
·λ [ξH(t|q(·)) + ξU(t|q(·)) + ξR(t|q(·))] .
g1(q(·)) can be written as
g1(q(·)) =
T∫
t
fτR(q(·))(s)P(NH(s|q(·)) +NU(s|q(·)) ≤ KH − 1) ds
=
T∫
t
P(NR(s|q(·)) = KR − 1)λξR(s|q(·))P(NH(s|q(·)) +NU(s|q(·)) ≤ KH − 1) ds.
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g2(q(·)) can be written as
g2(q(·)) =
T∫
t
fτT (q(·))(s) ·
[
KH−1∑
iH=0
KR−1∑
iR=0
KH − iH
KH +KR − iH − iR
·P(NH(s|q(·)) = iH , NR(s|q(·)) = iR,
NU(s|q(·)) = KH +KR − 1− iH − iR|τT (q(·)) = s)
]
ds
=
T∫
t
P(NH(s|q(·)) +NU(s|q(·)) +NR(s|q(·)) = KH +KR − 2)
·λ [ξH(s|q(·)) + ξU(s|q(·)) + ξR(s|q(·))]
·
{
KH−1∑
iH=0
KR−1∑
iR=0
KH − iH
KH +KR − iH − iR
(
KH +KR − 1
iH
)(
KH +KR − 1− iH
iR
)
·
{
E
0≤r≤s
[ξH(r|q(·))]
}iH {
E
0≤r≤s
[ξR(r|q(·))]
}iR
·
{
E
0≤r≤s
[ξU(r|q(·))]
}KH+KR−1−iH−iR }
ds.
g3(q(·)) can be written as
g3(q(·)) =
KH−1∑
iH=0
KR−1∑
iR=0
KH+KR−2−iH−iR∑
iU=0
P(NH(T |q(·)) = iH)P(NR(T |q(·)) = iR)
·P(NU(T |q(·)) = iU) min
{
KH − iH
iU + 1
, 1
}
.
Next, notice that
∣∣g(q1(·))−g(q2(·))∣∣ ≤ ∣∣g1(q1(·))−g1(q2(·))∣∣+∣∣g2(q1(·))−g2(q2(·))∣∣+∣∣g3(q1(·))−g3(q2(·))∣∣.
(B.4)
By using the same approach that is used to bound
∣∣h(q1(·))−h(q2(·))∣∣, we can bound
each term in the right-hand side (RHS) of (B.4) from above. Bounding the first term
161
in the RHS of (B.4) results in
∣∣g1(q1(·))−g1(q2(·))∣∣ ≤ αH2∥∥ξH(t|q1(·))−ξH(t|q2(·))∥∥∞+αU2∥∥ξU(t|q1(·))−ξU(t|q2(·))∥∥∞,
(B.5)
where αH2 = αU2 = (λT )
2αc(KH−1). Bounding the second term in the RHS of (B.4)
results in
∣∣g2(q1(·))−g2(q2(·))∣∣ ≤ αH3∥∥ξH(t|q1(·))−ξH(t|q2(·))∥∥∞+αU3∥∥ξU(t|q1(·))−ξU(t|q2(·))∥∥∞,
(B.6)
where
αH3 = λT
{
λTαp(KH +KR − 2) + 1
+
KH−1∑
iH=0
KR−1∑
iR=0
(
KH +KR − 1
iH
)(
KH +KR − 1− iH
iR
)
iH(KH − iH)
KH +KR − iH − iR
}
,
αU3 = λT
{
λTαp(KH +KR − 2) + 1
+
KH−1∑
iH=0
KR−1∑
iR=0
(
KH +KR − 1
iH
)(
KH +KR − 1− iH
iR
)
·(KH +KR − 1− iH − iR)(KH − iH)
KH +KR − iH − iR
}
.
Lemma B.3 is used in deriving αH3 and αU3. Bounding the third term in the
RHS of (B.4) results in
∣∣g3(q1(·))− g3(q2(·))∣∣ ≤ αH4(t)∥∥ξH(t|q1(·))− ξH(t|q2(·))∥∥∞ +
αU4(t)
∥∥ξU(t|q1(·))− ξU(t|q2(·))∥∥∞, where
αH4(t) = λT
KH−1∑
iH=0
KR−1∑
iR=0
KH+KR−2−iH−iR∑
iU=0
P(NR(T |q1(·)) = iR)αp(iH) min
{
KH − iH
iU + 1
, 1
}
,
αU4(t) = λT
KH−1∑
iH=0
KR−1∑
iR=0
KH+KR−2−iH−iR∑
iU=0
P(NR(T |q1(·)) = iR)αp(iU) min
{
KH − iH
iU + 1
, 1
}
.
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We then have
αH4(t) ≤ λT
KH−1∑
iH=0
KH+KR−2−iH∑
iU=0
αp(iH) min
{
KH − iH
iU + 1
, 1
}
def
== αH4,
αU4(t) ≤ λT
KH−1∑
iH=0
KH+KR−2−iH∑
iU=0
αp(iU) min
{
KH − iH
iU + 1
, 1
}
def
== αU4.
Thus, we have obtained that
∣∣g3(q1(·))−g3(q2(·))∣∣ ≤ αH4∥∥ξH(t|q1(·))−ξH(t|q2(·))∥∥∞+αU4∥∥ξU(t|q1(·))−ξU(t|q2(·))∥∥∞,
(B.7)
Thus, by plugging (B.5), (B.6), (B.7) into (B.4) and then plugging (B.2), (B.3),
(B.4) into (B.1), we obtain
∣∣b(q1(·))− b(q2(·))∣∣ ≤ αH∥∥ξH(t|q1(·))− ξH(t|q2(·))∥∥∞+αU∥∥ξU(t|q1(·))− ξU(t|q2(·))∥∥∞,
(B.8)
where
αH =
αH1 + αH2 + αH3 + αH4
α2h
, αU =
αU1 + αU2 + αU3 + αU4
α2h
.
Note that αH and αU do not depend on t.
It remains to bound
∥∥ξH(t|q1(·))− ξH(t|q2(·))∥∥∞ and ∥∥ξU(t|q1(·))− ξU(t|q2(·))∥∥∞
from above. Define v¯H = sup {vH : (vR, vH) ∈ Ω}, vH = inf {vH : (vR, vH) ∈ Ω}, v¯R =
sup {vR : (vR, vH) ∈ Ω}, vR = inf {vR : (vR, vH) ∈ Ω}. Fix t, and without loss of
generality, assume q1(t) < q2(t). First, consider
∥∥ξH(t|q1(·)) − ξH(t|q2(·))∥∥∞. We
have
ξH(t|q(t)) = γ
v¯H∫
pH

max
{
vH− pH−pR−q(t)p1−q(t) ,vR
}∫
vR
f(vR, vH) dvR
 dvH + (1− γ)ξ′H(t|q(t)).
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Since max
{
vH − pH−pR−q(t)p1−q(t) , vR
}
is decreasing in q(t), we have
∣∣ξH(t|q1(t))− ξH(t|q2(t))∣∣
= γ
v¯H∫
pH

max
{
vH− pH−pR−q1(t)p1−q1(t) ,vR
}∫
max
{
vH− pH−pR−q2(t)p1−q2(t) ,vR
} f(vR, vH) dvR
 dvH
≤ γ sup
(vR,vH)∈Ω
{f(vR, vH)}
v¯H∫
pH
[
max
{
vH − pH − pR − q1(t)p
1− q1(t) , vR
}
−max
{
vH − pH − pR − q2(t)p
1− q2(t) , vR
}]
dvH .
Define
q¯H = sup
{
0 < q < 1 : vH − pH − pR − qp
1− q ≥ vR
}
=

vH−pH+pR−vR
vH−vR−p if vH > pH − pR + vR,
0 otherwise.
It is easy to see that q¯H < 1, and vH − pH−pR−q(t)p1−q(t) ≥ vR if and only if q(t) ≤ q¯H .
Then,
max
{
vH − pH − pR − q1(t)p
1− q1(t) , vR
}
−max
{
vH − pH − pR − q2(t)p
1− q2(t) , vR
}
=
[
vH − pH − pR −min{q1(t), q¯H}p
1−min{q1(t), q¯H}
]
−
[
vH − pH − pR −min{q2(t), q¯H}p
1−min{q2(t), q¯H(t)}
]
=
(pH − pR − p) [min{q2(t), q¯H} −min{q1(t), q¯H}]
(1−min{q1(t), q¯H}) (1−min{q2(t), q¯H})
≤ pH − pR − p
(1− q¯H)2
[q2(t)− q1(t)] .
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Thus,
∣∣ξH(t|q1(t))− ξH(t|q2(t))∣∣ ≤ γ sup
(vR,vH)∈Ω
{f(vR, vH)} (pH − pR − p) [q2(t)− q1(t)]
·
v¯H∫
pH
1
(1− q¯H)2
dvH
= α′H [q2(t)− q1(t)] ,
where
α′H = γ sup
(vR,vH)∈Ω
{f(vR, vH)} (pH − pR − p)
·
[
(vR − pR)+ +
(v¯H − vR − p)3 − (pH −min{vR, pR} − p)3
3(pH − pR − p)2
]
.
Note that α′H is finite because Ω is finite. Then, we have
∣∣ξH(t|q1(t))− ξH(t|q2(t))∣∣ ≤ α′H∥∥q1(·)− q2(·)∥∥∞. (B.9)
Second, consider
∥∥ξU(t|q1(·))− ξU(t|q2(·))∥∥∞. We have
ξU(t|q(t)) = γ
v¯H∫
pH

vH−p∫
max
{
vH− pH−pR−q(t)p1−q(t) ,vR
} f(vR, vH) dvR
 dvH
+γ
pH∫
pR+p

vH−p∫
pR+q(t)p−q(t)vH
1−q(t)
f(vR, vH) dvR
 dvH .
Note that we write the lower bound of the second integration as pR + p instead of
vH because for vH < pR + p, we have vH − p < pR+q(t)p−q(t)vH1−q(t) for all q(t). Since
max
{
vH − pH−pR−q(t)p1−q(t) , vR
}
is decreasing in q(t) and pR+q(t)p−q(t)vH
1−q(t) is decreasing in
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q(t) for vH ≥ pR + p, we have
∣∣ξU(t|q1(t))− ξU(t|q2(t))∣∣
= γ
v¯H∫
pH

max
{
vH− pH−pR−q1(t)p1−q1(t) ,vR
}∫
max
{
vH− pH−pR−q2(t)p1−q2(t) ,vR
} f(vR, vH) dvR
 dvH
+γ
pH∫
pR+p

pR+q1(t)p−q1(t)vH
1−q1(t)∫
pR+q2(t)p−q2(t)vH
1−q2(t)
f(vR, vH) dvR
 dvH
≤ α′H [q2(t)− q1(t)] + γ
pH∫
pR+p

pR+q1(t)p−q1(t)vH
1−q1(t)∫
pR+q2(t)p−q2(t)vH
1−q2(t)
f(vR, vH) dvR
 dvH .
We can write the last integration equivalently as
γ
pH∫
pR+p

pR+q1(t)p−q1(t)vH
1−q1(t)∫
pR+q2(t)p−q2(t)vH
1−q2(t)
f(vR, vH) dvR
 dvH = γ
pR∫
vR

vR+p+
pR−vR
q1(t)∫
vR+p+
pR−vR
q2(t)
f(vR, vH) dvH
 dvR.
Now we bound this integration from above case by case. Define q¯U as the solution to
pR+q¯Up−q¯UvH
1−q¯U = vR, so q¯U =
pR−vR
pH−vR−p . At q(t) = q¯U ,
pR+q(t)p−q(t)vH
1−q(t) = vR becomes the
negatively-sloped diagonal of the rectangle {(vR, vH) : vR ≤ vR ≤ pR, pR + p ≤ vH ≤
pH}.
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• If q1(t) < q2(t) ≤ q¯U ,
γ
pH∫
pR+p

pR+q1(t)p−q1(t)vH
1−q1(t)∫
pR+q2(t)p−q2(t)vH
1−q2(t)
ft(vR, vH) dvR
 dvH
≤ γ sup
(vR,vH)∈Ω
{f(vR, vH)}
pH∫
pR+p
(vH − pR − p) [q2(t)− q1(t)]
[1− q1(t)] [1− q2(t)] dvH
≤ γ sup
(vR,vH)∈Ω
{f(vR, vH)} q2(t)− q1(t)
(1− q¯U)2
pH∫
pR+p
(vH − pR − p) dvH
= α′U [q2(t)− q1(t)] ,
where
α′U = γ sup
(vR,vH)∈Ω
{f(vR, vH)} (pH − vR − p)
2
2
.
• If q¯U ≤ q1(t) < q2(t),
γ
pR∫
vR

vR+p+
pR−vR
q1(t)∫
vR+p+
pR−vR
q2(t)
f(vR, vH) dvH
 dvR
≤ γ sup
(vR,vH)∈Ω
{f(vR, vH)}
pR∫
vR
(pR − vR) [q2(t)− q1(t)]
q1(t)q2(t)
dvR
≤ γ sup
(vR,vH)∈Ω
{f(vR, vH)} q2(t)− q1(t)
q¯2U
pR∫
vR
(pR − vR) dvR
= α′U [q2(t)− q1(t)] .
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• If q1(t) < q¯U < q2(t),
γ
pH∫
pR+p

pR+q1(t)p−q1(t)vH
1−q1(t)∫
pR+q2(t)p−q2(t)vH
1−q2(t)
f(vR, vH) dvR
 dvH
= γ
pH∫
pR+p

pR+q1(t)p−q1(t)vH
1−q1(t)∫
pR+q¯U p−q¯U vH
1−q¯U
f(vR, vH) dvR
 dvH
+γ
pR∫
vR

vR+p+
pR−vR
q¯U∫
vR+p+
pR−vR
q2(t)
f(vR, vH) dvH
 dvR
≤ α′U [q¯U − q1(t)] + α′U [q2(t)− q¯U ]
= α′U [q2(t)− q1(t)] .
Thus, we obtain that
∣∣ξU(t|q1(t))−ξU(t|q2(t))∣∣ ≤ α′U [q2(t)− q1(t)], where α′U is finite.
Then, we have
∣∣ξU(t|q1(t))− ξU(t|q2(t))∣∣ ≤ α′U∥∥q1(·)− q2(·)∥∥∞, (B.10)
Finally, by plugging (B.9) and (B.10) into (B.8), we obtain that
∣∣b(q1(·))−b(q2(·))∣∣ ≤
α¯
∥∥q1(·) − q2(·)∥∥∞ where α¯ = αHα′H + αUα′U and α¯ does not depend on t. Then, we
have
∥∥b(q1(·))− b(q2(·))∥∥∞ ≤ α¯∥∥q1(·)− q2(·)∥∥∞. Therefore, we have proved the Lip-
schitz continuity of b(q(·)), and hence the existence of q∗(·). If α¯ < 1, b(q(·)) is a
contraction mapping from Q to Q, hence q∗(·) is unique. q∗(·) is increasing in t be-
cause of the following. For every sample path, g(q(·)) is constant in t for t ≤ τ(q(·))
and is equal to zero for t > τ(q(·)). It is easy to see that h(q(·)) is decreasing in t,
hence after taking the average of g(q(·)) for each sample path, we know that b(q(·))
is increasing in t. Therefore, the solution to b(q(·)) = q(·) must be increasing in t.
The whole proof is complete.
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Proof of Theorem III.3
(i) For any q(·) and any t, as n → ∞, by the Strong Law of Large Numbers, we
have
NnH(t|q(·))
n
→
t∫
0
λH(s|q(·)) ds a.s.,
NnU(t|q(·))
n
→
t∫
0
λU(s|q(·)) ds a.s.,
NnR(t|q(·))
n
→
t∫
0
λR(s|q(·)) ds a.s..
Moreover, as n→∞, we have
τnT (q(·)) = inf {t ≥ 0 : NnH(t|q(·)) +NnU(t|q(·)) + 1 +NnR(t|q(·)) ≥ nKH + nKR}
= inf
{
t ≥ 0 : N
n
H(t|q(·))
n
+
NnU(t|q(·))
n
+
1
n
+
NnR(t|q(·))
n
≥ KH +KR
}
→ inf
t ≥ 0 :
t∫
0
[λH(s|q(·)) + λU(s|q(·)) + λR(s|q(·))] ds ≥ KH +KR
 a.s..
The convergence of τnH(q(·)) and τnR(q(·)) follows from the same approach, then the
convergence of τn(q(·)) is obtained.
(ii) To derive q∞∗(·), we need to first derive g∞(q(·)) and h∞(q(·)) and then derive
169
b∞(q(·)). First,
g∞(q(·)) = lim
n→∞ ENnH(t|q(·)),NnU (t|q(·)),NnR(t|q(·))
{
min
{
[nKH −NnH(τn(q(·))|q(·))]+
NnU(τ
n(q(·))|q(·)) + 1 , 1
}
·1 {t ≤ τn(q(·))}
}
= lim
n→∞ ENnH(t|q(·)),NnU (t|q(·)),NnR(t|q(·))
{
min
{
[nKH −NnH(τ∞(q(·))|q(·))]+
NnU(τ
∞(q(·))|q(·)) + 1 , 1
}
·1 {t ≤ τ∞(q(·))}
}
= lim
n→∞ ENnH(t|q(·)),NnU (t|q(·)),NnR(t|q(·))
{
min

[
KH − N
n
H(τ
∞(q(·))|q(·))
n
]+
NnU (τ
∞(q(·))|q(·))
n
+ 1
n
, 1

·1 {t ≤ τ∞(q(·))}
}
= min

[
KH −
∫ τ∞(q(·))
0
λH(t|q(·)) dt
]+
∫ τ∞(q(·))
0
λU(t|q(·)) dt
, 1
 · 1 {t ≤ τ∞(q(·))} .
Second,
h∞(q(·)) = lim
n→∞P
(
NnH(t|q(·))
n
< KH ,
NnR(t|q(·))
n
< KR,
NnH(t|q(·))
n
+
NnU(t|q(·))
n
+
NnR(t|q(·))
n
< KH +KR
)
= P
 t∫
0
λH(s|q(·)) ds < KH ,
t∫
0
λR(s|q(·)) ds < KR,
t∫
0
[λH(s|q(·)) + λU(s|q(·)) + λR(s|q(·))] ds < KH +KR

= 1 {t ≤ τ∞(q(·))} .
For t ≤ τ∞(q(·)), b∞(q(·)) is constant in t, hence so is q∞∗(·). Note that for t >
τ∞(q(·)), b∞(q(·)) is not defined. Since the upgrade probability is irrelevant in this
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case, without loss of generality, we let b∞(q(·)) take the same value as t ≤ τ∞(q(·)) to
preserve the differentiability of b∞(q(·)). It then follows that q∞∗(·) is given by Part
(ii) of the theorem.
Proof of Theorem III.4
With uniform valuation distribution, the formula of τˆ∞(q) in Theorem III.3 re-
duces to
τˆ∞(q) =

KH
λH(q)
if KH
λH(q)
≤ KH+KR
λH(q)+λU (q)+λR
,
KR
λR
if KR
λR
≤ KH+KR
λH(q)+λU (q)+λR
,
KH+KR
λH(q)+λU (q)+λR
if KH
λH(q)
> KH+KR
λH(q)+λU (q)+λR
and KR
λR
> KH+KR
λH(q)+λU (q)+λR
.
(B.11)
(i) qf = 1 corresponds to Case b, where qf = 1 requires KH ≥ (λbH + λbU)τ∞(1).
We will show that KH ≥ (λbH +λbU)τ∞(1) is equivalent to KH ≥ (λbH +λbU)T . First, if
τˆ∞(1) = KH/λbH , since KH/λ
b
H ≥ KH/λaH ≥ T , we have τ∞(1) = min{KH/λbH , T} =
T . Second, if τˆ∞(1) = KR/λbR, since KR/λ
b
R ≥ KR/λaR ≥ T , we have τ∞(1) =
min{KR/λbR, T} = T . Third, if τˆ∞(1) = (KH + KR)/(λbH + λbU + λbR), suppose
τˆ∞(1) < T , then it is easy to see that KH ≥ (λbH + λbU)τ∞(1) is equivalent to
KR/λ
b
R ≤ (KH+KR)/(λbH+λbU+λbR) which contradicts the second condition in (B.11)
for τˆ∞(1) = (KH + KR)/(λbH + λ
b
U + λ
b
R) to occur. Thus, we also have τ
∞(1) = T
in this case. Overall, KH ≥ (λbH + λbU)τ∞(1) is equivalent to KH ≥ (λbH + λbU)T .
Since λbH + λ
b
U is decreasing in p, if KH ≥ (λbH + λbU)T at p = 0, that is, if KH ≥
(λT/u2)[(u − pH + 2pR)(u − pH) + γ(pH − pR)(2u − pH + pR)], then qf = 1 for all
0 ≤ p < pH − pR.
(ii) Next, consider the case of KH < (λT/u
2)[(1 − γ)(u − pH + 2pR)(u − pH) +
γ(u2− p2R)]. We first characterize when qf = 1. In Case b, solving KH = (λbH + λbU)T
yields p = p¯. Since (λbH + λ
b
U)T is decreasing in p, qf = 1 for p ≥ p¯.
Now we derive qf for 0 ≤ p < p¯. We first derive qf for the case of τˆ∞(qf ) ≥ T and
then incorporate the case of τˆ∞(qf ) < T . When τˆ∞(qf ) ≥ T , Cases c, d, e may occur
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in sequence as p decreases. Since (pH − pR − qfp)/(1− qf ) =∞ > u at p = p¯, we are
in Case c where (3.1) becomes q = [KH − λcHT ]/[λcU(q)T ]. Solving (3.1) yields
qf =
KH
λT
u2 − (u− pH + 2pR)(u− pH) + γ(u− pH + pR)2
γ(u− p)2 (B.12)
which is increasing in p. Then, solving the condition for Case c (pH − pR− qfp)/(1−
qf ) ≥ u yields p ≥ p, hence Case c occurs where qf is given by (B.12) for p+ ≤ p < p¯
(note that p can be negative). For 0 ≤ p < p+, Cases d and e may occur. In Case d,
(3.1) becomes q = [KH − λdH(q)T ]/[λdU(q)T ]. Solving (3.1) yields
qf =
KH
λT
u2 − (u− pH + 2pR)(u− pH)
γ(pH − pR − p)2 + KHλT u2 − (u− pH + 2pR)(u− pH)
(B.13)
which is increasing in p. Then, solving the condition for Case d (pH − pR− qfp)/(1−
qf ) ≥ pH yields
p ≥ pH − pR − 1
γpR
[
KH
λT
u2 − (u− pH + 2pR)(u− pH)
]
def
== p˜.
So Case d occurs for p˜+ ≤ p < p+ and Case e occurs for 0 ≤ p < p˜+. In Case e, (3.1)
becomes q = [KH − λeH(q)T ]/[λeU(q)T ]. Solving (3.1) also yields (B.13). Thus, qf is
given by (B.13) for 0 ≤ p < p+.
Now, we incorporate the case of τˆ∞(qf ) < T . Note that when τˆ∞(qf ) < T , we
must have τˆ∞(qf ) = (KH+KR)/[λH(qf )+λU(qf )+λR] which is the last case in (B.11),
because τˆ∞(qf ) = KH/λH(qf ) implies qf = 0 and τˆ∞(qf ) = KR/λR implies qf = 1. To
analyze the case of τˆ∞(qf ) < T , we first show that it may only occur for small enough
p. In Cases c, d, e, τˆ∞(qf ) < T if and only if KH + KR < [λH(qf ) + λU(qf ) + λR]T .
We will show that when τˆ∞(qf ) ≥ T , KH +KR ≥ [λH(qf ) + λU(qf ) + λR]T for large
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p. Using the above derived qf , in Case c when τˆ
∞(qf ) ≥ T , we have
d[λcH + λ
c
U(qf ) + λ
c
R]
dp
=
2γλpR
u2
[
γpR(u− p)
KH
λT
u2 − (u− pH + 2pR)(u− pH) + γ(u− pH + pR)2
− 1
]
≤ 2γλpR
u2
[
γpR(u− p)
KH
λT
u2 − (u− pH + 2pR)(u− pH) + γ(u− pH + pR)2
− 1
]
<
2γλpR
u2
[
γ(u− pH + pR)(u− p)
KH
λT
u2 − (u− pH + 2pR)(u− pH) + γ(u− pH + pR)2
− 1
]
= 0,
hence λcH + λ
c
U(qf ) + λ
c
R is decreasing in p. Denote λN(q) = λ− λH(q)− λU(q)− λR
as the arrival rate of consumers who do not book any product. In Case d, we have
λdN(qf ) =
γλp2R
u2
p
2 − 2
{
pH − pR − 1γpR
[
KH
λT
u2 − (u− pH + 2pR)(u− pH)
]}
p
KH
λT
u2 − (u− pH + 2pR)(u− pH)
+
1
γ
[
KH
λT
u2 − (u− pH + 2pR)(u− pH)
]
+ (pH − pR)2
KH
λT
u2 − (u− pH + 2pR)(u− pH)
}
,
which is a parabola whose axis of symmetry is p˜. Thus, λdN(qf ) is increasing in p,
hence λdH(qf ) + λ
d
U(qf ) + λ
d
R is decreasing in p. In Case e, we have
λeN(qf ) =
λ
γu2
[
−KH
λT
u2 + (u− pH + 2pR)(u− pH) + 2γpHpR − γp2R
]
which is a constant, hence so is λeH(qf ) + λ
e
U(qf ) + λ
e
R. Thus, combining the above
analysis for Cases c, d, e, we know that λH(qf ) + λU(qf ) + λR is decreasing in p for
0 ≤ p < p¯. This means that τˆ∞(qf ) < T may only occur for small enough p.
Next, we show that τˆ∞(qf ) < T never occurs in Case d or e and may only occur
in Case c. We will prove that KH + KR ≥ [λ− λN(qf )]T at p = 0 in Cases d and e.
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In Case d at p = 0, we have
KH +KR − [λ− λN(qf )]T
= KH +KR − λT + λT (pR
u
)2
[
1 +
(pH − pR)2
KH
λT
u2 − (u− pH + 2pR)(u− pH)
]
.(B.14)
The derivative of (B.14) with respect to KH is
1− p
2
R(pH − pR)2[
KH
λT
u2 − (u− pH + 2pR)(u− pH)
]2
which is negative for λaHT ≤ KH < (λT/u2)[u2− 2(pH − pR)u+ p2H − pHpR− p2R] and
positive for KH > (λT/u
2)[u2 − 2(pH − pR)u + p2H − pHpR − p2R]. Thus, by taking
KH = (λT/u
2)[u2 − 2(pH − pR)u+ p2H − pHpR − p2R], we obtain
(B.14) ≥ KR − λT
u2
(pH − pR)(2u− pH − pR) = KR − λaRT ≥ 0,
hence KH + KR ≥ [λ− λdN(qf )]T at p = 0 in Case d. In Case e, note that λdN(qf ) =
λeN(qf ) at p = p˜. Since λ
e
N(qf ) stays constant in p and λ
d
N(qf ) is increasing in p,
λeN(qf ) at p = 0 is larger than λ
d
N(qf ) at p = 0. Thus, our analysis for Case d implies
that KH +KR > [λ− λeN(qf )]T at p = 0 in Case e as well.
So far, we have known that τˆ∞(qf ) < T may only occur in Case c for small enough
p. Now we derive qf in this case. (3.1) becomes
q =
KH − λcH KH+KRλcH+λcU (q)+λcR
λcU(q)
KH+KR
λcH+λ
c
U (q)+λ
c
R
,
and can be simplified to
γ(u− p)2q2 + βq + γkp2R = 0, (B.15)
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where k = KH/(KH + KR). (B.15) is a quadratic equation. Now we show that
the smaller root q = [−β +√β2 − 4γ2kp2R(u− p)2]/[2γ(u− p)2] is infeasible because
it yields (pH − pR − qp)/(1 − q) < u which contradicts the condition for Case c
to occur. With q = [−β + √β2 − 4γ2kp2R(u− p)2]/[2γ(u − p)2], we can simplify
(pH − pR− qp)/(1− q) < u to
√
β2 − 4γ2kp2R(u− p)2 > −β− 2γ(u− p)(u− pH + pR).
If−β−2γ(u−p)(u−pH+pR) < 0,
√
β2 − 4γ2kp2R(u− p)2 > −β−2γ(u−p)(u−pH+pR)
is trivially satisfied. If −β − 2γ(u − p)(u − pH + pR) ≥ 0, by taking square on both
sides of
√
β2 − 4γ2kp2R(u− p)2 > −β−2γ(u−p)(u−pH +pR) and rearranging terms,
we obtain −β(u− pH + pR)− γ(u− pH + pR)2(u− p)− γkp2R(u− p) ≥ 0. Since −β ≥
2γ(u−p)(u−pH+pR), we have −β(u−pH+pR)−γ(u−pH+pR)2(u−p)−γkp2R(u−p) ≥
γ(u−p)[(u−pH +pR)2−kp2R] > 0. So, q = [−β+
√
β2 − 4γ2kp2R(u− p)2]/[2γ(u−p)2]
always leads to (pH − pR − qp)/(1 − q) < u. Thus, in Case c when τˆ∞(qf ) < T , the
equilibrium qf is given by the larger root of (B.15):
qf =
−β +√β2 − 4γ2kp2R(u− p)2
2γ(u− p)2 =
2γkp2R
−β −√β2 − 4γ2kp2R(u− p)2 . (B.16)
To show that qf is increasing in p, we need to show that −β−
√
β2 − 4γ2kp2R(u− p)2
is decreasing in p. The derivative of −β−√β2 − 4γ2kp2R(u− p)2 with respect to p is
−2γkpR√
β2 − 4γ2kp2R(u− p)2
[√
β2 − 4γ2kp2R(u− p)2 + β + 2γpR(u− p)
]
. (B.17)
If β + 2γpR(u− p) ≥ 0, (B.17)≤ 0 trivially. If β + 2γpR(u− p) < 0, we have
(B.17) ≤ −2γkpR√
β2 − 4γ2kp2R(u− p)2
[√
β2 − 4γ2p2R(u− p)2 + β + 2γpR(u− p)
]
=
−2γkpR√
β2 − 4γ2kp2R(u− p)2
√
−β − 2γpR(u− p)
·
[√
−β + 2γpR(u− p)−
√
−β − 2γpR(u− p)
]
≤ 0.
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Thus, qf is increasing in p in Case c when τˆ
∞(qf ) < T .
Finally, we characterize the threshold p in Case c where τˆ∞(qf ) ≥ T switches to
τˆ∞(qf ) < T . When τˆ∞(qf ) ≥ T , KH + KR = [λcH + λcU(qf ) + λcR]T can be simplified
to
γp2Rp
2 + 2γpR
[
KH
λT
u2 − u2 + 2(pH − pR)u− p2H + pHpR + p2R
]
p
+
[
KH +KR
λT
u2 − u2 + 2(1− γ)pHpR + γp2R
]
·
[
KH
λT
u2 − (u− pH + 2pR)(u− pH)
]
+ γp2R(pH − pR)2 = 0. (B.18)
(B.18) is a quadratic equation whose smaller root is always negative and larger root
(which may also be negative) is p′. Therefore, by combining all our analysis above,
we conclude the following. If p+ ≥ p′+, we always have τˆ∞(qf ) ≥ T for 0 ≤ p < p¯;
Case c occurs for p+ ≤ p < p¯ where qf is given by (B.12), and Case d or e occurs
for 0 ≤ p < p+ where qf is given by (B.13). If p+ < p′+, Case c always occurs for
0 ≤ p < p¯ and qf is given by (B.12) for p′+ ≤ p < p¯ and (B.16) for 0 ≤ p < p′+.
Finally, all previous analysis indicates that qf is the unique solution to (3.1).
(iii) In the proof of Part (ii), we have shown that qf is increasing in p in all cases.
Proof of Theorem III.5
If KH ≥ (λT/u2)[(u− pH + 2pR)(u− pH) + γ(pH − pR)(2u− pH + pR)], we have
qf = 1 for all 0 ≤ p ≤ pH − pR, and as found in the proof of Theorem III.4(i),
τ∞(1) = T . Thus, the revenue function is Πf (p) = pRγλ(ξbR + ξ
b
U)T + pγλξ
b
UT +
(1 − γ)ΠN,f = (γλT/u2) [p3 − 2up2 + (u2 − 3p2R)p+ u2pR − p3R] + (1 − γ)ΠN,f . The
first-order condition is 3p2 − 4up + u2 − 3p2R = 0. The larger root of this quadratic
equation is (2u+
√
u2 + 9p2R)/3 which is larger than u; the smaller root is p
b
foc. Thus,
Πf (p) is increasing in p for p < p
b
foc and decreasing in p for p > p
b
foc; the optimal
upgrade price is min
{
(pbfoc)
+, pH − pR
}
.
Next, consider the case of KH < (λT/u
2)[(u−pH+2pR)(u−pH)+γ(pH−pR)(2u−
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pH + pR)]. For p¯ ≤ p ≤ pH − pR, we have qf = 1, hence our proof above indicates
that the local optimum is min
{
max
{
(pbfoc)
+, p¯
}
, pH − pR
}
. For 0 ≤ p < p¯, we have
0 < qf < 1 and
Πf (p) =
{
pR[λ
i
U(qf ) + λ
i
R] + pλ
i
U(qf )qf + pHλ
i
H(qf )
}
min
{
KH +KR
λiH(qf ) + λ
i
U(qf ) + λ
i
R
, T
}
,
where i = c, d, e as we may be in Case c, d, or e. We will show that Πf (p) is
increasing in p for 0 ≤ p < p¯, thus the global optimal upgrade price is also p∗ =
min
{
max
{
(pbfoc)
+, p¯
}
, pH − pR
}
.
First, consider Case c. If (KH +KR)/[λ
c
H +λ
c
U(qf )+λ
c
R] ≥ T , the revenue function
becomes
Πf (p) = pRγλ[ξ
c
U(qf ) + ξ
c
R]T + p[KH − (1− γ)λξaHT ] + (1− γ)ΠN,f
=
γλT
u2
K˜H
γλT
u2 + p2R
{
−p3Rp2 +
[
(
K˜H
γλT
)2u4 − K˜H
γλT
p2Ru
2 + 2p3Ru− 2p4R
]
p+
K˜H
γλT
pRu
4
}
+(1− γ)ΠN,f ,
where K˜H = KH − (1 − γ)λξaHT . So, Πf (p) is concave in p. Solving the first-order
condition
dΠf
dp
=
γλT
u2
K˜H
γλT
u2 + p2R
[
−2p3Rp+ (
K˜H
γλT
)2u4 − K˜H
γλT
p2Ru
2 + 2p3Ru− 2p4R
]
= 0
yields
p =
1
2
(
K˜H
γλT
)2
u4
p3R
− 1
2
K˜H
γλT
u2
pR
+ u− pR def== pcfoc.
Πf (p) is increasing in p for p < p
c
foc and decreasing in p for p > p
c
foc. Next, we show
pcfoc > p¯ so that Πf (p) is always increasing in p in Case c. p
c
foc > p¯ is equivalent to
√
K˜H
γλT
u2 + p2R > −
1
2
(
K˜H
γλT
)2
u4
p3R
+
1
2
K˜H
γλT
u2
pR
+ pR. (B.19)
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If K˜H/(γλT ) > 2(pR/u)
2, the RHS of (B.19) is negative so (B.19) holds. If K˜H/(γλT ) ≤
2(pR/u)
2, after taking square on both sides, (B.19) can be simplified to K˜H/(γλT ) <
3(pR/u)
2. Thus, (B.19) always holds.
If (KH +KR)/[λ
c
H + λ
c
U(qf ) + λ
c
R] < T in Case c, the revenue function becomes
Πf (p) = pRγλ[ξ
c
U(qf ) + ξ
c
R]τ
∞(qf ) + pγλcU(qf )τ
∞(qf )qf
+pH(1− γ)λξaHτ∞(qf ) + pR(1− γ)λξaRτ∞(qf )
= pR(KH +KR) + pKH + (1− γ)(pH − pR − p)λξaHτ∞(qf ),
where the last equality follows from using τ∞(qf ) = (KH+KR)/{γλ[ξcU(qf )+ξcR]+(1−
γ)λ(ξaH + ξ
a
R)} and qf = [KH − (1− γ)λξaHτ∞(qf )]/[γλξcU(qf )τ∞(qf )]. The derivative
of Πf (p) is
dΠf
dp
= KH − (1− γ)λξaHτ∞(qf )−
(1− γ)γ(pH − pR − p)λξaHτ∞(qf ) d[ξ
c
U (qf )+ξ
c
R]
dp
γ[ξcU(qf ) + ξ
c
R] + (1− γ)(ξaH + ξaR)
.
Now we show that ξcU(qf ) + ξ
c
R is decreasing in p and hence
dΠf
dp
≥ KH − (1− γ)λξaHτ∞(qf ) ≥ KH − λξaHT ≥ 0.
Using the qf in (B.16), we obtain
ξcU(qf ) + ξ
c
R =
1
u2
[
u2 − 2pRp+ β +
√
β2 − 4γ2kp2R(u− p)2
2γk
]
,
where k = KH/(KH +KR). Then,
d[ξcU(qf ) + ξ
c
R]
dp
=
pR
u2
[
β + 2γpR(u− p)√
β2 − 4γ2kp2R(u− p)2
− 1
]
,
and d[ξcU(qf ) + ξ
c
R]/ dp ≤ 0 can be simplified to −β +
√
β2 − 4γ2kp2R(u− p)2 ≥
178
2γpR(u−p). Note that the feasibility condition for Case c, (pH−pR−qfp)/(1−qf ) ≥ u,
can be simplified to −β +√β2 − 4γ2kp2R(u− p)2 ≥ 2γ(u − p)(u − pH + pR). Since
2γ(u− p)(u− pH + pR) > 2γpR(u− p), −β +
√
β2 − 4γ2kp2R(u− p)2 ≥ 2γpR(u− p)
is true in Case c. Thus, Πf (p) is increasing in p.
We have shown that Πf (p) is increasing in Case c. Second, consider Case d. As
proved in Theorem III.4(ii), we must have (KH + KR)/[λ
i
H(qf ) + λ
i
U(qf ) + λ
i
R] ≥ T
for i = d, e. The revenue function in Case d is
Πf (p) = pRγλ[ξ
d
U(qf ) + ξ
d
R]T + p[KH − γλξdH(qf )T − (1− γ)λξaHT ] + pHγλξdH(qf )T
+(1− γ)ΠN,f
= γλTpR + (K˜H − 2γλTp
2
R
u2
)p
+
γλT
u2

[
−(u− pH + pR)p+ (1− K˜HγλT )u2 − (pH − pR)u− p2R
]2
pH − pR − p
−
p3R
[
p2 − 2(pH − pR)p− (1− K˜HγλT )u2 + 2(pH − pR)u+ p2R
]
−(1− K˜H
γλT
)u2 + 2(pH − pR)u− p2H + 2pHpR

+(1− γ)ΠN,f .
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Taking derivatives yields
dΠf
dp
= K˜H − 2γλTp
2
R
u2
+
γλT
u2
−(u− pH + pR)2 +
[
(1− K˜H
γλT
)u2 − 2(pH − pR)u+ p2H − 2pHpR
]2
(pH − pR − p)2
+
2p3R(pH − pR − p)
−(1− K˜H
γλT
)u2 + 2(pH − pR)u− p2H + 2pHpR
}
,
d2Πf
dp2
=
2γλT
u2

[
(1− K˜H
γλT
)u2 − 2(pH − pR)u+ p2H − 2pHpR
]2
(pH − pR − p)3
− p
3
R
−(1− K˜H
γλT
)u2 + 2(pH − pR)u− p2H + 2pHpR
}
.
Since the second-order derivative is increasing in p and is equal to zero at p = p˜,
d2Πf/ dp
2 ≥ 0 and Πf (p) is convex in p in Case d. Moreover, we have
dΠf
dp
∣∣∣∣
p=p˜
=
γλT
u2
[
−(1− K˜H
γλT
)u2 + 2(pH − pR)u− p2H + 2pHpR
]
= KH − λaHT ≥ 0.
Thus, Πf (p) is increasing in p in Case d.
Third, consider Case e. The revenue function in Case e is
Πf (p) = pRγλ[ξ
e
U(qf ) + ξ
e
R]T + p[KH − γλξeH(qf )T − (1− γ)λξaHT ] + pHγλξeH(qf )T
+(1− γ)ΠN,f
=
γλT
u2
{[
−(1− K˜H
γλT
)u2 + 2(pH − pR)u− p2H + 2pHpR
]
p
+pH(u
2 − p2H)− (2u− 2pH − pR)
[
−(1− K˜H
γλT
)u2 + 2(pH − pR)u+ p2R
]}
+(1− γ)ΠN,f .
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Since
dΠf
dp
=
γλT
u2
[
−(1− K˜H
γλT
)u2 + 2(pH − pR)u− p2H + 2pHpR
]
≥ 0,
Πf (p) is increasing in p in Case e.
Therefore, we conclude that if KH < (λT/u
2)[(1 − γ)(u − pH + 2pR)(u − pH) +
γ(u2−p2R)], the optimal upgrade price is p∗f = min
{
max
{
(pbfoc)
+, p¯
}
, pH − pR
}
which
induces qf = 1. Finally, note that p¯ ≤ 0 if KH ≥ (λT/u2)[(1 − γ)(u − pH +
2pR)(u − pH) + γ(u2 − p2R)], so we can always write the optimal upgrade price as
p∗f = min
{
max
{
(pbfoc)
+, p¯
}
, pH − pR
}
.
Proof of Theorem III.6
Offering upgrades increases the revenue if p∗f < pH−pR and decreases the revenue
if p∗f = pH − pR. p∗f = pH − pR if and only if max
{
pbfoc, p¯
} ≥ pH − pR. Since
KH ≥ λaHT , we have p¯ ≤ pH − pR. Thus, p∗f = pH − pR if and only if pbfoc ≥ pH − pR
or equivalently, pH ≤
(
2u+ 3pR −
√
u2 + 9p2R
)
/3.
Proof of Theorem III.7
First, consider the monotonicity of p∗f in γ. Since p
b
foc and pH−pR are independent
of γ, we only need to show that p¯ is increasing in γ. This is true because KH/(λT ) ·
u2 − (u− pH + 2pR)(u− pH) = u2/(λT ) · (KH − λaHT ) ≥ 0.
Second, consider the monotonicity of Πf (p
∗
f ) in γ. When p
∗
f = p
b
foc, using the
revenue function in Case b, the Envelope Theorem yields
dΠf (p
∗
f )
dγ
=
λT
u2
[
3(pbfoc)
2 − 4upbfoc + u2 − 3p2R
]− ΠN,f > 0,
because p∗f = p
b
foc (so p
∗
f 6= pH − pR) implies Πf (pbfoc) > ΠN,f which is equivalent to
(λT/u2)[3(pbfoc)
2 − 4upbfoc + u2 − 3p2R] > ΠN,f . Next, when p∗f = p¯, dΠf (p∗f )/ dγ ≥ 0
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can be simplified to
2γ2
√
1
γ
[
KH
λT
u2 − (u− pH + 2pR)(u− pH)
]
+ (u− pH + pR)2
·(u− pH + pR)(u2 − 2pHu+ 2pRu+ p2H − 2pHpR − 2p2R) ≥ a1γ2 + b1γ + c1, (B.20)
where
a1 = 2(u− pH + pR)2(u2 − 2pHu+ 2pRu+ p2H − 2pHpR − 2p2R),
b1 =
[
KH
λT
u2 − (u− pH + 2pR)(u− pH)
]
(u2 − 2pHu+ 2pRu+ p2H − 2pHpR − 2p2R),
c1 = −
[
KH
λT
u2 − (u− pH + 2pR)(u− pH)
]2
.
We show (B.20) indeed holds as follows. If u2−2pHu+2pRu+p2H−2pHpR−2p2R ≤ 0,
we have a1 ≤ 0, b1 ≤ 0, c1 ≤ 0, and hence the RHS of (B.20) ≤ 0. Since the left-hand
side (LHS) of (B.20) ≥ 0, (B.20) holds. If u2− 2pHu+ 2pRu+ p2H − 2pHpR− 2p2R > 0,
RHS can be both positive and negative. If RHS≤ 0, again (B.20) holds. If RHS> 0,
by taking square on both sides and rearranging terms, (B.20) is equivalent to
[
KH
λT
u2 − (u− pH + 2pR)(u− pH)
]2
(a2γ
2 + b2γ + c2) ≥ 0, (B.21)
where
a2 = 3(u
2 − 2pHu+ 2pRu+ p2H − 2pHpR + 2p2R)(u2 − 2pHu+ 2pRu+ p2H − 2pHpR − 2p2R),
b2 = 2
[
KH
λT
u2 − (u− pH + 2pR)(u− pH)
]
(u2 − 2pHu+ 2pRu+ p2H − 2pHpR − 2p2R),
c2 = −
[
KH
λT
u2 − (u− pH + 2pR)(u− pH)
]2
.
It is easy to see that a2 > a1, b2 ≥ b1, c2 = c1. Thus, RHS> 0 implies that (B.21) is
satisfied. We have proved that Πf (p
∗
f ) is increasing in γ when p
∗
f = p¯. Finally, when
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p∗f = pH − pR or p∗f = 0, Πf (p∗f ) is constant in γ. Therefore, we conclude that Πf (p∗f )
is increasing in γ overall.
Proof of Theorem III.8
If KH < (λT/u
2)[(u−pH+2pR)(u−pH)+γ(pH−pR)(2u−pH+pR)], we have p¯ > 0,
hence p∗f > 0. If KH ≥ (λT/u2)[(u− pH + 2pR)(u− pH) + γ(pH − pR)(2u− pH + pR)],
we have p¯ ≤ 0, hence p∗f = 0 if and only if pbfoc ≤ 0 which is simplified to u ≤
√
3pR.
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APPENDIX C
Proofs of Theorems in Chapter IV
Proof of Theorem IV.1
(i) The first-order derivative of Πu(pa) is
dΠu
dpa
= [c′(λHF¯H(pa) + λLF¯L(pa))− (pa − ca)][λHfH(pa) + λLfL(pa)].
Since c′(λHF¯H(pa) +λLF¯L(pa))− (pa− ca) is decreasing in pa, Πu(pa) is quasi-concave
in pa. Thus, the optimal ancillary service price is the solution to the first-order
condition, i.e., p∗a = ca + c
′(λHF¯H(p∗a) + λLF¯L(p
∗
a)).
(ii) Since p∗a > 0, for i = H,L, we have p
∗
mi = vi+E(ui−p∗a)+ < vi+E(ui)+ = p∗bi.
Since p∗mi + p
∗
a = vi + E[max(ui, p
∗
a)], we have p
∗
bi < p
∗
mi + p
∗
a.
(iii) Since p∗bi− p∗mi = E(ui)+−E(ui− p∗a)+ =
∫ p∗a
0
F¯i(x) dx for i = H,L, the result
follows.
Proof of Theorem IV.2
Since E(ui − x)+ = βi2u¯(u¯ − x)2 for i = H,L, taking derivatives of the optimal
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profit functions with respect to βH and βL yields
∂Π∗u
∂βH
=
(u¯− p∗a)2
2u¯
· λH + (p∗a − ca)λH ·
u¯− p∗a
u¯
− c′(λHF¯H(p∗a) + λLF¯L(p∗a))λH ·
u¯− p∗a
u¯
=
(u¯− p∗a)2
2u¯
· λH ,
∂Π∗b
∂βH
=
( u¯
2
− ca
)
λH ,
∂Π∗u
∂βL
=
(u¯− p∗a)2
2u¯
· λL + (p∗a − ca)λL ·
u¯− p∗a
u¯
− c′(λHF¯H(p∗a) + λLF¯L(p∗a))λL ·
u¯− p∗a
u¯
=
(u¯− p∗a)2
2u¯
· λL,
∂Π∗b
∂βL
=
( u¯
2
− ca
)
λL,
where the derivation for derivatives of Π∗u follows from the Envelope Theorem and
the first-order condition. Thus,
∂(Π∗u − Π∗b)
∂βH
=
[
(u¯− p∗a)2
2u¯
− u¯
2
+ ca
]
λH ,
∂(Π∗u − Π∗b)
∂βL
=
[
(u¯− p∗a)2
2u¯
− u¯
2
+ ca
]
λL.
By applying the Implicit Function Theorem to the first-order condition, we obtain
∂p∗a
∂βH
=
c′′(λHF¯H(p∗a) + λLF¯L(p
∗
a))λH
u¯−p∗a
u¯
1 + c′′(λHF¯H(p∗a) + λLF¯L(p∗a))[λHfH(p∗a) + λLfL(p∗a)]
> 0,
∂p∗a
∂βL
=
c′′(λHF¯H(p∗a) + λLF¯L(p
∗
a))λL
u¯−p∗a
u¯
1 + c′′(λHF¯H(p∗a) + λLF¯L(p∗a))[λHfH(p∗a) + λLfL(p∗a)]
> 0.
Thus p∗a is increasing in βH and βL. Then, since
∂(Π∗u−Π∗b )
∂βH
is decreasing in p∗a, it is
decreasing in βH , hence Π
∗
u − Π∗b is concave in βH . Similarly, Π∗u − Π∗b is concave in
βL.
When βH = βL = 0, Π
∗
u − Π∗b = 0; also, p∗a = ca, hence ∂(Π
∗
u−Π∗b )
∂βH
∣∣∣
βH=βL=0
=
c2a
2u¯
· λH > 0, ∂(Π
∗
u−Π∗b )
∂βL
∣∣∣
βH=βL=0
= c
2
a
2u¯
· λL > 0. Thus, when βL = 0, there exists a
threshold βˆH such that Π
∗
u−Π∗b ≥ 0 when βH ≤ βˆH , and Π∗u−Π∗b < 0 when βH > βˆH .
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Similarly, when βH = 0, there exists a threshold βˆL such that Π
∗
u − Π∗b ≥ 0 when
βL ≤ βˆL, and Π∗u − Π∗b < 0 when βL > βˆL.
Next, notice that
∂(Π∗u−Π∗b )
∂βH
and
∂(Π∗u−Π∗b )
∂βL
have the same sign. If βL > βˆL, we have
∂(Π∗u−Π∗b )
∂βL
∣∣∣
βH=0
< 0, hence we also have
∂(Π∗u−Π∗b )
∂βH
∣∣∣
βH=0
< 0. Then, since Π∗u − Π∗b is
concave in βH , we have
∂(Π∗u−Π∗b )
∂βH
< 0 for any βL > βˆL. Thus, if βL > βˆL, since
Π∗u − Π∗b < 0 when βH = 0, we have Π∗u − Π∗b < 0 for all βH . Similarly, if βH > βˆH ,
Π∗u − Π∗b < 0 for all βL. Thus, the solution to Π∗u − Π∗b = 0 must satisfy βH ≤ βˆH
and βL ≤ βˆL. For any βL, because Π∗u − Π∗b is concave in βH and Π∗u − Π∗b ≥
0 at βH = 0, Π
∗
u − Π∗b crosses the zero line once from positive to negative when
varying βH . Let β¯H(βL) denote this threshold. We must have
∂(Π∗u−Π∗b )
∂βH
∣∣∣
βH=β¯H(βL)
< 0
and
∂(Π∗u−Π∗b )
∂βL
∣∣∣
βH=β¯H(βL)
< 0. Thus, by applying the Implicit Function Theorem to
Π∗u − Π∗b = 0 which is the equation that defines β¯H(βL), we know that β¯H(βL) is
decreasing in βL. Note that β¯H(βL) intersects with the βH-axis and βL-axis at βˆH
and βˆL, respectively.
Proof of Theorem IV.3
(i) When c′(·) increases, p∗a increases, hence ∂(Π
∗
u−Π∗b )
∂βH
decreases. As a result, β¯H(βL)
decreases. When c(·) = 0, we have Π∗b = Πu(0) ≤ Π∗u for any βH and βL.
(ii) Using the approach in Part (i), the result follows because p∗a is decreasing in
ca.
(iii) When we increase λH and decrease λL such that λH + λL = λ, applying the
Implicit Function Theorem to the equation Π∗u − Π∗b = 0 yields
dβ¯H
dλH
= −
∂(Π∗u−Π∗b )
∂λH
− ∂(Π∗u−Π∗b )
∂λL
∂(Π∗u−Π∗b )
∂β¯H
= −
β¯H
[
(u¯−p∗a)2
2u¯
− u¯
2
+ ca
]
− βL
[
(u¯−p∗a)2
2u¯
− u¯
2
+ ca
]
λH
[
(u¯−p∗a)2
2u¯
− u¯
2
+ ca
]
=
βL − β¯H
λH
.
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Thus, β¯H(βL) is decreasing in λH when β¯H(βL) ≥ βL and increasing in λH when
β¯H(βL) < βL. Also, note that when β¯H(βL) = βL, β¯H(βL) does not change with λH
if we keep λH +λL = λ. Thus, β¯H(βL) intersects at the same point on βH = βL when
we change λH and keep λH + λL = λ.
Proof of Theorem IV.4
For each of the four cases (“HH”, “HL”, “LH”, “LL”), by using the same approach
in the proof of Theorem III.5, we can prove the quasi-concavity of the profit function,
and hence the optimal ancillary service price is given by the first-order condition as
follows:
• “HH” case: The optimal ancillary service price pHH∗a,m is the solution to pHH∗a,m =
ca + c
′(αHλHF¯H(pHH∗a,m ) + αLλLF¯L(p
HH∗
a,m )).
• “HL” case: The optimal ancillary service price pHL∗a,m is the solution to pHL∗a,m =
ca + c
′(αHλHF¯H(pHL∗a,m ) + λLF¯L(p
HL∗
a,m )) +
λLF¯L(p
HL∗
a,m )
αHλHfH(pHL∗a,m )+λLfL(pHL∗a,m )
.
• “LH” case: The optimal ancillary service price pLH∗a,m is the solution to pLH∗a,m =
ca + c
′(λHF¯H(pLH∗a,m ) + αLλLF¯L(p
LH∗
a,m )) +
λH F¯H(p
LH∗
a,m )
λHfH(pLH∗a,m )+αLλLfL(pLH∗a,m )
.
• “LL” case: The optimal ancillary service price pLL∗a,m is the solution to pLL∗a,m =
ca + c
′(λHF¯H(pLL∗a,m ) + λLF¯L(p
LL∗
a,m )) +
λH F¯H(p
LL∗
a,m )+λLF¯L(p
LL∗
a,m )
λHfH(pLL∗a,m )+λLfL(pLL∗a,m )
.
The result then follows.
Proof of Theorem IV.5
(i) We will show that when Π∗u ≥ Π∗b , the following four results hold: 1) ΠHH∗u,m ≥
ΠHH∗b,m , 2) Π
HL∗
u,m ≥ ΠHL∗b,m , 3) ΠLH∗u,m ≥ ΠLH∗b,m , 4) ΠLL∗u,m ≥ ΠLL∗b,m .
• ΠHH∗u,m ≥ ΠHH∗b,m : Notice that ΠHHu,m(pa) is equal to Πu(pa) with λH replaced by
αHλH and λL replaced by αLλL. Theorem II.6 states that when Π
∗
u ≥ Π∗b , we
also have Π∗u ≥ Π∗b with smaller λH and λL. Thus, we know that when Π∗u ≥ Π∗b ,
or equivalently, when ΠHH∗u,m ≥ ΠHH∗b,m with αH = αL = 1, we have ΠHH∗u,m ≥ ΠHH∗b,m
for all αH and αL.
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• ΠHL∗u,m ≥ ΠHL∗b,m : Theorem II.6 indicates that by replacing λH with αHλH , we also
have Π∗u ≥ Π∗b , i.e.,
[vH + E(uH − p∗a)+ − cm]αHλH + [vL + E(uL − p∗a)+ − cm]λL
+(p∗a − ca)[αHλHF¯H(p∗a) + λLF¯L(p∗a)]− c(αHλHF¯H(p∗a) + λLF¯L(p∗a))
≥ [vH + E(uH)+ − cm]αHλH + [vL + E(uL)+ − cm]λL
−ca[αHλHF¯H(0) + λLF¯L(0)].
Note that in the above inequality, p∗a is the optimal ancillary service price in the
basic model with λH replaced by αHλH . Next, subtracting the left-hand side of
the above inequality by E(uL − p∗a)+λL and subtracting the right-hand side by
a larger amount E(uL)
+λL, we obtain
[vH + E(uH − p∗a)+ − cm]αHλH + (vL − cm)λL
+(p∗a − ca)[αHλHF¯H(p∗a) + λLF¯L(p∗a)]− c(αHλHF¯H(p∗a) + λLF¯L(p∗a))
> [vH + E(uH)
+ − cm]αHλH + (vL − cm)λL − ca[αHλHF¯H(0) + λLF¯L(0)],
which is equivalent to ΠHLu,m(p
∗
a) > Π
HL∗
b,m . Since Π
HL∗
u,m ≥ ΠHLu,m(p∗a), we have
ΠHL∗u,m > Π
HL∗
b,m as well.
• ΠLH∗u,m ≥ ΠLH∗b,m : It follows from the same approach we used above to prove
ΠHL∗u,m ≥ ΠHL∗b,m .
• ΠLL∗u,m ≥ ΠLL∗b,m : This is true because ΠLL∗u,m > ΠLLu,m(u¯) = vHλH + vLλL > ΠLL∗b,m .
Note that ΠLL∗u,m ≥ ΠLL∗b,m is actually always true and is not dependent on Π∗u ≥ Π∗b .
Therefore, combining these four results, we conclude that when Π∗u ≥ Π∗b , Π∗u,m ≥ Π∗b,m
for all αH and αL.
(ii) In Part (i), we have proved that ΠLL∗u,m ≥ ΠLL∗b,m always holds. Thus, when
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Π∗u,m = Π
LL∗
u,m and Π
∗
b,m = Π
LL∗
b,m , we must have Π
∗
u,m ≥ Π∗b,m. We first consider
the unbundling case and characterize when Π∗u,m = Π
LL∗
u,m . Π
∗
u,m = Π
LL∗
u,m requires 1)
ΠLL∗u,m ≥ ΠHH∗u,m , 2) ΠLL∗u,m ≥ ΠHL∗u,m , 3) ΠLL∗u,m ≥ ΠLH∗u,m .
• Condition for ΠLL∗u,m ≥ ΠHH∗u,m : When αH = αL = 0, ΠLL∗u,m > ΠHH∗u,m trivially
because ΠHH∗u,m = 0. When αH = αL = 1,
ΠLL∗u,m = (vH − cm)λH + (vL − cm)λL
+(pLL∗a,m − ca)[λHF¯H(pLL∗a,m ) + λLF¯L(pLL∗a,m )]− c(λHF¯H(pLL∗a,m ) + λLF¯L(pLL∗a,m ))
< [vH + E(uH − pLL∗a,m )− cm]λH + [vL + E(uL − pLL∗a,m )− cm]λL
+(pLL∗a,m − ca)[λHF¯H(pLL∗a,m ) + λLF¯L(pLL∗a,m )]− c(λHF¯H(pLL∗a,m ) + λLF¯L(pLL∗a,m ))
= ΠHHu,m(p
LL∗
a,m )
≤ ΠHH∗u,m .
Moreover, we know from the proof of Theorem IV.6 that
d(ΠLL∗u,m−ΠHH∗u,m )
dαH
< 0
and
d(ΠLL∗u,m−ΠHH∗u,m )
dαL
< 0. Thus, there exists a threshold function α¯H,u(αL) such
that ΠLL∗u,m ≥ ΠHH∗u,m when αH ≤ α¯H,u(αL) Moreover, by applying the Implicit
Function Theorem to the equation ΠLL∗u,m − ΠHH∗u,m = 0 which defines α¯H,u(αL),
we obtain that α¯H,u(αL) is a decreasing function.
• Condition for ΠLL∗u,m ≥ ΠHL∗u,m : When αH = 0, ΠHL∗u,m = (vL − cm)λL + (pHL∗a,m −
ca)λLF¯L(p
HL∗
a,m )− c(λLF¯L(pHL∗a,m )) which is independent of λH . Consider ΠLL∗u,m as
a function of λH . At λH = 0, we have Π
LL∗
u,m = Π
HL∗
u,m . Moreover, by using the
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Envelope Theorem and the first-order condition, we have
dΠLL∗u,m
dλH
= vH − cm
+(pLL∗a,m − ca)F¯H(pLL∗a,m )− c′(λHF¯H(pLL∗a,m ) + λLF¯L(pHL∗a,m ))F¯H(pLL∗a,m )
= vH − cm + F¯H(pLL∗a,m ) ·
λHF¯H(p
LL∗
a,m ) + λLF¯L(p
LL∗
a,m )
λHfH(pLL∗a,m ) + λLfL(pLL∗a,m )
> 0.
Thus, when αH = 0, Π
LL∗
u,m > Π
HH∗
u,m for any positive λH . When αH = 1,
ΠLL∗u,m = (vH − cm)λH + (vL − cm)λL
+(pLL∗a,m − ca)[λHF¯H(pLL∗a,m ) + λLF¯L(pLL∗a,m )]− c(λHF¯H(pLL∗a,m ) + λLF¯L(pLL∗a,m ))
< [vH + E(uH − pLL∗a,m )− cm]λH + (vL − cm)λL
+(pLL∗a,m − ca)[λHF¯H(pLL∗a,m ) + λLF¯L(pLL∗a,m )]− c(λHF¯H(pLL∗a,m ) + λLF¯L(pLL∗a,m ))
= ΠHLu,m(p
LL∗
a,m )
≤ ΠHL∗u,m .
Moreover, we know from the proof of Theorem IV.6 that
d(ΠLL∗u,m−ΠHL∗u,m )
dαH
< 0.
Thus, there exists a threshold αˆH,u such that Π
LL∗
u,m ≥ ΠHL∗u,m when αH ≤ αˆH,u.
• Condition for ΠLL∗u,m ≥ ΠLH∗u,m : By using the same approach of deriving the con-
dition for ΠLL∗u,m ≥ ΠHL∗u,m , we can obtain that there exists a threshold αˆL,u such
that ΠLL∗u,m ≥ ΠLH∗u,m when αL ≤ αˆL,u.
Therefore, we have obtained that Π∗u,m = Π
LL∗
u,m when αH ≤ αˆH,u, αL ≤ αˆL,u, and
αH ≤ α¯H,u(αL).
Next, consider the bundling case. Π∗b,m = Π
LL∗
b,m requires 1) Π
LL∗
b,m ≥ ΠHH∗b,m , 2)
ΠLL∗b,m ≥ ΠHL∗b,m , 3) ΠLL∗b,m ≥ ΠLH∗b,m . We have the following:
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• ΠLL∗b,m ≥ ΠHH∗b,m is equivalent to
αH ≥ (vH − cm)λH + (vL − cm)λL
[vH + E(uH)+ − cm − caF¯H(0)]λH
−ca[λHF¯H(0) + λLF¯L(0)] + [vL + E(uL)
+ − cm − caF¯L(0)]λLαL
[vH + E(uH)+ − cm − caF¯H(0)]λH
def
== α¯H,b(αL).
• ΠLL∗b,m ≥ ΠHL∗b,m is equivalent to
αH ≥ vH − cm − caF¯H(0)
vH + E(uH)+ − cm − caF¯H(0)
def
== αˆH,b.
• ΠLL∗b,m ≥ ΠLH∗b,m is equivalent to
αL ≥ vL − cm − caF¯L(0)
vL + E(uL)+ − cm − caF¯L(0)
def
== αˆL,b.
Therefore, Π∗b,m = Π
LL∗
b,m when αH ≤ αˆH,b, αL ≤ αˆL,b, and αH ≤ α¯H,b(αL).
Finally, take α¯H(αL) = min(α¯H,u(αL), α¯H,b(αL)), αˆH = min(αˆH,u, αˆH,b), αˆL =
min(αˆL,u, αˆL,b). Thus, when αH ≤ αˆH , αL ≤ αˆL, and αH ≤ α¯H(αL), we have
Π∗u,m = Π
LL∗
u,m and Π
∗
b,m = Π
LL∗
b,m , and hence Π
∗
u,m ≥ Π∗b,m.
Proof of Theorem IV.6
First, consider the monotonicity of Π∗b,m. We need to show that each of Π
ij∗
b,m,
i, j = H,L, has a non-negative derivative with respect to αH and αL. This is true
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because
∂ΠHH∗b,m
∂αH
=
∂ΠHL∗b,m
∂αH
= [vH + E(uH)
+ − cm]λH − caλHF¯H(0) > 0,
∂ΠLH∗b,m
∂αH
=
∂ΠLL∗b,m
∂αH
= 0;
∂ΠHH∗b,m
∂αL
=
∂ΠLH∗b,m
∂αL
= [vL + E(uL)
+ − cm]λL − caλLF¯L(0) ≥ 0,
∂ΠHL∗b,m
∂αL
=
∂ΠLL∗b,m
∂αL
= 0.
Second, consider the monotonicity of Π∗u,m. We have
∂ΠHH∗u,m
∂αH
= [vH + E(uH − pHH∗a,m )+ − cm]λH
+(pHH∗a,m − ca)λHF¯H(pHH∗a,m )− c′(αHλHF¯H(pHH∗a,m ) + αLλLF¯L(pHH∗a,m ))λHF¯H(pHH∗a,m )
= [vH + E(uH − pHH∗a,m )+ − cm]λH
> 0,
where the first equality follows by using the Envelope Theorem and the second equal-
ity follows by using the first-order condition. Similarly,
∂ΠHH∗u,m
∂αL
= [vL+E(uL−pHH∗a,m )+−
cm]λL > 0. By applying the Envelope Theorem and the first-order condition, we also
have
∂ΠHL∗u,m
∂αH
= [vH + E(uH − pHL∗a,m )+ − cm]λH
+(pHL∗a,m − ca)λHF¯H(pHL∗a,m )− c′(αHλHF¯H(pHL∗a,m ) + λLF¯L(pHL∗a,m ))λHF¯H(pHL∗a,m )
= [vH + E(uH − pHL∗a,m )+ − cm]λH + λHF¯H(pHL∗a,m ) ·
λLF¯L(p
HL∗
a,m )
αHλHfH(pHL∗a,m ) + λLfL(pHL∗a,m )
> 0.
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Similarly,
∂ΠLH∗u,m
∂αL
= [vL+E(uL−pLH∗a,m )+−cm]λL+λLF¯L(pLH∗a,m )·
λHF¯H(p
LH∗
a,m )
λHfH(pLH∗a,m ) + αLλLfL(pLH∗a,m )
> 0.
Additionally, we have
∂ΠLH∗u,m
∂αH
=
∂ΠLL∗u,m
∂αH
=
∂ΠHL∗u,m
∂αL
=
∂ΠLL∗u,m
∂αL
= 0. Therefore, Π∗u,m is also
increasing in αH and αL.
Proof of Theorem IV.7
We use a subscript of “o” to represent the case of selling through OTAs (inter-
mediaries). In the bundling case, the optimal prices are p∗bH,o = vH + E(uH)
+ and
p∗bL,o = vL + E(uL)
+. The optimal profit from bundling is
Π∗b,o = [vH + E(uH)
+][γH + (1− γH)(1− τ)]λH − cmλH
+[vL + E(uL)
+][γL + (1− γL)(1− τ)]λL − cmλL
−ca[λHF¯H(0) + λLF¯L(0)].
In the unbundling case, the optimal prices should satisfy pmH = vH +E(uH−pa)+
and pmL = vL + E(uH − pa)+. The profit function is
Πu,o(pa) = [vH + E(uH − pa)+][γH + (1− γH)(1− τ)]λH − cmλH
+[vL + E(uL − pa)+][γL + (1− γL)(1− τ)]λL − cmλL
+(pa − ca)[λHF¯H(pa) + λLF¯L(pa)]− c(λHF¯H(pa) + λLF¯L(pa)).
Taking derivative of Πu,o(pa) yields
dΠu,o
dpa
= (1− γH)τλHF¯H(pa) + (1− γL)τλLF¯L(pa)
+[c′(λHF¯H(pa) + λLF¯L(pa))− (pa − ca)][λHfH(pa) + λLfL(pa)],
which is decreasing in pa. Thus, Πu,o(pa) is concave. Moreover, it is easy to see that
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dΠu,o
dpa
∣∣∣
pa=ca
> 0 and dΠu,o
dpa
∣∣∣
pa=u¯
< 0. Thus, the optimal ancillary service price p∗a,o
is the solution to the first-order condition dΠu,o
dpa
= 0. Then, by using the Envelope
Theorem, we have
dΠ∗u,o
dτ
= −[vH + E(uH − p∗a,o)+](1− γH)λH − [vL + E(uL − p∗a,o)+](1− γL)λL,
dΠ∗u,o
dγH
= [vH + E(uH − p∗a,o)+]τλH ,
dΠ∗u,o
dγL
= [vL + E(uL − p∗a,o)+]τλL.
Moreover,
dΠ∗b,o
dτ
= −[vH + E(uH)+](1− γH)λH − [vL + E(uL)+](1− γL)λL,
dΠ∗b,o
dγH
= [vH + E(uH)
+]τλH ,
dΠ∗b,o
dγL
= [vL + E(uL)
+]τλL.
Thus,
d(Π∗u,o−Π∗b,o)
dτ
≥ 0, d(Π
∗
u,o−Π∗b,o)
dγH
≤ 0, d(Π
∗
u,o−Π∗b,o)
dγL
≤ 0.
Proof of Theorem IV.8
Taking derivatives of the profit function yields
dΠu,n
dpa
= λH [F¯H(pa)− F¯L(pa)]
+[c′(λHF¯H(pa) + λLF¯L(pa))− (pa − ca)][λHfH(pa) + λLfL(pa)],
d2Πu,n
dp2a
= −2λHfH(pa) + λHfL(pa)− λLfL(pa)
−c′′(λHF¯H(pa) + λLF¯L(pa))[λHfH(pa) + λLfL(pa)]2,
d3Πu,n
dp3a
= c′′′(λHF¯H(pa) + λLF¯L(pa))[λHfH(pa) + λLfL(pa)]3.
If βH ≥ βL, it is easy to see that d
2Πu,n
dp2a
< 0, so Πu,n is concave. If βH < βL,
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d3Πu,n
dp3a
≥ 0, hence dΠu,n
dpa
is convex. Moreover,
dΠu,n
dpa
∣∣∣∣
pa=u¯
= −(u¯− ca)[λHfH(pa) + λLfL(pa)] < 0.
Thus, dΠu,n
dpa
can cross the zero line at most once, from positive to negative, which
means Πu,n is quasi-concave.
Therefore, p∗a,n = inf{0 < pa < u¯ : λH [F¯H(pa) − F¯L(pa)] + [c′(λHF¯H(pa) +
λLF¯L(pa)) − (pa − ca)][λHfH(pa) + λLfL(pa)] ≤ 0}. Recall that p∗a is the solution
to p∗a = ca + c
′(λHF¯H(p∗a) + λLF¯L(p
∗
a)). Then, if βH ≥ βL, we have dΠu,ndpa
∣∣∣
pa=p∗a
≥ 0,
hence p∗a,n ≥ p∗a; if βH < βL, we have dΠu,ndpa
∣∣∣
pa=p∗a
< 0, hence p∗a,n < p
∗
a.
Proof of Theorem IV.9
Consider Π∗u,n−Π∗b,n as a function of βH . First consider the case of p∗a,n = 0. p∗a,n =
0 occurs when dΠu,n
dpa
∣∣∣
pa=0
= λH(βH − βL) + [c′(λHβH + λLβL) + ca] · λHβH+λLβLu¯ ≤ 0,
which requires βH is small enough (if p
∗
a,n = 0 ever occurs). When p
∗
a,n = 0, we have
Π∗u,n − Π∗b,n = −c(λHβH + λLβL) which is negative and decreasing in βH .
Second, consider the case of p∗a,n > 0 which occurs when βH is large enough.
Taking derivatives of the optimal profit functions with respective to βH yields:
∂Π∗u,n
∂βH
= [p∗a,n − ca − c′(λHF¯H(p∗a,n) + λLF¯L(p∗a,n))]λH ·
u¯− p∗a,n
u¯
,
∂Π∗b,n
∂βH
= −caλH ,
where the derivative of Π∗u,n follows from the Envelope Theorem. Thus,
∂(Π∗u,n − Π∗b,n)
∂βH
= λH
{
[p∗a,n − ca − c′(λHF¯H(p∗a,n) + λLF¯L(p∗a,n))] ·
u¯− p∗a,n
u¯
+ ca
}
.
(C.1)
Recall from the proof of Theorem IV.8 that the first-order condition in the uniform
pricing case is p∗a,n− ca− c′(λHF¯H(p∗a,n) +λLF¯L(p∗a,n)) = λH [F¯H(p
∗
a,n)−F¯L(p∗a,n)]
λHfH(p∗a,n)+λLfL(p∗a,n)
. Thus, if
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βH ≥ βL, p∗a,n − ca − c′(λHF¯H(p∗a,n) + λLF¯L(p∗a,n)) ≥ 0, and hence
∂(Π∗u,n−Π∗b,n)
∂βH
> 0. If
βH < βL, by using the first-order condition, we can equivalently write
∂(Π∗u,n−Π∗b,n)
∂βH
as
∂(Π∗u,n − Π∗b,n)
∂βH
=
λH
λHβH + λLβL
{
λH · βH − βL
u¯
· (u¯− p∗a,n)2 + ca(λHβH + λLβL)
}
.
If p∗a,n is increasing in βH , then λH · βH−βLu¯ · (u¯−p∗a,n)2 +ca(λHβH +λLβL) is increasing
in βH , and hence
∂(Π∗u,n−Π∗b,n)
∂βH
is first decreasing then increasing in βH . We now show
that p∗a,n is increasing in βH . By applying the Implicit Function Theorem to the
first-order condition dΠu,n
dpa
= 0, we obtain
dp∗a,n
dβH
= −
∂
∂βH
( dΠu,n
dpa
)∣∣
pa=p∗a,n
∂
∂pa
( dΠu,n
dpa
)∣∣
pa=p∗a,n
= −
∂
∂βH
( dΠu,n
dpa
)∣∣
pa=p∗a,n
d2Πu,n
dp2a
∣∣
pa=p∗a,n
. (C.2)
The numerator of (C.2) is
∂
∂βH
(
dΠu,n
dpa
)∣∣∣∣
pa=p∗a,n
= λH ·
u¯− p∗a,n
u¯
+c′′(λHF¯H(p∗a,n) + λLF¯L(p
∗
a,n)) ·
λH(u¯− p∗a,n)(λHβH + λLβL)
u¯2
−[p∗a,n − ca − c′(λHF¯H(p∗a,n) + λLF¯L(p∗a,n))] ·
λH
u¯
.
Since βH < βL, the first-order condition implies that p
∗
a,n − ca − c′(λHF¯H(p∗a,n) +
λLF¯L(p
∗
a,n)) < 0. Then, since c(·) is convex, we know that ∂∂βH
( dΠu,n
dpa
)∣∣
pa=p∗a,n
> 0.
Moreover, in the proof of Theorem IV.8, we already know that dΠu,n
dpa
can only cross
the zero line from positive to negative. Thus, d
2Πu,n
dp2a
∣∣
pa=p∗a,n
< 0, and hence
dp∗a,n
dβH
> 0.
So far, we have obtained that 1) for small βH (if p
∗
a,n = 0 ever occurs), Π
∗
u,n−Π∗b,n is
negative and decreasing in βH ; 2) for large βH (i.e., βH ≥ βL), Π∗u,n−Π∗b,n is increasing
in βH ; 3) for medium βH (i.e., βH < βL and p
∗
a,n > 0), Π
∗
u,n − Π∗b,n is first decreasing
then increasing in βH . Thus, overall, Π
∗
u,n−Π∗b,n is quasi-convex (i.e., first decreasing
then increasing) in βH . If p
∗
a,n = 0 occurs for small βH , Π
∗
u,n − Π∗b,n first decreases
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from a negative value and then becomes increasing in βH , thus it is negative for small
βH and positive for large βH . If p
∗
a,n = 0 never occurs, we may have two scenarios.
First, if Π∗u,n −Π∗b,n is increasing in βH at βH = 0, then it is always increasing in βH ,
and hence Π∗u,n − Π∗b,n can only be negative for small βH and positive for large βH .
Second, if Π∗u,n−Π∗b,n is decreasing in βH at βH = 0, we now show that we must have
Π∗u,n − Π∗b,n < 0 at βH = 0 in this case, so that Π∗u,n − Π∗b,n is negative for small βH
and positive for large βH . At βH = 0, we have
Π∗u,n − Π∗b,n = −λH ·
βL
2u¯
· p∗a,n(2u¯− p∗a,n) + λL ·
βL
2u¯
· p∗a,n(2ca − p∗a,n)− c(λLF¯L(p∗a,n)).
∂(Π∗u,n−Π∗b,n)
∂βH
∣∣
βH=0
< 0 can be simplified to −λH · βLu¯ ≤ − caλLβL(u¯−p∗a,n)2 . Thus, we have
Π∗u,n − Π∗b,n ≤ −
caλLβL
2(u¯− p∗a,n)2
· p∗a,n(2u¯− p∗a,n) + λL ·
βL
2u¯
· p∗a,n(2ca − p∗a,n)− c(λLF¯L(p∗a,n))
=
λLβL
2u¯
· p∗a,n ·
[
−ca ·
2u¯− p∗a,n
u¯− p∗a,n
· u¯
u¯− p∗a,n
+ (2ca − p∗a,n)
]
− c(λLF¯L(p∗a,n))
< −λLβL
2u¯
· (p∗a,n)2 − c(λLF¯L(p∗a,n))
< 0,
where the first inequality follows from using −λH · βLu¯ ≤ − caλLβL(u¯−p∗a,n)2 and the second
inequality follows from
2u¯−p∗a,n
u¯−p∗a,n > 2 and
u¯
u¯−p∗a,n > 1. Therefore, combining all cases
analyzed above, we obtain that there exists a threshold function β¯H,n(βL) such that
Π∗u,n ≥ Π∗b,n if and only if βH ≥ β¯H,n(βL).
Next, we show that β¯H,n(βL) is an increasing function. By applying the Implicit
Function Theorem to the equation Π∗u,n − Π∗b,n = 0 which defines β¯H,n(βL), we have
dβ¯H,n
dβL
= −
∂(Π∗u,n−Π∗b,n)
∂βL
∣∣∣
βH=β¯H,n(βL)
∂(Π∗u,n−Π∗b,n)
∂βH
∣∣∣
βH=β¯H,n(βL)
.
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We have shown that Π∗u,n−Π∗b,n can only cross the zero line from negative to positive,
thus
∂(Π∗u,n−Π∗b,n)
∂βH
∣∣∣
βH=β¯H,n(βL)
> 0. It remains to show that
∂(Π∗u,n−Π∗b,n)
∂βL
∣∣∣
βH=β¯H,n(βL)
≤ 0.
Taking derivatives of the optimal profit functions with respective to βL yields:
∂Π∗u,n
∂βL
=
(u¯− p∗a,n)2
2u¯
· (λH + λL) + [p∗a,n − ca − c′(λHF¯H(p∗a,n) + λLF¯L(p∗a,n))]λL ·
u¯− p∗a,n
u¯
,
∂Π∗b,n
∂βL
=
u¯
2
· (λH + λL)− caλH ,
where the derivative of Π∗u,n follows from the Envelope Theorem. Thus,
∂(Π∗u,n − Π∗b,n)
∂βL
=
p∗a,n(p
∗
a,n − 2u¯)
2u¯
· (λH + λL)
+λL
{
[p∗a,n − ca − c′(λHF¯H(p∗a,n) + λLF¯L(p∗a,n))] ·
u¯− p∗a,n
u¯
+ ca
}
.
At βH = β¯H,n(βL), we have Π
∗
u,n = Π
∗
b,n which is equivalent to the following equation
after rearranging terms:
βL
2u¯
· p∗a,n(p∗a,n − 2u¯)(λH + λL) = −(p∗a,n − ca)(λHβH + λLβL) ·
u¯− p∗a,n
u¯
+c(λHF¯H(p
∗
a,n) + λLF¯L(p
∗
a,n))− ca(λHβH + λLβL).
By using c(x) ≤ c′(x)x, we obtain from the above equation that at βH = β¯H,n(βL),
βL
2u¯
· p∗a,n(p∗a,n − 2u¯)(λH + λL) ≤ −[p∗a,n − ca − c′(λHF¯H(p∗a,n) + λLF¯L(p∗a,n))](λHβH + λLβL)
· u¯− p
∗
a,n
u¯
− ca(λHβH + λLβL).
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By using the above inequality, at βH = β¯H,n(βL), we have
∂(Π∗u,n − Π∗b,n)
∂βL
≤ −[p∗a,n − ca − c′(λHF¯H(p∗a,n) + λLF¯L(p∗a,n))] ·
λHβH + λLβL
βL
· u¯− p
∗
a,n
u¯
−ca · λHβH + λLβL
βL
+λL
{
[p∗a,n − ca − c′(λHF¯H(p∗a,n) + λLF¯L(p∗a,n))] ·
u¯− p∗a,n
u¯
+ ca
}
= −λH · βH
βL
·
{
[p∗a,n − ca − c′(λHF¯H(p∗a,n) + λLF¯L(p∗a,n))] ·
u¯− p∗a,n
u¯
+ ca
}
.(C.3)
Thus, by comparing (C.1) and (C.3), we obtain that
∂(Π∗u,n − Π∗b,n)
∂βL
∣∣∣
βH=β¯H,n(βL)
≤ ∂(Π
∗
u,n − Π∗b,n)
∂βH
∣∣∣
βH=β¯H,n(βL)
·
[
− β¯H,n(βL)
βL
]
≤ 0.
Therefore, β¯H,n(βL) is increasing in βL.
Proof of Theorem IV.10
(i) If βH ≥ βL, we have
Π∗u,n − Π∗u ≥ Πu,n(p∗a)− Π∗u
= −(vH − vL)λH − [E(uH − p∗a)+ − E(uL − p∗a)+]λH
= −(vH − vL)λH − λH
u¯∫
p∗a
[F¯H(x)− F¯L(x)] dx
≥ −(vH − vL)λH − λH
u¯∫
0
[F¯H(x)− F¯L(x)] dx
= −(vH − vL)λH − [E(uH)+ − E(uL)+]λH
= Π∗b,n − Π∗b .
Rearranging terms in the inequality obtained above yields Π∗u,n − Π∗b,n ≥ Π∗u − Π∗b .
Thus, when Π∗u ≥ Π∗b , we also have Π∗u,n ≥ Π∗b,n.
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(ii) If βH < βL, we have
Π∗u,n − Π∗u < Π∗u,n − Πu(p∗a,n)
= −(vH − vL)λH + [E(uL − p∗a,n)+ − E(uH − p∗a,n)+]λH
≤ −(vH − vL)λH + [E(uL)+ − E(uH)+]λH
= Π∗b,n − Π∗b ,
where the second inequality follows from the same approach used in Part (i). Thus,
we have Π∗u,n − Π∗b,n < Π∗u − Π∗b ; when Π∗u,n ≥ Π∗b,n, we also have Π∗u ≥ Π∗b .
Proof of Theorem IV.11
When we increasing λH and decreasing λL such that λH + λL = λ, applying the
Implicit Function Theorem to the equation Π∗u,n − Π∗b,n = 0 yields
dβ¯H,n
dλH
= −
∂(Π∗u,n−Π∗b,n)
∂λH
− ∂(Π
∗
u,n−Π∗b,n)
∂λL
∂(Π∗u,n−Π∗b,n)
∂β¯H
= −
(β¯H,n − βL)
{
[p∗a,n − ca − c′(λHF¯H(p∗a,n) + λLF¯L(p∗a,n))] · u¯−p
∗
a,n
u¯
+ ca
}
λH
{
[p∗a,n − ca − c′(λHF¯H(p∗a,n) + λLF¯L(p∗a,n))] · u¯−p
∗
a,n
u¯
+ ca
}
=
βL − β¯H,n
λH
.
Thus, β¯H,n(βL) is decreasing in λH when β¯H,n(βL) ≥ βL and increasing in λH when
β¯H,n(βL) < βL. Also, note that when β¯H,n(βL) = βL, β¯H,n(βL) does not change with
λH if we keep λH + λL = λ. Thus, β¯H,n(βL) intersects at the same point on βH = βL
when we change λH and keep λH + λL = λ.
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